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The decline o f the French Communist Party (PCF) was a key feature in French politics 
in the 1980s, one which was analysed in a number o f scholarly studies. These focused 
on the four established contributory causes, i.e. the transformation o f socio-economic 
structures in France since the late 1960s; institutional factors (presidentialism and 
bipolarisation); the rise o f the French Socialist Party since 1974; and the sharp 
deterioration of the Soviet image in French public opinion. Although these studies 
were also in unanimous agreement that, to a large extent, the party leadership with its 
orthodox regime and intransigent practices must bear responsibility for the Party’s 
failure to adapt, they failed to offer any explanation and analysis o f the reasons or 
mechanisms behind the leadership’s motives and behaviour and therefore gave an 
incomplete picture o f tire decline. The novelty o f the approach adopted in this study is 
that, whilst not denying the importance of the other contributory factors, it focuses 
primarily on elements which enabled the party leadership to sustain its immobilism in 
the face o f changes which were taking place in the Party’s social, institutional, political 
and international environment. Thus, by focusing on the internal dynamics o f the PCF, 
this investigation shows how, by the skilful utilisation o f the Party s organisational 
principle o f democratic centralism, and by the methodical use o f its political training 
system, the leadership ensured the availability o f ideologically sound cadres who would 
perpetuate the conservative outlook of their superiors. It is asserted that the communist 
political training system therefore formed one o f the most important institutions for the 
perpetuation o f the private and all embracing world o f French Communism. We also 
argue that the Party’s political education system that had begun to mould leaders in the 
Stalinist era, became, in the hands o f orthodox and intransigent leaders, a significant 
brake to change and a further manifestation o f the PCF’s conservatism and inflexibility. 
Consequently, the question o f how the PCF trained its cadres is fundamental to the 
understanding o f the Party’s evolution and its eventual decline.
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INTRODUCTION
“Comme la vie est singulière, changeante!
Comme il faut peu de chose 
pour vous perdre ou vous sauver! ”
Guy de Maupassant 
( “La Parure ’’)
Aims of the study
This work focuses on one particular aspect o f the decline o f the French Communist 
Party, namely the PCF’s political education system as a factor in the perpetuation o f 
the Party’s conservatism 1945-90. The aim o f this investigation is to ascertain to what 
extent the influence exercised by the central control and direction o f the political 
education o f successive generations o f party cadres reinforced the French Communist 
Party’s general reluctance to change and thus contributed to the Party’s decline. Its 
thesis is that by the skilful utilisation o f the Party’s organisational principle of 
democratic centralism, and by the systematic use o f its political training system, which 
aimed to produce politically committed and ideologically sound cadres and militants for 
the application o f democratic centralism, die communist leadership ensured the 
availability o f more or less “obedient clones” who would perpetuate the conservative 
outlook o f their superiors. To illustrate this argument the thesis provides an analysis of 
the party’s system of political education, its content, its methods and the people 
involved, namely the students and teachers who worked within that system.
Origins of the study
The decline o f the French Communist Party (PCF) formed an important factor in 
French politics in the 1980s, one which was addressed by a number o f serious studies in 
both English and French.1 These contemporary historians and sociologists o f the 
French Communist Party appeared to focus almost exclusively on four main 
contributory causes o f the Party’s decline, i.e. the transformation o f French socio­
economic structures since the late 1960s; institutional factors (i.e. presidentialism 
resulting in particular from the 1962 constitutional reform, and bipolarisation which
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involved the creation o f alternative governing alliances likely to be harmful to the 
PCF); the rise o f the French Socialist Party from 1974 onwards; and the sharp 
degradation o f the image of the Soviet Union in French opinion, particularly since the 
1970s. All studies also agreed that the Party itself, namely the leadership, must bear 
responsibility for its own failures in an area where it was supposed to excel, namely that 
o f politics, strategy and tactics, but where it undisputedly had let down le peuple 
communiste.
A review of these sources revealed that, albeit to varying degrees, they only told part o f 
the story. As all these studies had focused on the same set o f causes, they had failed to 
generate alternative explanations but had merely produced confirming evidence and, 
naturally, no surprises. They were in fact “perpetuating” themselves - just like the 
Communist Party leadership - and arriving at a kind o f impasse by simply expressing 
their criticism of the role o f the leadership. There seemed to be a singular unconcern 
with the reasons or mechanisms behind the leadership’s motives and behaviour. There 
was also a lack o f analysis of the leadership’s ability to exercise its will in situations of 
serious internal conflict and against a background o f angry challenge from disappointed 
party members. In this sense existing research on the PCF’s marginalisation has given 
a restricted and unsatisfactory picture o f the Party’s rapid decline since it describes 
rather than studies the problem. It was therefore more important to consider the 
problem from within than from without. Some authors2 noted that the Party’s 
organisational principle o f democratic centralism, was the one crucial factor which 
enabled the leadership to retain its power in the face o f much internal opposition and 
anxiety. Yet none had undertaken the task o f explaining how this organisational 
principle functioned or o f linking it to analyses o f the internal dynamics o f the PCF 
itself.
There did in fact exist a number o f significant studies o f both the theory and practice of 
democratic centralism.3 The “unhealthy” aspects of democratic centralism were spelled 
out with a particular clarity by Naudy and Lavau; it was in fact the analyses o f these 
two authors that led me to search for other accounts written by former PCF members. 
At this stage, the subject o f party training began to crop up with some regularity.4
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As I delved more deeply into the literature dealing with the PCF’s internal life, I also 
came across the famous Communist “counter-community” (or counter-society) 
phenomenon described first by Annie Kriegel and then taken up by Roland Tiersky and 
Irvine Wall,5 all o f whom recognised that the French Communist movement 
constituted a “community within society”. They saw this community as an alternative 
mini-society that took care of the material needs and cultural aspirations o f its members 
and provided them and their families with the necessary forms of diversion. A closer 
examination o f this aspect o f political socialisation also revealed the extreme vastness 
o f the area to be studied. Any in-depth investigation would have to include the Party’s 
youth and student organisations, women’s organisations, the Peace Movement, 
communist-dominated trade unions, the Workers’ Sport movement, the communist 
press and publishing firms, the diverse communist-dominated cultural organisations, 
and various types o f other front organisations (war veterans, pensioners, tenants, etc.).
The early stages o f the research thus revealed two potential sources which could be 
considered in any investigation which sought to explain the PCF leadership’s reluctance 
to change. Discussions with a former member o f the Finnish Communist Party (SKP) 
led in turn to a recognition o f the potential significance o f the party’s own political 
education system. He emphasised the importance o f political training at the party’s 
central school, Sirola Opisto (Sirola College) in the maintenance o f the Party’s 
ideological discipline and internal cohesion: a primary task o f the SKP’s political 
education system had always been to make the theoretical understanding of 
revolutionary practice the common property o f all members, and to achieve this goal, it 
was necessary to train party cadres who in turn would “educate” the broadest possible 
circle o f party members, thus creating a mechanism o f control o f the “communist 
person”. Further research, including interviews with two former SKP leaders, Aame 
Saarinen (party chairman 1966-82) and Arvo Aalto (general secretary 1969-84, party 
chairman 1984-88), and with Simla’s last principal, Ilkka Tervonen (1990)\ suggested 
that a similar importance might be attributed to the political education system o f the 
PCF. It soon became apparent that this was an under-researched area, little touched 
upon save by Annie Kriegel who described the PCF’s political school network in the 
1920s and 1930s.7
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Sources and method
Having narrowed down my primary area o f interest, the next problem was that of 
identifying and locating sources o f primary information and archival material. 
Virtually no materials were available either in UK university libraries or the Archives 
Nationales in Paris. Letters to scholars concerned with the PCF also generated no 
response. By chance, a television review published in Le Monde (28.1 - 29.1,1990) 
referred to a documentary which focused on the PCF’s counter-community and 
included an interview with a long-time party activist and former central school student 
Robert Charles. Although only the name o f his village was given, I wrote to request an 
interview. A response came from his son, Jean Charles, a professor at the University o f 
Besançon, a PCF historian and himself a former student and teacher o f the Party’s 
central schools. After checking my credentials he provided a list o f archives and also 
personal introductions to the former secretary o f the Paris federation, Jean Argelès, and 
a former PCF senator and a Central Committee member, Marcel Rosette, who had been 
the director o f the Central School in 1956-62. These contacts led in turn to others, and I 
was thus able to begin the task o f charting the area from the dissidents’ point o f view, 
both by reference to documentary sources and semi-structured interviews.
The range o f available sources was extended by making personal contact, via the 
Portsmouth Trades Council’s exchange programme with Caen, with the CGT delegate, 
Thierry Lepaon, a member o f the PCF’s federal committee in Calvados and one o f 
Georges Marchais’ bodyguards at the annual Fête de l ’Humanité. He took an interest 
in my research and facilitated a visit to the Party’s Ecole nationale in Draveil 
(Essonne), as well as the opportunity to cariy out local interviews in Caen amongst 
party members who had been to party schools or taught in them. He was also 
instrumental in providing access to the PCF’s headquarters and archives in Colonel- 
Fabien in Paris. This preliminary research8 indicated the availability o f a wide variety 
o f sources which would permit the reconstruction and analysis o f the development of 
the party education system and an assessment o f its significance.
The most important archives relating to the project were located mainly through 
recommendations. The crucial discovery was that o f the central school archives at the
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Ecole nationale: these records, relating to the student population and the functioning of 
the Party’s central schools, had never previously been tapped. I was also permitted 
unfettered access to the PCF’s Central Committee and Service central de 
documentation at Colonel-Fabien and supplied with statistical information, teaching 
programmes and general and historical information relating to the political training 
system and its functioning. At the Institut de recherches marxistes in Paris I found 
teaching programmes, text books, correspondence and reviews. La Bibliothèque 
marxiste de Paris made available its complete collection o f Cahiers du communisme 
and L ’Humanité and other party publications. The comprehensive general archives o f 
L ’Humanité turned out to be useful for checking dates and events. Archives Marty at 
the CRHMSS o f University o f Paris were particularly important in the task o f 
researching the interwar and immediate postwar periods. In addition, many researchers 
and private individuals finally succumbed to my relentless mailing and phone calls and 
allowed me access to their own archives (see Bibiliography, p. 245).
Apart from documentary analysis, the methodology was based heavily on extensive 
interviews with people who had personal experience and knowledge o f the party 
training system (both dissidents and party activists) either as students, teachers, 
directors or responsables du secteur éducation (see Bibliography, p. 245). These 
interviews yielded much valuable information as to the everyday life and functioning of 
the party schools, the activities o f students and teachers, as well as the content and 
changes in teaching programmes following congress resolutions and decisions and 
general shifts (or sharp reversals) o f party strategy in the wake of national and 
international political events. They also made it possible to establish further contacts 
with others who had experience o f the party education system. As a consequence, 
several former students and teachers either gave or lent their personal course material 
(study programmes, course “outlines” or schémas, personal notes, books, etc.) ranging 
from 1939 to 1990.
Archival and interview information9 received from members and ex-members o f  the 
Party revealed that most members o f the then Central Committee and Political Bureau 
(1990-92) had in fact attended one or more party schools; moreover, about a quarter of 
the Central Committee members o f the early 1990s had been former students o f one
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particular central school director between 1962 and 1966.10 A sociological study by 
Marie-Claire Lavabre11, concerning the cadres o f the Paris Federation (the country’s 
most important federation) in 1977 had also revealed that only 15 per cent o f the cadres 
had not attended a party school.
I also prepared a detailed ten-page questionnaire intended for past and present party 
school students. The questionnaire was checked and revised by Jean Charles from the 
University o f Besançon. The intention was to distribute it to about 100 people (with the 
Party’s agreement). I also sent the questionnaire to about 20 party “dissidents”, and 
used it as a basic framework in conjunction with personal interviews. The purpose o f 
the questionnaire was to collect statistical data and authentic recollections about the 
students’ “learning experience”, and to provide a basis for follow-up interviews. This 
objective turned out to be too optimistic: only 10 questionnaires were in fact returned, 
and consequently the data gleaned from them could not be used as extensively as 
originally planned. However, the replies that were received confirmed some general 
concepts regarding student motivation and expectations, and once again provided 
further leads.
In order to gain a comparative methodological dimension I examined the possibility and 
usefulness o f including a chapter about the political training systems o f other 
Communist Parties, namely the SKP, tire CPGB and the CPSU. The Finnish aspect had 
already been covered to some extent in my article published in 1990 (see above). I then 
located and inspected the archives o f the CPGB, and began to work on the material I 
unearthed. However, the extent o f the already available material and that concerning 
the Soviet dimension, plus the unknown quantity o f the inaccessible information (in the 
USSR) soon made the unworkability o f this plan apparent. One positive aspect o f this 
effort, however, was that my investigation o f the Soviet political education system 
(1920-70) enabled me to demonstrate to what extent the other communist parties had 
used it as a model.
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Contextualisation
Once I had located and assembled the primary and archival materials relevant to my 
subject, I next had to address the complex problem o f adequate contextualisation. It 
would be pointless to discuss the development and role o f the PCF’s political education 
system without giving some background concerning the political socialisation process 
and wider party political context (the PCF’s contemporary history plus theoretical and 
intellectual aspects). First o f all, then, it was therefore necessary to investigate literature 
concerning political socialisation as a means o f incorporating people into the political 
culture. Particularly useful for the general background were the studies by Rush12 who 
describes how individuals in a given society become acquainted with the political 
system, explains the purpose o f political socialisation and defines the various processes 
by which people learn about politics; and by Kavanagh13 who analyses the debate on 
the primacy and recency schools (i.e. the critical period o f socialisation). According to 
Kavanagh, advocates o f the primacy school underline the importance o f childhood 
whereas adherents o f the recency theory emphasise the on-going socialisation (and 
resocialisation) processes which span a person’s entire life cycle and relate to his/her 
experiences. Like Kavanagh, Dawson and Prewitt14 also see political socialisation as a 
continuous learning process which contributes to the development o f the ‘political se lf; 
their analyses focus on some direct and indirect methods o f political learning. Durham 
Hollander15 also discusses the purpose, content and means o f political socialisation and 
highlights the political training of party cadres and the fundamental principles o f the 
Soviet party education system whereas Holmes16 identifies the various processes o f 
political socialisation and provides an analysis o f the agencies and methods involved in 
purposive socialisation, the process with which this study is concerned. The effects of 
political education under a totalitarian system are described by Propper Mickiewicz17 
who gives an excellent description o f the early days o f the Soviet political education 
system on which most other communist parties modelled their own training. Her in- 
depth investigation is complemented by the detailed studies by Katz'8 and Kenez19 on 
political training and mass mobilisation in the Soviet Union. In the case o f Communist 
Parties operating in Western democracies, the parties had to overcome the effects o f 
socialisation in the dominant culture. In this respect, the work o f Almond20 gave me a 
valuable insight into the motivations, tensions and expectations o f party members as
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well as the psychological pressures placed upon them; these insights are supplemented 
by Meyer’s21 detailed analyses o f the various stages in the complete training process of 
the Communist cadre, the finely drawn portraits o f seasoned communists and in 
particular, the portrait o f the “ideal militant” (see Chapter 2) which was the desired end 
result o f all communist education programmes. A special mention must be made in this 
context o f Kriegel’s22 remarkable illustration o f the psycho-social processes in the 
development o f the French Communist militant during the training period. The various 
descriptions and analyses concerning the functioning of the education process clearly 
called for an explanation as to the reasons and motivation for all this toil and effort. Our 
underlying argument concerning the supreme importance o f political education in the 
process o f political socialisation within the context o f this study was indeed further 
strengthened by the enlightening studies by Gaxie,23 Offerld24 and Derville & Croisat25 
who have written extensively on the motivations o f party activists and the system of 
rewards (material, psychological, symbolic) which mass parties with vast, rigid 
hierarchical structures have had to adopt in order to retain their following. Finally, 
Maurice Thorez‘s autobiography Fils dupeuple, the PCF’s own publications in Cahiers 
du communisme, and the sociologist Bernard Pudal26 further refine the picture o f the 
“communist person” within the framework o f the French Party.
Furthermore, to provide an adequate historical context I reviewed the vast body of 
studies devoted to the PCF’s history. These studies are too numerous to mention here 
in their entirety (see Bibliography) but there were a number o f works whose 
interpretations I found particularly useful. Adereth,27 Brunet,28 Courtois & Lazar,29 
Bell & Criddle30 and Ysmal31 provide general and objective accounts o f the PCF’s 
doctrine, electoral performance, leadership and political role from the Party’s 
foundation to present day. Johnson32 gives a detailed chronological analysis o f the 
dilemmas, tensions and divisions confronting both the PCF and PS during the period o f 
the Left Unity. For the preceding periods, there are the informative and extensive 
studies by Tiersky (with his interpretations o f the PCF’s four principal roles)33, Wall34 
and Mortimer.35 A parallel study of the communist parties o f Italy, France and Spain 
by Lange and Vannicelli36 provides an abundance o f specific data and documents. The 
PCF’s side is given in the unusually (for the PCF) lively - although rather uncritical - 
study by the party historian Roger Martelli (a former central school teacher and
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member o f the CC).37 Finally, there is the monumental work by Robrieux,38 an 
indispensable guide into the workings and chronology o f the PCF (Part IV is 
particularly rich in biographical detail and party records) despite the well known 
criticism39 that Robrieux’s oeuvre tends to rely excessively on private oral sources and 
psychological analyses. Since I proceeded on the assumption that most readers 
interested in the subject would already be familiar with much o f the detail and since it 
was not my intention to produce yet another Histoire du PCF, I have attempted to 
sketch in enough descriptive information in each chapter to provide a sufficient 
backdrop for my particular subject but not to swamp it in too much narrative. I hope 
that this balance has been achieved.
The virtual absence o f previous scholarly investigation o f the PCF’s political education 
system confirmed the belief that my study would indeed fill a major gap. Only one 
work had dealt with the establishment o f the Party’s training schools, namely Danielle 
Tartakowsky’s doctoral thesis Ecoles et Editions communistes 1921-33,40 which was 
completed in 1977. Bernard Pudal’s book, Prendre parti (1989), also started life as a 
doctoral thesis, and although it mainly deals with the PCF’s groupe dirigeant in the 
1934-39 period, it also provides valuable information about the communist party 
training system during that time. The PCF’s Education Sector in Paris also confirmed 
that the postwar period had never been systematically researched, and that its records 
concerning party education at the Service central de documentation (Colonel-Fabien) 
and at the Ecole nationale had not been exploited to that end. It was therefore clear that 
the subject was more than ripe for an in-depth investigation.
The Working Hypothesis
The argument o f this study will be developed in six chapters. To set the scene, Chapter 
1 provides an overview o f the contemporary decline o f the French Communist Party 
and an examination o f the exogenous causes to w hich the decline has traditionally been 
attributed, and which have generally been thought o f as being beyond the Party’s 
control. It also introduces the element o f the role o f the party leadership.
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Chapter 2 examines the process involved in the moulding o f a communist party activist 
and aims to establish the vital importance o f political education in the process o f 
political socialisation in the context o f our study. First, we will define the main agents 
o f political education and the methods used to effect this process under a totalitarian 
regime (in this case, the Soviet Union). This will be followed by an in-depth 
examination o f political education as one element in the process o f political 
socialisation in Western Communist parties. It will be argued that, within this process, 
the formal training system was in fact the refining touch which was applied on a select 
group o f people who were earmarked for special functions and higher responsibilities 
within the party and its mass organisations. We shall also examine the function o f 
scientific Marxism as the “academic” element in the communist education system 
which was used to provide the training programmes with the required weight and 
scientific importance. This “moulding process” had an end product, namely the fully 
trained communist cadre. The principal qualities, characteristics and function in the 
party o f such cadres will also be defined in this chapter. Finally, we will take a closer 
look at the “ideal cadre” who would set a shining example to successive generations o f 
cadres o f the French Communist Party. The portrait o f the “ideal militant” is also 
intended to contribute to our understanding of one aspect o f the PCF’s decline, since 
the criteria for the model cadre remained frozen in history for much too long.
The historical origins o f the PCF’s political education system and its development 
during the interwar period following the split in Tours in 1920 constitute the principal 
theme for Chapter 3. We first examine the muddled beginnings o f party training in the 
pre-bolshevisation period 1920-24; much o f this account is drawn from the thesis of 
Danielle Tartakowsky (see above). We also discuss the Comintern-imposed 
bolshevisation programme and the ensuing internal chaos in the PCF, which greatly 
hampered the introduction o f a systematic and well organised national training system. 
As a result, most o f the higher party training took place in the Soviet Union in the 
International Lenin School. However, once the PCF’s ideological purity and working- 
class domination o f the leadership had been achieved the Party was able to devote itself 
to the important task o f giving to the political education system the basic shape, 
structures and stability that were by then required for the training o f the members o f a 
“mass party” o f the kind which the PCF had become in the second half o f the 1930s.
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This rigid training format would subsequently be maintained for close to 60 years. It 
will be noted that already, coupled with democratic centralism, the newly-created party 
education system was developing into an excellent tool for preserving the 
predominance and authority o f the working-class leadership.
The entire political training network of the PCF perished during the Second World War. 
However, as the PCF rapidly became a major force in French politics in the immediate 
postwar period, the leadership had to act swiftly to relaunch the education system in 
order to train the huge influx o f new members to the Party. An examination o f the 
postwar period, an era which was successful for the PCF both in terms of electoral glory 
and the rapid growth o f the education system, provides a point o f departure for Chapter 
4. The second section o f this chapter focuses on the period from the beginning o f the 
Cold War to the 1956 Khrushchev report and the end o f the Thorezian era. It was 
during this period that the PCF found itself in the bizarre situation o f total political 
isolation whilst still being France’s biggest party in electoral terms. It will be shown 
that the role o f the Party’s resurrected political education system was vital in 
maintaining the morale and motivation o f party members, militants and cadres; it also 
contributed to the strengthening o f communist identity and, above all, continued to 
constitute an effective mechanism for safeguarding the leadership’s authority at a 
difficult time in the PCF’s history.
Chapter 5 outlines the development o f the political education system during the 
animated and challenging period 1965-80, which saw first the birth and then the death 
o f the Common Programme o f the French Left. We first examine the training system as 
seen by the directors o f the central school. There will also be an analysis o f the study 
programmes in the context o f three main themes o f the era, i.e. the shifts in relations 
between the alliance parties; the role o f the working class in tire PCF and the Party’s 
specific identity as the party o f the working class; and the effects o f these changes on 
the PCF-CPSU relations during the alliance phase. Investigation o f the previously 
unexplored archives o f the Ecole nationale enables us to furnish more accurate details 
concerning the student population o f the central school during the 1974-80 period. 
Students’ own accounts o f their “personal school experience” also provide first-hand 
information about the daily life in party schools. We shall show that, while it had
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proven to be an excellent mechanism for control in the past, the PCF’s political 
education system was now developing flaws. Controlled as it was by a cautious 
leadership, by the end o f the 1970s it was becoming an obstacle to the modernisation o f 
the Party. It was clearly unable to meet the needs o f a new type o f student and thus 
could not fulfill its aim of political socialisation.
The accelerated and remorseless decline o f the PCF in 1981-90 forms the setting for the 
sixth and final chapter o f this study. It begins with an assessment o f tire response o f the 
planners o f the education programmes to the national and international events o f this 
period and to the four party congresses. With the PCF’s strategy in tatters after the 
break-up o f the Left Union and the brief and confusing spell o f communist participation 
in government, this was no easy task. We will also continue our examination o f the 
now shrinking student population in the Party’s central schools and compare the general 
trends with those that had emerged in 1974-80. Finally, just as we had begun our study 
with the “identikit” o f the ideal cadre, so we shall conclude by investigating the 
itinerary and “personal learning experience” o f a modem communist militant in the 
communist education system 60 years after that system had been originally set up, and 
by describing our own experience o f the PCF’s central training school in Draveil in the 
early 1990s. In this way we demonstrate how many of the political training procedures 
had remained anchored in the past, and how the PCF’s education system was blatantly 
being used as a brake on change. It had thus become one further manifestation o f the 
Party’s inflexibility and conservatism, and a factor in its apparently unrelenting decline.
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CHAPTER 1
THE DECLINE OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY
“Pour la première fois depuis 1934, l ’avenir de la France est imaginable sans un Parti 
communiste
The dramatic decline o f the French Communist Party (PCF) in the 1980s, which actually 
preceded the collapse o f Communism in Eastern Europe and the USSR in 1989-91, was 
a remarkable development in French politics given the important role that the PCF had 
played in France so long. In the account which follows we start by examining the main 
causal factors to which the PCF’s decline is generally attributed and which, to a certain 
extent, have been beyond the Party’s control. The first o f these is the transformation of 
French socioeconomic structures and in particular, the changes in the French working 
class, over the last thirty years; secondly, there are the institutional factors, namely 
presidentialism and bipolarisation o f French political life; thirdly, we have the strategy 
o f the French Socialist Party, led by François Mitterrand, to redress the balance o f forces 
on the left; and fourthly, we look at the deterioration o f the Soviet image in French 
opinion and the consequent condemnation o f the close links between the French 
Communists and the Soviet Union.
Another perspective on the process o f communist marginalisation in French society will 
be proposed: this perspective will focus on the party leadership and the extent o f its own 
responsibility in the process o f decline. At the end o f this examination o f the decline o f 
the PCF, we will develop the thesis that by skilfully utilising the Party’s organisational 
principle, democratic centralism, and by making systematic use o f its political training 
system aimed at producing politically committed and ideologically sound militants and 
cadres for the application o f democratic centralism, tire communist leadership ensured 
the availability o f more or less “obedient clones” who would perpetuate the conservative 
outlook o f their superiors.
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The transformation of socioeconomic structures in France
"Le Parti communiste est comme un chanteur qui vieillit avec son public de fidèles mais 
sans les renouveler. ”2
The PCF’s entire action and identity have always been based on two principles, both o f 
which determine the mobilisation o f a specific clientele.3 The first principle is the 
historic conflict between social groups, the class struggle. In this sacred struggle o f the 
working class against its exploitation by capitalism, tire Communist Party has valiantly 
placed itself in the avant-garde o f the proletariat which it embodies. The second 
principle stems from the first one: the revolutionary class par excellence, namely the 
working class, must occupy the dominant and leading role in the class struggle and 
within the revolutionary party, it is the working class which must form the majority and 
occupy the leading positions. As Ysmal puts it, it therefore follows that the PCF must 
preserve its working-class identity.4
However, the PCF today represents only a small proportion o f the working class which 
itself has changed composition and undergone decline.5 In the context o f  major 
industrial upheaval, the enormous changes which have taken place within the working 
class - in particular since thel980s - produced in workers a profound crisis o f  identity 
which could not but be reflected in its most illustrious representative, the Communist 
Party. A 1987 survey shows that 50% of workers thought that they “belonged to a social 
class” as against 74% in 1976; amongst 56% o f all those who believed that they 
belonged to a social class, only 26% thought they were working-class compared with 
40% in 1976.6 According to an earlier SOFRES survey between 1975 and 1982, “the 
percentage o f French people who felt they belonged to the working class sank from 27% 
to 22%, whilst in the same period the share of the working class in the active population 
fell from 36% to 31%”.7
This loss o f the centralité ouvrière - the belief that the working class should play a 
central and dominant role in society and politics - was further aggravated by the rise o f 
other well educated and highly qualified social categories in tire tertiary sector (clerical 
workers, managers, technicians, liberal professions) as well as the increase in the
numbers o f couples mixtes* Moreover, the young people, already noticeably absent 
from the communist electorate for years, were becoming completely indifferent to 
ideologies in general; Lazar explains how “[La jeunesse] elle n ’est ni procommuniste, 
ni anticommuniste, mais, tout simplement, indifférente au communisme. ”9
Furthermore, the traditional political representation o f the working class reached a crisis 
point during the 1980s. The traditional working class saw its numbers shrink fast: its 
more qualified members were becoming middle class; its older members were hit by 
unemployment as industrial development by-passed their skills; and its least qualified 
members (immigrants, women, non-qualified young people) were left without any 
protection.10 The outcome was that, without even really noticing it, the PCF lost its 
social base and as Courtois points out, it was this loss that destabilised the entire 
communist “ecosystem”, i.e., the Party’s firm implantation in French society which 
centred largely around communist municipalities.11
The above analyses fit in neatly with the observations o f Oliver Schwartz,12 who has 
identified three main long-term constants o f the image o f the working class in the 
communist vision. First, the PCF never changed its perception o f the working class as 
“une classe dépossédée, un adversaire infatigable et inconciliable du capitalisme ”, both 
in economic and social terms; this element o f communist thought did not change even 
when the theory o f paupérisation could hardly be considered to correspond to the 
realities o f the consumer society.
The PCF’s second idée fixe was that the working class constituted “une classe radicale, 
dure”, in eternal conflict with the social system. In truth, the average worker o f  the 
1970s and 1980s wanted nothing to do with the legendary refus social o f the proletariat. 
Finally, the Party continued to hold on to the notion o f family and moral conformity o f 
the working class and completely ignored the modem trends in sexuality and role­
sharing. The PCF’s vision was further distorted by the idea o f the working class forming 
- as if  by its very nature - a coherent and class-conscious unity, able and willing to adopt 
systematic and radical measures advocated by the Party. Schwartz concludes: “Il faut 
bien dire que, quand on a un peu trop consommé du marxisme simplifié, il devient 
extrêmement difficile d'imaginer que des ouvriers ne luttent pas pour leur émancipation,
que l ’identité de classe ne soit pas le sens de tous leurs actes, qu ’ils ne soient pas à tout 
moment partie prenante d ’un vaste sujet collectif et révolutionnaire. ”l}
Finally, the PCF’s total divorce from contemporary social realities was confirmed by its 
return to orthodox “workerism”, the exaggerated emphasis placed on the exclusive and 
dominant role o f the working class. At the 27th Congress in 1990, 94% o f the party 
cadres were still agreed that the lutte de classes was a topical theme and 84% believed 
that the PCF was the party o f the working class. ̂  Unfortunately for the Party, a more 
affluent working class had no interest in these strong workerist traditions; even the new 
watch words “la classe ouvrière élargie” and “le travailleur collectif’ which were 
adopted to generate new members from the non-communist working class had no 
success.
Therefore, the Party was confronted with a social dilemma to which it did not respond. 
It also faced a number o f institutional obstacles highlighted by political explanations 
concerning the Party’s decline.
Institu tional obstacles
“Le Parti communiste est en somme psychologiquement interdit d ’élections 
présidentielles. ”15
Certainly the Communists also suffered from the damaging effects o f the institutional 
framework, namely “presidentialism”, as inaugurated by General de Gaulle, the 
bipolarisation o f French political life resulting from the 1962 constitutional reform 
which created a directly elected, powerful presidency; and the two-ballot majoritarian 
(scrutin majoritaire) electoral system used in most legislative elections.
The most important institutional cause o f bipolarisation was the présidentialisation o f 
the regime after 1958.16 The Constitution o f 1958 embodied de Gaulle’s views o f a 
strong executive and a reduced role for the National Assembly, although de facto 
presidential dominance came only through precedents set by de Gaulle himself during 
the early years o f the Fifth Republic. This led to a natural reduction o f parliamentary
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powers, which in turn deprived the Communists o f an effective political base since they 
were now prevented from obstructing legislative work and provoking ministerial crises 
as they had during the Fourth Republic.
The reform o f the 1958 Constitution in 1962 completed the transition to presidential 
dominance. Until then, the president had been elected by an electoral college but 
henceforth, the presidential election was to be carried out by universal suffrage. This, 
although not conferring new functions, privileges or powers upon the president, 
nevertheless accorded him an important new power and status, that o f the élu du peuple. 
It was widely assumed, therefore, that the democratic legitimacy o f the presidential 
office could not be challenged by any other democratic institutions.
Moreover, the presidential election procedure further intentionally polarised public 
preference: according to its mechanism, only the two best placed candidates from the 
first round could proceed to the second ballot if  no candidate had obtained an absolute 
majority at the first ballot. But presidential dominance was not written into the 
Constitution: for a strong presidency to develop, it had to coincide with a loyal 
parliamentary majority (which was the case until 1986 when the first cohabitation 
between a president and parliamentary majority o f differing convictions took place; as 
a result o f this, President Mitterrand’s powers were immediately reduced). Given that 
presidential dominance depended on a sympathetic and solid parliamentary majority and 
that no single party was capable o f  achieving such a majority alone, alliances became 
indispensable.
Institutional forces have clearly contributed to the decline o f  the PCF since 
presidentialism and bipolarisation caused a loss o f dominance o f the Communist Party 
in favour o f its more moderate socialist rival. Presidential elections have always been 
harmful to the health o f the PCF. First, public opinion in these elections tends to focus 
on personality, leadership qualities and capacity to govern - areas where the communist 
candidates are weak - more than on programmes and ideologies which have always been 
the Communist Party’s main campaign themes.17 Moreover, the personalisation o f the 
campaigns and the attention o f the media to personalities in the 1980s left the 
communist candidates on their starting blocks insofar as any American-style packaging
o f the candidates was concerned. Secondly, the two-ballot electoral system means that 
a communist candidate advocating radical change would never stand a chance o f being 
elected on the second round against a right-wing candidate, as the battle is usually over 
centrist votes and would not favour the more extreme o f the left candidates.18
Successive opinion polls have shown that only a very small minority o f the French 
nation would have preferred a communist president: in 1979, for example, when the 
PCF was still attracting a solid 21% of the votes, only 14% o f the French questioned by 
Le Nouvel Observateur opinion poll admitted their preference for a communist 
candidate.19
Thirdly, the precedent set by the PCF’s support for François Mitterrand’s joint left 
candidacy in 1965 and 1974 led to widespread use by communist voters o f the vote utile 
at the first round even when the PCF did put up its own candidate (in 1981 and 1988; 
Jacques Duclos’ 21.5% of the votes at the first ballot in 1969 was mainly due to the total 
lack o f credibility o f Gaston Defferre, the socialist candidate). The outcome o f the vote 
utile meant a considerably lower score for the PCF and with hindsight, it is easy to see 
the communist leadership’s serious tactical error in completely eliminating the Party 
from the highest election in the country.
Neither was the PCF’s situation vis-à-vis the presidential election facilitated by the fact 
that, throughout the Fifth Republic, the Party has criticised the “undemocratic and 
monarchial” nature o f the presidential function.20 The communist situation was therefore 
paradoxical: the PCF’s presidential candidate had to convince the French electorate o f 
his personal credibility and that o f his political programme whilst, at the same time, the 
Party was still questioning the president’s role. André Lajoinie in 1988 therefore became 
un présidentiable antiprésidentiel, as the PCF defended its decision by claiming that this 
was the only way to check right-wing presidentialism. This claim was indeed 
fundamental in order to preserve the PCF’s ideological integrity but it caused further 
confusion among the potential communist electorate.
As for the electoral system for legislative elections, that, too, carried serious 
implications for the PCF. As we shall see below, the two-ballot system threatened the
Communists with virtual elimination at the second round if  they did not conclude 
electoral alliances with the non-communist left. However, alliances and coalitions with 
the Socialists did not turn out to the advantage o f the Communist Party. Obliged to 
moderate its programme and make doctrinal concessions (while its rival radicalised its 
platform and gained left credentials), the PCF lost its traditional image as the party o f 
protest. Alliance strategy implied the creation o f a governing alliance with a credible and 
electorally convincing programme which all combined rather unsatisfactorily with the 
Communist Party’s traditional tribune role as the articulator o f protest. Bell and Criddle 
rightly point out that, in the multi-party system under the Fourth Republic, “mere protest 
articulation sufficed to deliver a regular 25% o f the vote to the Communist Party”; 21 
however, under the new system o f the Fifth Republic something more concrete had to 
be proposed. Moreover, the scrutin majoritaire tended to favour the dominant and 
popular parties with a solid block o f support on left or right plus the ability to attract the 
centre; however, it penalised weak, isolated and less popular “outsiders” .22 The 
legislative election system also led to the practice o f the vote utile at the second ballot: 
whilst at the first ballot the voters “chose” according to their personal convictions, at the 
second ballot they “eliminated” and were thus often “forced” to vote for a less-preferred 
candidate. Until the break-up of the left union, first-ballot socialist voters were gradually 
adapting to voting communist at the second ballot, but the transfert des voix started to 
suffer as a result o f the worsening relations between the Socialists and Communists and 
was working virtually in sens unique after 1978.
In the final analysis, however, it is important to note that - although there is no doubt 
that both the legislative and presidential elections discriminate against the PCF and, 
consequently, reflect negatively on its image, morale, credibility and strategy - the fact 
remains that the Communists’ electoral slide has been constant in virtually all elections 
(see Table 1.1 below) since 1981 (even when proportional representation was used as 
in 1986).
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TABLE 1.1 The PCF’s electoral performance 1945-1997 (%)
1945 26
1946 (June) 25.7
1946 (November) 28.6
1951 26.9
1956 25.9
1958 19.2
1962 21.9
1967 22.5
1968 20.0
1969 (presid.) 21.5
1973 21.4
1978 20.7
1981 (presid.) 15.5
1981 16.1
1986 9.6
1988 (presid.) 6.7
1993 9.1
1995 (presid.) 8.7
1997 9.94
The Socialist element
‘‘Ma grande chance historique, c ’est l ’incroyable médiocrité intellectuelle des 
dirigeants communistes. Regradez-les: Marchais, Plissonnier, Laurent et les autres. Il 
n ’y  en a pas un pour racheter l ’autre. On peut les manipuler comme on veut. Ils sont 
tous plus bêtes les uns que les autres. Toutes leurs réactions sont prévisibles. Ils sont 
programmés. Si j ’avais eu en face de moi des responsables du niveau de ceux du parti 
communiste italien, les choses auraient été beaucoup plus difficiles pour moi. ”23
In order to evaluate the part played by the Socialist Party under François Mitterrand in 
the political marginalisation o f the PCF, we need to briefly outline the political 
background and the evolution o f the balance o f forces on the left.
After the break-up in 1947 of the “tripartite” coalition o f Communists, Socialists and 
Christian Democrats, French politics came to be dominated by the division o f the left 
which prevented any natural alternation o f political power. Furthermore, the East-West 
schism at the international level condemned the PCF to virtual exclusion and isolation 
from political participation and positions o f authority. However, as the PCF was the 
largest party in France in terms o f organisation and membership (see Table 1.2 below), 
its sheer strength completely distorted the French political system during the Fourth 
Republic by propelling the centre towards the right and perpetuating the split o f the left. 
The saying went that nothing could be done without the Communist Party and nothing 
could be done with it.
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TABLE 1.2 The PCF’s membership figures 1945-1987
1945 785 292 1964 340 000
1946 814 285 1966 341 000
1947 774 629 1967 350 000
1948 650 400 1969 380 000
1949 550 100 1970 380 000
1950 482 700 1971 375 000
1951 408 779 1972 390 000
1952 330 000 1973 410  000
1953 351 400 1974 450  000
1954 358 400 1975 491 000
1957 330 000 1978 520 000
1960 300 000 1984 380 000
1961 300 000 1985 352 000
1962 318 000 1986 340 000
1963 330 000 1987 330 000
Source: COURTOIS, S. & LAZAR, M., Histoire du Parti communiste français 
(Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1995), p. 423.
Some major developments in the 1950s and 1960s in the international environment and 
on the French political scene changed the stalemate situation o f the PCF. At the 
international level, the year 1956 marked a watershed: Khrushchev’s secret speech 
denouncing Stalinism and the subsequent strategy o f peaceful coexistence opened up 
new possibilities for communist parties in Western Europe. In French politics, the return 
o f General de Gaulle in 1958 had an immediate and catastrophic effect on the French 
left. The two institutional innovations o f the Fifth Republic, namely the creation o f a 
strong presidency on the one hand and the two-ballot voting system on the other, 
presented the divided left with a major challenge since success in both elections 
necessitated a strong alliance policy. The anti-European and anti-American foreign 
policy o f General de Gaulle and his interest in developing relations with the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Bloc also contributed to the softening o f the image of the hitherto 
“feared revolutionaries” by depriving them of some o f the traditional communist themes 
o f agitation. ,
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It was against this background o f political and electoral necessity that the Communists 
and Socialists concluded limited electoral deals for the 1962 legislative elections.24 In 
1965, the PCF agreed to support François Mitterrand as the left’s joint presidential 
candidate against de Gaulle. Mitterrand’s success in forcing de Gaulle to a second ballot 
established him as the de facto leader o f the (still unofficial) united left opposition; 
however, it also set a dangerous precedent for all types o f future elections with the vote 
utile. As a result o f further efforts at unity, a “Joint Declaration” listing points o f 
agreement and disagreement was signed by Mitterrand and Waldeck Rochet in February 
1968. However, the Events o f May 1968 and the invasion o f Czechoslovakia by the 
Warsaw Pact forces in August 1968 temporarily stopped the transition towards left 
union.
Nevertheless, Mitterrand’s emergence as the leader o f the new Parti socialiste at the 
Epinay congress in 1971 revived the Socialists following their disastrous electoral 
performances, and the renewal o f their party apparatus and the radicalisation o f their 
programme confirmed that the strategy o f left unity and the pursuit o f a programmatic 
deal with the Communists were on the agenda as before. After the publications o f new 
programmes 25 and intensive negotiations in early 1972, the PCF and the PS together 
with a dissident wing o f the Radical Party, Mouvement des radicaux de gauche, signed 
a common platform, Programme commun de gouvernement, and agreed on a nationally 
binding second-ballot electoral pact for the 1973 legislative elections (in which the 
united left got closer to its immediate post-war level o f support: 46% of the vote in 1973 
against 57% in 1946).
The euphoria o f the moment disguised the quite different motives and expectations o f 
the two main signatories. The PCF’s aim was to use the Common Programme as a 
means o f setting France “on the road to socialism” and, at the same time, to maintain the 
Communist Party as the leading force on the left. The Party also expected to make 
substantial gains, as in the 1936 Popular Front era. On the face o f it, this optimism was 
justified as the united frontism o f the 1930s and 1940s had served the PCF extremely 
well. But the 1970s presented an entirely new scenario: the anti-fascism of the 1930s and 
the prestige o f  the victorious Soviet Union o f the 1940s were no longer playing a part 
and there was nothing new to replace them as a general rallying point. The intentions o f 
the PS - and in particular o f Mitterrand - justified the private fears o f Marchais26 and 
some other communist leaders that the revitalised Socialists intended to make full use
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The legislative elections o f March 1973 provided the first test for the union. Although 
the PCF preserved its dominant position its percentage dropped by 1.2% (21.3%) 
compared with 1967 whilst the PS increased its share to 20.4%. The PCF’s dilemma was 
further highlighted by the 1974 presidential election: President Pompidou died in office 
and the Communists had no choice but to accept Mitterrand for the second time as the 
joint candidate o f the left. This again reinforced the threat o f the vote utile for future 
elections, and despite the communist leadership’s outward pleasure at M itterrand’s 
excellent performance, the seeds o f discord between the partners had been sown and had 
fallen on fertile ground.
The PCF’s 22nd Congress in 1976 was a certain turning point in its attempt to compete 
with the PS on ideological ground. The adoption o f the notion o f an original “democratic 
road to socialism” implied that the Party accepted existing democratic forms 
(parliament, etc.) and that the socialist revolution in France would not be a violent one. 
The PCF also officially abandoned the dictatorship o f the proletariat in favour o f 
“democratic socialism”. Numerous other policy changes (for example, acceptance o f 
party plurality and, by implication, “alternance”, change of attitude towards intellectuals, 
and semantic changes in party practice) all came too suddenly and too late after decades 
o f immobilism under Thorez. To add to the membership’s confusion, much o f the PCF’s 
ideological cohesion was lost and the rapidity o f changes considerably aggravated intra­
party conflicts about strategy. As early as 1974, Jean-Pierre Chevènement had sounded 
a warning to the Communist Party: an alliance with the PS would oblige the 
Communists to be ideologically dynamic to survive. The problem was that despite the 
PCF’s efforts, the Socialists always managed to be even more dynamic and by 1977 it 
was becoming clear that the PCF had failed to maintain its dominant position in the Left 
Union. Alarmingly, the PCF was also beginning to lose out to the PS on its traditional 
tribune clientele, the “defence o f the défavorisés this was a clear indication to the 
leadership that the Party was jeopardising its distinctive identity. The leadership was 
also facing stiff opposition from the Party’s anti-unitarian element, which placed 
additional constraints on the leaders’ ability to modernise.
The updating o f the Common Programme in view o f the 1978 legislative elections 
became the major issue between the PCF and the PS: for the Socialists, the joint
o f the union to establish the PS as an alternative ideological force and focus to the PCF
and carry out a complete rééquilibrage de la gauche.27
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programme now appeared too radical and restrictive whereas the more than 100 
demands set down by the PCF constituted a significant radicalisation o f the document. 
No common ground was found and the union o f the left collapsed in a barrage o f mutual 
bitterness and recriminations: as a result, the left lost the legislative elections which it 
was expected to win.28 The public criticism of the PCF was accompanied by an 
unprecedented internal debate in the Party over intra-party democracy and practice: the 
result was a generalised revolt o f the communist intellectuals which the PCF was unable 
to stem29 and which was to have crucial consequences in that a great many o f these 
united frontists left the PCF, whereas the “workerist” and “pro-Soviet” elements stayed. 
This development would leave an indelible mark on the PCF’s trajectory in years to 
come.
By the time of the 1981 presidential election the PCF still lacked a convincing strategy, 
alliance policy and new image.30 Marchais’ tactical electoral engineering ensured that 
the PCF returned to government for the first time in 34 years in the most unfavourable 
conditions possible: an unprecedented socialist domination o f the left (an absolute 
majority with 285 seats including élus apparentés) and an unprecedented electoral 
setback for the Communists (44 seats compared with 86 in 1978). The PCF found itself 
in the humiliating position o f subordination to the PS: the latter had all the keys to 
power - presidency, premiership and parliament - without any particular necessity to rely 
on its partner, who was given four relatively junior ministries.31 In government the PCF 
had a difficult task: it had to prove it was up to its new responsibilities, and at the same 
time retain its traditional role o f the parti de luttes. The leadership was issuing 
contradictory statements in an attempt to define these roles32 and had to resort to its 
courroie de transmission, the CGT, to “mobilise the masses” and keep the PS on its toes 
as regards its electoral promises. But the complications o f the strategy which involved 
a leadership on the outside, criticising government policy, along with the communist 
ministers on the inside bound by solidarité gouvernementale became too much after the 
PS’s austerity U-turn in 1983.
The Communists withdrew into opposition, and soon afterwards, the PCF’s 25th 
Congress in February 1985 condemned the Common Programme as a purely negative 
and damaging experience and a major programmatic error. A new strategy, Nouveau 
rassemblement populaire et majoritaire with an emphasis on a popular movement failed 
to save the PCF at the 1986 legislative elections which produced the worst ever 
communist result during the Fifth Republic: 9.79% o f the votes cast, just ahead o f the
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Front national and back at the 1924 level (9.5%). The PCF’s election campaign themes 
- anti-cohabitationist and anti-socialist - and the Party’s internal problems also 
contributed to the disaster which struck subsequently in the 1988 presidential election. 
The meagre 6.7% collected by André Lajoinie in the first ballot was the worst result at 
the polls in the Party’s history (Pierre Juquin, the rénovateur candidate, only received 
2.1% o f the vote). Thus the communist leadership’s inability to handle its alliance 
strategy had left the Party disunited and broken on the eve o f the extraordinaiy crisis o f 
Communism in the East which, within a year, was to cast its shadow on the remains o f 
communist credibility.
The Soviet factor
“La situation du PCF n ’a rigoureusement rien à voir avec la situation du PCUS. On 
continue la lutte/ ”33
Throughout most o f its existence, the PCF consistently identified very closely with the 
international communist movement, dutifully followed the 21 conditions adopted at the 
Tours Congress and, more or less readily, subordinated its political aims to the Soviet 
policy o f the day. The PCF’s role as “an obedient servant o f Moscow” (Annie Kriegel’s 
expression) put it in an ambiguous position at home and earned it sarcastic nicknames 
such as la fdle aînée de l ‘Eglise communiste and le parti de l ‘étranger, both expressions, 
which in the collective memory o f the French caused extensive damage to the 
Communist Party.
As Wright points out, there were rare periods in the PCF’s history when the CPSU’s and 
the French Party’s interests merged, as in the Popular Front era and the immediate post- 
Liberation period when it was “possible” for the PCF to be both pro-Soviet and 
patriotic.34 Despite the French Communists’ obvious subservience to the Moscow line, 
the relationship had its fair share o f problems. Khrushchev’s secret speech in 1956 was 
not accepted by the Thorezian leadership (it was referred to as “le rapport attribué à 
Khroushchev” for a long time in party parlance and was not published in full by the PCF 
until 198235). In the 1960s the PCF increasingly - albeit sporadically - criticised acts o f 
political repression in the Soviet Union such as the Daniel and Sinyavsky trial in 1966 
and initially, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Yet, the real willingness o f  the 
PCF to distance itself from the Soviet Union did not take place until the 1970s and it
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immediately cooled the fraternal relationship between the French and Soviet parties 
when Moscow did not approve o f the French Communists’ left alliance strategy at 
home.
During its short-lived flirtation with Eurocommunism, the PCF sought to disengage 
itself from the many aspects o f Soviet influence by underlining its strategic 
independence in domestic matters and by severely criticising Soviet foreign and internal 
policy as well as the CPSU’s imposition o f uniform proletarian internationalism on the 
entire communist movement. Many party intellectuals in particular warmly welcomed 
the rapprochement with the Italian and Spanish parties. They were the supporters who 
were to experience the most painful feelings o f disappointment in the aftermath o f the 
disintegration o f the Left Union in 1978 when the PCF leadership abruptly changed its 
fusil d ’épaule and decided to return to the Soviet lap. At that point, a whole series o f 
seemingly defiant actions followed: Georges Marchais made his famous statement o f 
the Soviet bloc’s bilan positif at the 23rd Congress in 1979;36 the Soviet invasion o f 
Afghanistan was approved very publicly;37 practically all criticism of Soviet reality came 
to a halt; and in general, relations with the Soviet Union were again strengthened and 
bilateral meetings were resumed. However, as Wright points out, the PCF did concede 
that the USSR “was not a model to be emulated” and continued its intermittent criticism 
o f the violation o f human rights. For most communist intellectuals the PCF’s return to 
the fold was the final blow and many o f them abandoned their affiliation to the Party 
after arduous political and ideological in-fighting with the leadership.38
The arrival o f Mikhail Gorbachev on the world scene had every chance o f turning the 
tables to the PCF’s advantage. The PCF publicly endorsed Gorbachev’s reforms from 
the beginning, but the radicalisation o f the perestroika and glasnost programme in 1987- 
88 created problems for the leadership: it was more than obvious that while Gorbachev 
“democratised”, Marchais was busy “stalinising”. Until then, the PCF had supported 
Gorbachev’s international disarmament initiatives and was clearly in favour o f his 
internal reforms concerning the Communist Party. In fact, according to the French 
communists, the USSR was, at last, taking note o f the PCF’s long-standing criticism 
concerning the lack o f democracy in the Soviet Union since in the early days, 
perestroika and glasnost were “exactly the kind o f thing” that the PCF slogan 
“socialisme aux couleurs de la France" had been advocating since 1976,39 But 
Gorbachev’s reforms revealed the backwardness and poverty o f the Soviet society which 
the PCF had been trying to conceal; they also turned out to be considerably more far-
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reaching and bolder than the Party had anticipated, and so the French Communists were 
forced to re-evaluate the whole situation. An additional problem for the PCF was that, 
as a declining and unpopular political force, it was becoming less and less useful to the 
CPSU.40 The PCF, whilst ostentatiously approving perestroika and glasnost as far as the 
USSR was concerned, therefore preferred to retain an ambivalent wait-and-see attitude.
The collapse o f Communism in Eastern Europe left the PCF numb, and for a 
considerable time, the leadership still expected the situation to return to “normal”.41 The 
abortive Moscow coup in August 1991 revealed the full extent o f the PCF’s dilemma 
and confusion. The leadership issued a most ambiguous declaration which stated that 
“les conditions d ’éviction de Mikhaïl Gorbachev de ses responsabilités sont 
inacceptables this was followed by severe criticism of perestroika which “had failed 
to tackle the problems o f the Soviet Union”. The official “condemnation” was 
immediately contested by PCF dissidents: Charles Fiterman called the statement 
“insuffisant et ambigu ” and refused to accept it.42 When the coup failed, the PCF was 
obliged to clarify its stand quickly.
But no amount o f clarification and elucidation could paper over the cracks in the Party 
caused by this latest example o f the leadership’s old inflexible line as the number o f 
contestataires increased dramatically. The explanations given by the party hierarchy o f 
what went wrong in the USSR and the Eastern bloc offered no new insight into party 
thinking. The predictable main argument was that the French Party had never known the 
full extent o f the problems plaguing the socialist countries; what it did know it had never 
ceased to criticise loud and clear. The 27th Congress in 1990 reconfirmed and reinforced 
the party strategy: what had happened to socialism in the East and the USSR had 
“rigoureusement rien à voir" with the PCF. Consequently, the Party saw no reason to 
change the party name, strategy or doctrine. A need for new approaches and 
organisational methods was however admitted: the PCF’s remodelled approach would 
have to find a way between capitalism and bureaucratic socialism, the French idea o f 
socialism, i.e. socialisme à la française, which was different from the socialism of 
existing or former socialist countries. The context and form were to be decided by the 
“people” themselves and would set the pace o f the movement towards socialism without 
“une grande théorie ” and its ready-made solutions.
The PCF-Russian connection is not o f much practical significance today, but as the 
above analysis demonstrates, it was certainly one o f the obvious reasons for the French
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Communists’ decline. With Mikhail Gorbachev’s accession to power in the USSR, the 
revolutions o f the Eastern Bloc and the subsequent collapse o f the Soviet Union, the 
situation changed completely and the Soviet factor lost its relevance, leaving the PCF 
stupefied on the sidelines. However, what was still relevant was that the PCF lost 
important points by failing to respond to the “events” and the “new, brave Russia” . 
Thus the Party’s ill-formulated and ambiguous reactions to the Russian situation led to 
the final crumbling of any communist credibility as the public opinion’s attitude towards 
the PCF was suddenly not so much anti-communist as simply a-communist.
The Communist Leadership
"Ily a un élément de mystère ... dans la constitution de Sparte: les libres citoyens sont 
menés tyranniquement et l ’acceptent. ”43
Thus far, the account given above o f the decline o f the PCF has focused on factors that 
have been, to a certain extent, beyond the control o f the Party itself. We have seen that 
the political failures o f the PCF had indeed solid exogenous causes, since the Party’s 
socioeconomic fragility and political vulnerability represented factors which already 
threatened the Communists and jeopardised the PCF’s existence as a meaningful 
political force. Moreover, the institutional framework fostered a relationship with the 
Socialists that clearly benefited the latter at the expense o f the PCF. In addition, the 
Party’s dogged and close identification with the Soviet Union had manifestly caused 
extensive damage to the credibility o f the French Communists. There now remains the 
question o f the extent to which the decline was conditioned or accelerated by internal 
factors which the Party, in principle, could have influenced. This leads us to examine 
matters concerning the party leadership and its own responsibility in this process o f 
decline.
Some observers have maintained that the decline o f  the PCF was the ineluctable 
consequence o f the convergence o f the factors already discussed and that individuals 
only played a minor role. Others, on the contrary, comest this view and maintain that it 
was by no means logically preordained that the decline should take place on such an 
enormous scale and with such rapidity - virtually within one decade. Whilst not denying 
the cumulative effects o f the adverse external elements in the Party’s decline, the latter 
observers believe that, in the final analysis, it is the communist leadership which must
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be seen as the main instrument in the further marginalisation o f the Party: the 
leadership’s ill-judged decisions and shifting strategies transformed a decline due to 
circumstances into a débâcle à part entière.** Therefore, the leadership’s multiple 
mistakes must be seen as the subjective, endogenous cause o f the Party’s brutal decline 
in the 1980s.
In the section that follows we shall first examine the role o f the party leadership in the 
face o f the converging forces o f the decline analysed above. It will be argued that the 
communist leadership pointedly refused to accept any responsibility for the Party’s 
increasingly perilous predicament in the 1980s. It would also seem appropriate at this 
stage to consider the role o f the PCF’s long-time secretary-general, Georges Marchais, 
who presided over the Party during the entire period o f this decline. Given the 
magnitude and extent o f the decline during his reign, the political longevity o f Marchais 
obviously needs an explanation. This leads us to examine the Communist Party’s way 
o f functioning, namely its organisational principle o f democratic centralism. Analysis 
o f the process o f democratic centralism will show that the system, by allowing an ageing 
but powerful and dogged leadership to hold sway over the Party in the name o f 
communist identity and ideological cohesion, rendered any process o f change extremely 
difficult.
“Un syndicat des défavorisés ’’?
To what extent could the PCF, then, be considered as the “helpless victim” o f the 
socioeconomic upheavals o f post-industrial French society? Enormous changes had 
taken place in that society during the period under discussion: by the 1980s, class 
structures had become increasingly blurred and educational standards were rising; 
ideologies no longer seemed to hold any relevance as a new type o f elector emerged, 
with a preference for individual choices and an interest in current as opposed to 
historical issues; the tertiary sector had developed at the expense o f the traditional 
industrial sectors, so long the familiar stronghold o f the communist movement. Was the 
PCF really fated to become “un syndicat des défavorisés ”45 and “a party o f old people 
and nostalgies”?46
In this particular area the PCF leadership’s lack o f strategies to deal with the changing 
society of France was nothing short o f spectacular. Although the working class had been 
in numerical decline since the mid-1970s, the PCF still continued to recruit most o f its
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leadership from la classe ouvrière. This ineluctably led the leading organs to lose their 
grip on the party membership - and on reality. A closer examination o f the party 
leadership and membership structures (see Table 1.3 below) provides an interesting 
opportunity to evaluate the extent to which the leadership insisted on the “social purity” 
o f the Party’s higher organs. It also provides an illustration o f the leadership’s total 
incomprehension - or unwillingness to comprehend - in the face of social change.
TABLE 1.3 The PC F’s social composition 1954 - 1979 (% )
1 1954 1959 1966 1979
________
M a le 7 9 .8 78.1 7 4 .5 6 4 .3
! F e m a le 2 0 .2 2 1 .9 2 5 .5 3 5 .7
j U n d e r  2 5  y e a r s 10 .2 5 .6 9 .4 11 .8
; 2 6 -4 0  y e a r s 3 5 .6 3 8 .5 33 .1 3 9
j O v e r  4 0  y e a r s
1
5 4 .3 5 6 .2 5 7 .5 4 9 .2
1
W o r k e r s 4 0 .1 4 0 .3 4 3 .4 3 0 .8
:
! E m p lo y é s
1
18 .6 1 6 .9
r
T e c h n ic ia n s 3 .8
■ E n g in e e r s  &  te c h n ic ia n s 1.9
I
In s t i tu te u r s 2 2 .7 3 .3
r
' T e a c h e rs  &  R e s e a r c h e r s 4 .9 1 .9
R e t i r e d
L
15.5
Source: COURTOIS, S. & LAZAR, M., Histoire du Parti communiste français 
(Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1995), p. 424.
Courtois and Peschanski47 have observed how, with the Party in decline, the famous 
homogeneity and uniformity o f the PCF lost their meaning. Not only did these 
socioeconomic transformations affect the population in general, but the PCF also felt the 
impact since it had accumulated a mass o f very diverse elements both in social terms and 
in terms o f political generations and experiences. In the past, the Party’s strong 
charismatic leaders - Cachin, Thorez, Duclos, Frachon, etc. - had skilfully managed to 
preserve a powerful communist identity (in this they were aided by the absence o f 
serious left competition at the time). However, the Marchais generation was as patently 
unable to blend together the extremely heterogeneous elements o f the Party as it was to 
adapt to the sociological changes which had taken place in France.
Courtois and Peschanski have identified a major imbalance in the social origins o f  the 
PCF which strongly contributed to the weakening o f the Party and which was 
aggravated by the leadership’s obstinate inflexibility. Since the 1980s, there had been 
a huge disequilibrium in the party structure between the entirely working-class 
leadership and the party apparatus which came to be increasingly dominated by middle- 
class members. This represented an enormous change from 50 years o f  fairly 
homogeneous structure in terms of membership, militants and leadership. Middle-class 
employés were now in the majority among the federal apparatuses but in the minority 
among congress delegates - and even more so among the vitally important first 
secretaries o f the federations. The authors suggest that the blocking of the access o f  the 
white-collar workers to the highest posts had much to do with the crises o f 1977-78, in 
which intellectuals mounted a serious opposition movement against the party leadership. 
Lazar48 quotes some figures concerning working-class domination in the higher party 
organs: in the Central Committee, workers represented over 51% o f the total members 
in 1945, over 45% in 1950 and still 49.6% in 1976 - this at a time when the proportion 
o f workers in the active population was falling rapidly. The Politbureau (see Table 1.4, 
below) was dominated by working-class or peasant members (plus a considerable 
number o f employés in the public sector - EDF, PTT, SNCF, etc.) until the 1970s when 
technicians and professeurs agrégés made their entry (the latter starting to push out the 
instituteurs). This development did reflect, to some extent, the sociological changes 
within the party membership and delegates in 1960-70; but as Lazar points out, the shifts 
in the leadership’s sociological structure have only relative value since the real centres 
o f decision-making remained firmly in the hands o f working-class militants. The party 
secretariat in particular remained virtually watertight as far as non-working-class
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penetration was concerned: for 45 years the majority of its members consisted o f 
workers, peasants or employés (in 1970-79 there were only two instituteurs and one 
technician).49
TABLE 1.4 The sociological composition of the PCF’S Politbureau 1947-1990
19 4 7 19 5 6 1 9 6 4 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 4 1979 1982 1987 1 9 9 0
W o r k e r s 7 7 8 7 7 8 7 8 9
j P a y s a n s 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1
E m p lo y é s 2 4 4 5 4 4 6 5 3
j I n s t i tu te u r s 1 2 1 2 2 0 0 1 2
S e c o n d a r y  
S c h o o l  T e a c h e r s
1 2 1 1 4 4 4 3 2
rrc 0 0 I 1 2 3 3 3 2
O th e r s 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
T O T A L 13 17 17 18 2 0 21 2 2 23 23
Source: LAZAR, M., Maisons rouges (Aubier, 1992), Table 15, p. 404.
Another important imbalance emerged between the political generations and the various 
levels o f hierarchy within the Party. Courtois and Peschanski identified four political 
generations in the PCF in 1979: 59.1% (the majority) had joined the Party in 1972-79 
in the heyday o f the Left Union; most (55.7%) middle-level apparatchniks had joined 
in the aftermath of 1968 up to 1974; the leadership, however, still originated from the 
Thorez generation (77% of federation first secretaries in 1982 had joined before 1967); 
and finally, after 1979, a fourth generation, extremely hostile towards the PS, joined the 
Party after the collapse of the Common Programme.50
Lazar, too, has analysed the leadership generations: his conclusion is that there was a 
discrepancy between the generations of the central leadership and those o f the Party’s 
congress delegates. Between 1970 and 1990, this discrepancy was particularly striking: 
it was not until 1990 that the Politbureau was penetrated by a post-1968 adhérant 
(Francis Wurtz). However, there were still no left-union adhérents although the rank and
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file was well stocked with adhérents d ’esprit unitaire (almost 56% o f the total 
membership in 1979).51 Consequently, as the 1980s approached, the PCF faced a 
completely new situation: the leadership was not able to “manage” the heterogeneity of 
the social origins and political generations and experiences in the Party. Not only did the 
differences o f viewpoint and behaviour result in serious intra-party conflicts, but the 
leadership’s insistence on the ouvriériste domination also divorced the leaders - and by 
extension, the Party - from the current social reality in France. The result was a serious 
crisis (if not a loss) o f communist identity.52
Another aspect o f the party leadership’s struggle to preserve the dominant and leading 
role o f the working class in the PCF is highlighted by Lazar’s analysis of the educational 
levels o f the 58 Politbureau members in 1945-90: eleven members had the certificat 
d ’études (primary school leaving certificate), eight had the agrégation (the highest 
teaching qualification in France), seven had a brevet o f some kind or other (an O-level 
type vocational or school qualification), and six had a technical qualification. From 1974 
onward, agrégés formed about 25% of the Politbureau (but no agrégés ever penetrated 
the party secretariat, and it was only in 1990 that the university-educated Pierre Zarka 
made his entry there).53 The conclusion must be that the general level o f education o f the 
communist leadership was fairly low which, in the 1950s, would not have been a 
handicap as it clearly corresponded to the level o f education o f the majority o f  the 
French nation at that time. By the 1980s, however, the situation had changed, and there 
existed a huge discrepancy between the educational achievements o f the PCF leadership 
and those o f the communist rank and file and - for that matter - o f the French population 
at large.
The over-representation o f workers in the communist leadership and apparatus was 
therefore a clear source o f problems from the mid-1970s onward. The access o f  non- 
working-class members to leading positions was limited (to delegate level, at the most); 
their entry to the Politburo was carefully controlled; and they were not able to penetrate 
the party secretariat at all. The Marchais leadership was blocking all attempts to dilute 
its pureté sociale and the culture politique o f its organisations which had served specific 
worker categories so well as an instrument o f promotion. By hanging on to their 
outdated notions o f centralité ouvrère at a time when the numerical and social 
importance o f the working class continued to diminish, the communist leaders showed 
that they had become completely déphasés with social changes in France.
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“La sérieuse menace du nouveau mécanisme institutionnel”
The brief description given above concerning the institutional obstacles may seem to 
suggest that here, indeed, we might be looking at a factor which rendered the PCF an 
utterly defenceless victim o f circumstances. What chance or choice did the communist 
leadership have in the face o f the existing the electoral systems? Choice was indeed 
limited but the leadership made matters worse by some fatal misjudgements and 
miscalculations. At the very moment o f signing the Common Programme in 1972, the 
balance o f forces had already potentially swung in favour o f the PS. The PCF could not 
have known that at the time but was soon to find out: underestimating as it did the 
impact o f the institutions o f the Fifth Republic on the French political scene, the Party 
realised too late the real significance o f a directly elected presidency. In fact, it had been 
loyally helping to create the presidential image o f François Mitterrand and implementing 
in the minds o f the left-wing electorate a “natural” reflex towards a vote utile which, as 
we have seen, automatically stripped the Communists o f any important role in French 
politics.
It was not until 1981 that the PCF publicly admitted to the damaging effects o f the 
institutional elements in its sudden decline. In his report to the Central Committee 28- 
29.6.1981 Georges Marchais declared that one o f the main reasons for the PCF’s 
electoral defeats was the aggressive présidentialisation o f the institutions and the 
perverse effects o f the voting system which favoured, "d ’une façon irréelle”, the 
Socialist Party and penalised the PCF. “Nous avons sousestimé la sérieuse menace que 
constitue pour notre parti ce nouveau mécanisme institutionnel, ” Marchais admitted.-54 
Thus, once more, it was the communist leadership’s stubborn resistance to change that 
aggravated the consequences o f the long-term institutional dangers. Taking steps to 
alleviate the worst implications o f the institutional forces would have required, at the 
very least, the abandonment of some o f the Party’s more extreme structures and dogma. 
The French Communists might have followed in the footsteps o f the Italian Communist 
Party, which gradually diluted its communist organisation and ideology. The PCF might 
also have chosen to present more présidentiable candidates in the presidential elections
- candidates who might have been better equipped with the necessary leadership 
qualities and popular appeal so important in the modem media-influenced campaigns. 
The decision to field Marchais in 1981 - at a time when his star was clearly on the wane
- and the little known and lack-lustre André Lajoinie in 1988 (a candidate who was, 
additionally, completely encadré et éclipsé by the omnipresence o f the secretary general
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Marchais) seemed singularly ill-advised when a more appealing candidate in the person 
o f the former Transport Minister Charles Fiterman might have been chosen. However, 
Marchais’ personal power and domination at the head o f the Party prevented any major 
and potentially more presentable personalities from emerging.
“Une démarche de zigzags ”
The zigzags in the Communist-Socialist relationship provide a prime example o f  the 
communist leadership’s strategy choices and its inability to handle them. The PCF’s 
entire left-alliance strategy was based on an erroneous reading of the balance o f political 
forces. After Jacques Duclos’ triumphant score o f 21% in the 1969 presidential election 
(as against Gaston Defferrre’s 5%), the PCF jumped into the conclusion that the 
Socialists were now a spent force and could be exploited as a manipulable and easily 
influenced ally. However, two factors arose which completely upset the Communists’ 
calculations: the growing prominence o f the middle class following 1968 and the 
renaissance o f the SFIO as the Parti socialiste. Unfortunately for the PCF, it was the PS 
which attracted the middle class (very much underestimated by the PCF in any case).
Furthermore, the communist leadership failed to realise the damaging implications o f 
the alliance with the PS from the point o f view o f the institutional framework. The 
Party’s competition with the Socialists was always derivative: driven by electoral 
exigency, the PCF was mostly adjusting to the agenda set by Mitterrand. After the 
break-up o f the Left Union, the PCF no longer had a precise and consistent policy vis-à- 
vis the PS. The collapse o f the Common Programme triggered a profound reaction 
among communist sympathisers; but it was the 1981 presidential election campaign that 
really drove home to the communist electorate, still largely preferring a Unitarian 
strategy to bring to power a left-wing government, to severely sanction the PCF for the 
break-up. The “anti-unitarian” line was therefore a fundamental miscalculation on the 
part o f the Marchais leadership and it revealed the extent to which the leaders had lost 
touch with communist supporters. As François Hincker wrote, the “retard réel" o f the 
PCF was not to have understood how attached communist voters were to the left-union 
strategy.55
Lionel Jospin neatly sums up the meanderings o f  the PCF leadership as regards 
Communist-Socialist relations: “Dénonciations et ralliements, brouilles et 
réconciliations se succèdent, dans une démarche de zigzag, au milieu des contradictions
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que manifeste la différence des explications chaque fois avancées. ” The leadership 
never had the courage to stay the course and so ended up playing classe-contre-classe 
on the one hand and la discipline républicaine on the other. Jospin drily concludes: 
“[The PCF] never followed through with any o f its successive arguments, it was never 
equal to the historic circumstances which were presented to it and which it had 
sometimes even fashioned itself. ”56
“Bilan globalement p o s itif
At the end o f our examination o f the effects o f the “Soviet factor”, it was not difficult 
to see how seriously the doggedly defensive actions and analyses o f the communist 
leadership had damaged the Party. The harm done to the PCF’s reputation, credibility 
and image in the eyes o f the French electorate by the various retards historiques and the 
brutal volte-face was extensive, and all the 1980s opinion polls substantiate that fact.
According to various SOFRES opinion polls in the 1980s, the PCF was the one political 
party in France which aroused the most hostility in the nation. In 1985, 63% o f the 
French questioned in a SOFRES poll declared that “in no circumstances” would they 
vote for the PCF.57 Apparently, this was mainly because o f the French Communists’ 
close identification with the Soviet Union: a BVA-Paris Match poll ascertained in the 
same year that the first thing that came to people’s mind when asked to “think o f the 
PCF” was the USSR or the Soviet bloc (38%).58 Communist voters themselves 
considered that the deterioration o f the image o f the Soviet Union was the main cause 
o f the Party’s decline. As seen above, Soviet prestige had suffered as a result o f the 
USSR’s foreign and social policy; but another aspect emerged as the 1980s dawned. The 
obvious material success o f the Western capitalist societies clearly exposed the 
inefficiency o f the socialist system and thus destroyed the myth o f the socialist 
revolution. A 1984 SOFRES poll confirmed the deterioration o f the image o f the USSR 
in the French public opinion: in 1972, 28% of the French at large had “rather a 
favourable opinion” o f the bilan du socialisme in the Soviet bloc; by 1980, that 
percentage had halved and in 1982 it was only 11%. On the other hand, negative 
opinions had gathered pace accordingly: from 43% in 1972 to 59% in 1980 and to 69% 
in 1982. The same trend could be observed among communist sympathisers: from 62% 
o f positive opinions in 1972, the percentage went down to 35% by 1982. The early years 
o f Gorbachev’s reforms did not improve the situation. In 1985-86, 69% o f the French 
still had a negative opinion o f the “global Soviet balance sheet”, and amongst
- 3 9 -
communist supporters 38% had a negative opinion against 40% o f positive opinions.59 
The inescapable reality was neatly expressed by Lionel Jospin: “Les héros, pour la 
jeunesse, ne sont plus Staline, Tito ou Castro, mais Walesa, Havel et Sakharov. ”60
In the face o f such incontournable facts, the PCF leadership still continued to cling to 
its virtually unchanged world view. Many of the remaining militants, however, had now 
clearly lost their bearings: according to yet another opinion poll by BVA-France Inter- 
Le Nouvel Observateur, conducted among the militants and sympathisers at the Fête de 
L ’Humanité in September 1991,80% of the militants considered Marchais’ own balance 
sheet “globalement positif’ - but 43% o f them still wanted him to resign as the party 
leader (against 41% who wanted him to stay on). As to the party line, 51% o f the 
communist militants thought it should be changed whereas 39% saw no need for a 
change. It is therefore permissible to conclude that the demise o f communism in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union had raised more questions than ever before - and, certainly, 
more than the leadership o f the time was willing or able to answer - about the relevance 
and raison d ’être o f a communist party. Officially, however, the PCF was unwavering 
in its refusal to see itself as an “orphelin du monde d'hier " f
“L ’effet Marchais ”
“Qu ’il semble lointain le temps, où maniant la langue française avec originalité, 
superbe d ’aplomb, il séduisait une partie de la France à travers le petit écran qui fit 
longtemps sa fortune avant de contribuer à son infortune, puis à son discrédit. "62
Georges Marchais officially became the PCF’s secretary-general in 1972. As a result 
o f  Waldeck Rochet’s illness however he had already become the latter’s de facto 
successor in 1969 and deputy secretary general in 1970. Marchais’ rise in the PCF was 
as meteoric as it was unexpected: unlike many party veterans, such as Etienne Fajon and 
Benoît Frachon, he did not join the Party until 1947 (at the age o f 27). What is more, for 
the prewar period there is no trace o f his ever being involved with any political or trade 
union activities; indeed, Marchais himself has admitted that at the time o f the Popular 
Front, he observed it “d ’assez loin ” because “j ’étais toujours ni politisé ni syndiqué ”.63 
The mystery deepens when Marchais’ wartime record is examined (and it has been 
examined many times, thoroughly): from 1940 Marchais worked for the Luftwaffe, first 
in France and subsequently in Germany. There are also doubts as to the date o f his return 
to France and it appears that he may well have stayed on in Germany until the end of the 
war.64
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For almost ten years after joining the PCF and the CGT in 1947, Georges Marchais 
remained “«« petit permanent sans histoire ” until his sudden rise to prominence as a 
member o f  the secretariat o f the Seine-Sud federation (Thorez’s own federation). 
Rumour has it that he subsequently attended the International Lenin School in Moscow 
in 1954, but no evidence for this exists. From the mid-1950s, Marchais’ rise in the party 
hierarchy was fast and unstoppable; and after Thorez’s death in 1964, he started to forge 
personal links with the Soviet leadership which, according to Robrieux, would explain 
his accession to the leadership in 1972.65 Quite apart from the obvious problems 
associated with his lack o f early political activism and his murky wartime record, 
Marchais was the first French CP general secretary without the traditional self-taught 
intellectual’s baggage. To quote Robrieux, Marchais was not "capable d ’acquérir le 
bagage qui fait d ’un militant d'origine populaire un intellectuel d ’un type nouveau"; 
hence the need to put him through a rigorous training programme (however, Marchais 
never attended a party school66). Marchais’ early popularity as the PCF leader is 
attributed by Robrieux to l ’air du temps: “Dans le climat des années post-68, même ses 
fautes de français, la grossièreté de ses manières jouent en sa faveur: en lui c ’est un peu 
le barbare qui fascine. ”67 The task o f grooming Marchais was entrusted to Jean 
Kanapa, party intellectual and the PCF’s foreign affairs expert, and Charles Fiterman,68 
intellectual autodidacte, and supervised by the PCF’s “pro-Soviet lobby”.
In the wake o f the intra-party conflict after the break-up o f the Left Union, M archais’ 
“assets” were transformed into glaring handicaps, both within and without the Party. By 
the 1980s, it was clear that the PCF’s leader was inextricably tied to the communist 
legacy, his body language and rhetoric a painful reminder o f a bygone era. His very 
presence served as a constant reminder to the Party and the electorate o f the past that the 
PCF had come from - and where it remained stuck. There is no doubt that the personal 
rejection o f Georges Marchais by the French electorate reflected badly on the PCF. His 
popularity was at its highest point immediately after the 1974 presidential election: 
according to a SOFRES poll in June/July 1974, 34% o f the French “wished to see 
Georges Marchais play an important role in the future”.69 However, as the Left Alliance 
stumbled on painfully and finally collapsed, so did the popularity o f the secretary 
general. SOFRES surveys between 1976 and 1985 concerning Marchais’ leadership 
ability confirm the downward trend: in 1972, 62% o f the French thought that he was 
“plutôt bon comme leader" but by 1985, this figure had dropped by half. Conversely, 
16% o f the French had considered Marchais “plutôt mauvais " in 1976; nine years later
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51% thought so.70 In addition, Marchais’ image seems to have deteriorated equally 
noticeably in all age groups, among both sexes and all socioprofessional categories as 
well as among le peuple communiste. Whereas in 1976 Marchais had enjoyed the full 
and almost unanimous support o f communist sympathisers - 90% considered him as a 
“plutôt bon leader ” - by 1985 only 57% agreed. Furthermore, a third o f communist 
supporters interviewed considered Marchais as “plutôt un mauvais leader”.1'
After examining the role played by the communist leadership in the marginalisation o f 
the Party it would be fairly easy to conclude that the PCF was indeed the victim o f 
circumstances. However, the roots o f the inability of this “victim” to fight back lay deep 
within its own character. It was also prevented from doing so by the “specialists” by its 
bedside, namely by those leading the Party for the last twenty years. Before the collapse 
o f its main point o f reference, the Soviet Union, the PCF’s unconditional solidarity was 
the cause o f the deterioration o f the communist image in French public opinion. 
Moreover, under the impulse o f the anti-PS and ouvriériste elements, the PCF slipped 
steadily further away from the realities o f French society. The institutional obstacles 
were ignored for far too long because o f the leadership’s miscalculation o f the équilibre 
des forces on the French left; these miscalculations also led to fatal mistakes regarding 
the rise o f the rejuvenated Socialist Party. Consequently, in the face o f a process o f 
decline, the communist leadership appeared singularly complacent and incapable - 
despite being fully aware o f what was happening. Instead, the Party successfully 
cultivated an efficient strategy o f self-preservation o f the leadership circle whose sole 
aim was auto-reproduction - reproducing itself in order to preserve its concept o f 
communist identity and its own power. In pursuing this strategy, the leadership made 
full and skilful use o f the Party’s organisational principle, democratic centralism, and 
the intra-party political education system.
Democratic centralism as a tool of the leadership72
The term “democratic centralism” made its entry into the communist vocabulary in 
1905, and it subsequently became one o f the 21 conditions for acceptance o f a party into 
the Comintern. Article 12 o f the document stipulated: “All parties belonging to the 
Communist International should be formed on the basis o f the principle o f democratic 
centralism. At the present time o f acute civil war, the Communist Party will be able to 
fully do its duty only when it possesses an iron discipline, and its party centre enjoys the 
confidence o f the members o f the party, who are to endow this centre with complete
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power, authority and ample rights. ”73 The organisational forms developed by the Soviet 
Communist Party during the first 25 years as the only established bastion o f Marxism- 
Leninism became a major point of reference for communist parties. However, given that 
democratic centralism was the guiding principle o f a party aspiring to rule a still largely 
peasant country, there were bound to be problems with the non-ruling Western 
communist parties functioning in very diverse historical, cultural and economic 
surroundings and trying to identify themselves with the Soviet role model. As Michael 
Waller74 crucially points out, these basic differences between ruling and non-ruling 
communist parties should have been reflected in their organisational behaviour; 
however, their slavish adherence to the Russian model and their lack o f adaptation to 
individual circumstances was a recipe for enormous problems and even extinction for 
those parties which failed to adapt.
Based on the PCF’s revolutionary theory, democratic centralism was the condition for 
the ideological and political cohesion o f the Party, and for its unity o f action. The main 
principles were free discussion at all levels; majority decisions applied by all; 
interdiction o f all fractional activity; democratic election of leading organs o f the various 
levels o f the Party; collective leadership; accountability o f elected leading bodies to their 
electors; the decisions o f higher organs to be binding on lower organs to ensure the 
strength o f the Party; and finally, freely exercised criticism and self-criticism in all 
organisations and at all levels o f the Party.75 On the face o f it, there is nothing special 
in the theory o f democratic centralism as defined by the rules o f the PCF that would set 
it apart from the rules and regulations o f other parties. But as observers generally point 
out, the theoretical definition does not reflect the reality and practice o f democratic 
centralism. This is supported by Georges Marchais’ own words during the preparations 
for the PCF’s 25"' Congress in 1984: “Le centralisme démocratique, ça tient sur un 
timbre-poste, le tout, c ’est la pratique. ’’76 Therefore, democratic centralism should be 
examined through the eyes o f its critics in order to interpret what the party rules leave 
unsaid - what Georges Lavau calls le non-dit - rather than what they do say.
Michel Naudy, a journalist and a former PCF member, has critically analysed the 
“formidable battery o f weapons” which the communist party leadership had at its 
disposal for “practising” democratic centralism and for controlling intra-party debate, 
“les six péchés du centralisme démocratique ”. The following account is based on this 
analysis.
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First, only the outgoing leadership had the right to draw up the pre-congress draft 
resolution {projet de résolution) which was then submitted to the members who could 
express their opinions by putting forward amendments, by abstaining or voting against 
it; they could not, however, present an alternative draft resolution (Fiterman tried to do 
just that in the 27th Congress in 1990 but it was rejected). The Politbureau, having 
already discussed the resolution text and taken a “vote” on it and the Central Committee, 
only needed to rubberstamp the cut-and-dried document.
Second, the leadership controlled the PCF’s main organ, L 'Humanité, the platform for 
all open discussion and the only “legal” means o f diffusing the thoughts and proposals 
o f party members to all Communists. This meant that only “suitable” contributions were 
usually published; if  critical contributions did appear, they were “spontaneously” and 
“vigilantly” refuted by counterclaims published in the form o f immediate responses.
Third, the leadership was able to direct and control {encadrer) the progress o f the debate 
by applying the principle o f “collective leadership” in respect o f all outgoing leaders 
during the preparatory stages o f the party congress. Consequently, a member o f  the 
leadership who opposed a proposal or a motion was still obliged to promote that 
proposal or motion once it had been accepted by majority vote. Furthermore, the 
“heretic” was not allowed to explain or justify his/her disagreement to other party 
members, who were thus kept in total darkness about any debates or disputes within the 
leadership.
Fourth, the PCF leadership’s line was the official line and only one that got voiced. As 
no tendencies or fractions were allowed, only the representatives o f the leadership had 
access to party media and as explained above, the leadership had to speak with une seule 
voix. This enabled the party leaders to intervene from outside any debate and subtly 
direct the course o f the debate. (Witness Marchais’ intervention in the debate concerning 
the dictatorship o f  the proletariat: he nipped in the bud all arguments by declaring to a 
journalist o f L ’Humanité that he “personally” was in favour o f the dictum’s 
abandonment; the same “personal view” was subsequently reiterated on television 
before any meaningful discussion on the subject had taken place.)
Fifth, the leadership had at its disposal an “elite army” o f paid party workers, the so- 
called permanents or functionaries whose main task, according to Naudy, was to see that 
the draft documents drawn up by the leadership were adopted - “à tout prix ”. The
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permanents were an important cog in the machinery o f democratic centralism and much 
has been written about them, their devotion to the cause and their unwavering loyalty.77 
According to Borkenau, in the final stages o f bolshevisation, “between 1929 and 1934, 
the communist parties finally and definitely formed themselves into quasi-military 
organisations, ready to obey anything. The structure did not change: at the top a 
bureaucracy from which every single man likely to oppose orders had been weeded out; 
in the middle a small stratum with an absolute unquestioning faith in every order; at the 
bottom a shifting mass ... They had become an obedient army o f crusaders.”78 For the 
purposes o f applying the principle o f democratic centralism, the permanents occupied 
diverse functions and had different levels o f status. Both Kriegel and Lavau have 
defined them as politically trained men and women who had abandoned - for good, in 
most cases - their original occupation, and who depended on the Party, directly or 
indirectly, for their income, career prospects, standard o f life and promotion. Lavau has 
underlined the importance o f the “political permanents" who controlled the most 
important aspects o f party life and activity and divided them in five categories: party 
journalists, collaborateurs o f the Central Committee, the federal secretaries, members 
o f  the Central Committee, and finally, the most influential group, the members o f  the 
party secretariat, the Politbureau and the Central Commission for Political Control.79
Finally, we shall return to Naudy’s analysis o f the communist leadership’s sixth 
“weapon” in the application o f democratic centralism: the leadership’s complete 
knowledge of everything that took place within the Party. The communist party structure 
is vertical, and the base o f the pyramid is formed by cells where freedom of discussion 
was traditionally almost total. However, these cells were isolated, and there was no 
horizontal network across the country. The only communication was therefore from the 
base up (whereas the discipline flowed from the top down), and any sideways movement 
o f discussion and information was non-existent. The “free” debates were thus easily 
contained at the lowest level. As Naudy puts it, “although the right hand does not know 
what the left hand does, the head knows perfectly well what both hands are up to and, 
in any case, knows enough to prevent them from joining” !80
The pyramidal structure was repeated in the way that cadres were appointed: all leaders, 
however modest their function, were designated by the next level above them and the 
lower level generally only confirmed the decision. Moreover, before being able to enter 
the Politbureau, a candidate had to be elected right through the system - his/her cell, 
section, federation, the congress and the Central Committee - and also had to be
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included in the majority group which alone could “supply” delegates. Consequently, a 
handful o f people at the top was able to decide about everything, having confiscated all 
means o f debate. Fittingly, Naudy writes that “from democratic centralism, the PCF 
moved to aristocratic centralism”81. In this way, the leadership became a sinecure for a 
small co-opted elite whose word was law and who applied its own brand o f democratic 
centralism in order to perpetuate itself.
Conclusion
It emerges from the above description o f democratic centralism that the usual criticism 
expressed by communist party dissidents was mostly valid: the system, by its operation 
and practices, made it difficult to propose and implement change. Its collective 
psychology, application and high degree o f centralisation created extreme inflexibility 
and made it difficult for the PCF to adapt to changing circumstances both at home and 
abroad. Any process o f change was further hindered by the leadership’s ability to 
demolish the opposition o f party dissidents (who were in any case divided amongst 
themselves). Furthermore, the ban on any fractional activity and the development o f 
vertical linking and the compartmentalisation o f the Party, which restricted the freedom 
o f action o f the base,82 invested the communist leadership with a power and authority 
that rested on much more than the majority principle, since a minority was easily 
transformed into an opposition and then if  necessary, denounced as traitors to the Party. 
Thus, armed with its disproportionate power, the communist leadership was able to 
preserve its strict orthodoxy and perpetuate its resistance to change.
Although certain changes did take place in the way that the PCF practised democratic 
centralism, it was not always clear what changed regarding the notion o f democratic 
centralism itself. As Waller points out,83 relations between the PCF and its front 
organisations did change, and the traditional rhetoric also underwent considerable 
modifications (witness the abandonment o f tire dictatorship o f proletariat). But a change 
in tactics and strategy is not to be confused with the transformation o f deeply ingrained 
concepts and behaviour patterns: tactical and mostly ad-hoc window-dressing was one 
thing, and the real practice o f democratic centralism another - and it was in the latter that 
very little change took place. Instead, change in the PCF seemed to take place in three 
ways: as a negation o f the past rather than movement toward clearly formulated, 
ideologically rooted positions on which the Party settled; as a response to events and 
conditions over which the Party had little control; or as a consequence o f the death or
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incapacity o f individuals (witness the last years o f Maurice Thorez and Waldeck 
Rochet).84 The application o f democratic centralism kept the PCF as a solid, working- 
class community, the preservation of which appeared to be more important than the need 
to influence the political system and decision-making. The PCF clung to ideological 
conservatism, and its immobilism became a source o f emotional stability and o f 
solidarity amongst its members.
Furthermore, the practical elements o f democratic centralism as applied by the PCF 
remained untouched, thus enabling the leadership to resist challenges to its own 
authority or orthodoxy. The result was a closed, well disciplined, mechanised and 
monolithic party organisation; one which resembled a military apparatus, but whose 
methods o f regimentation and control were considerably more adaptable and efficient 
because they were based on a training o f minds rather than that o f bodies. It was this 
training that claimed to provide a complete and final philosophy o f the universe and 
whose aim was two-fold. Firstly, the preservation o f communist identity, and o f the 
power o f  the leadership which rested on that identity, and secondly, the promotion o f 
homogeneity in order to maintain the Party’s ideological cohesion and unity. The 
importance o f the PCF’s training procedures in transforming a heterogeneous assortment 
o f militants into a coherent political force and in producing committed, ideologically 
correct leaders is therefore unquestionable, and the issue o f how the PCF trained its 
leadership thus becomes elemental to the understanding o f the Party’s postwar evolution 
and its eventual decline.
The next chapter will therefore be devoted to a closer examination o f the specific 
communist political training system in the wider context o f traditional political 
education as one element in the process o f political socialisation. There will also be an 
attempt to construct an “identikit” o f the desired end product o f the training process, i.e. 
the “ideal Communist”.
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CHAPTER 2
POLITICAL EDUCATION: THE MOULDING PROCESS
“Without a revolutionary theory 
there can be no revolutionary movement.
This cannot be insisted upon too strongly. ”
V. I. Lenin
(“What is to be done? ’)
The purpose o f the present chapter is to place the communist training system into the 
wider framework o f political socialisation and to establish the crucial importance o f 
political education in the context o f our study. First, there will be a general discussion 
about the various types and agents o f political socialisation. We will then examine the 
process o f political education in communist and non-communist societies: although the 
functions o f the process were largely similar, the difference is that under a totalitarian 
regime (in this case, the Soviet Union) all the other overt agencies were working in the 
same direction (except perhaps the family in some cases), while in Western democracies 
the communist parties had their own system o f socialisation and education to counter 
the prevailing political culture. In the case o f communist societies, agencies o f what 
might be called ‘primary’ political socialisation were already embedded in everyday life 
and experience. This was obviously not the case in non-communist societies where 
communist political socialisation had to compete with and counteract the effects o f quite 
a different set o f norms and values. To emphasise this distinction, we shall therefore first 
examine the methods used to effect this process under a totalitarian regime, i.e. the 
USSR. This will be followed by an in-depth examination o f political education as one 
element in the multifaceted process o f political socialisation in Western communist 
parties. There will be an attempt to explain why these communist parties made such 
substantial allocations o f their human, financial and organisational resources to maintain 
a structured party school network for formal political instruction. It will be argued that 
the formal training system was in fact the definitive refining touch in the process of 
political socialisation o f a select body o f people who were destined for special functions 
and higher responsibilities within the party and its mass organisations.
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Communist parties also believed that their position was intellectually strengthened by 
the “academic” side of Marxism, i.e. dialectical materialism, which took on the prestige 
o f a modem science - especially in the case o f working-class students with little formal 
education. “Scientific Marxism” provided verbal answers which were decipherable only 
by the “initiated” leadership. The study and mastery of Marxism-Leninism thus created 
and preserved coherence and discipline, and established common values, modes o f 
thought and discourse in an often hostile environment. This was crucial for maintaining 
ideological unity, given that “M  Waldeck-Rochet, M. Louis Althusser, le rédacteur du 
bulletin de la cellule Seine-Visconti et l ’électeur communiste de Huelgoat (Finistère) ne 
perçoivent pas exactement le communisme de la même façon ”,1 We shall therefore also 
briefly examine the function o f Scientific Marxism in the communist political education 
programme.
Finally, it would be rather pointless to outline the role o f the political education system 
without attempting to find out what it was meant to achieve. One o f the most important 
tasks o f  the party schools was to pick “promising” people and mould them into 
politically trustworthy activists who could then safely assume responsibilities at the 
various levels o f party apparatus and the various party-controlled mass organisations and 
movements. They were the raw material from which the communist party intended to 
create its “ideal cadres” in possession o f the necessary qualities and beliefs. Although 
this ideal type never existed in reality, communist parties always presented “models” of 
such individuals toward which militants were expected to strive. There will therefore 
first be an attempt to construct an “identikit” o f  the desired end product, the “ideal 
Communist”. Finally, we shall take a look at a representative o f this unique group o f 
people: in the case o f the PCF, the best known model was Maurice Thorez, and there 
will be an examination o f his credentials for this role.
Political socialisation
“Salut à toi parti ma famille nouvelle 
Salut à toi parti mon frère désormais
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Salut a toi qu ’il faut qu ’on choisisse 
Quand toute chose est claire et patent 
le danger. ”2
In the sections which follow, we shall attempt to define the contours o f  political 
socialisation, and more specifically, the function and the vital importance o f one o f its 
principal instruments, namely political education.
In broad terms, political socialisation is defined as the process o f induction into the 
political culture.3 It is a process whereby individuals acquire their political orientations 
and a set o f attitudes - cognitions, value standards and feelings - toward the political 
system and its various roles and which, to a certain degree, determines their perceptions 
and their reactions to political phenomena.4 Although there is much dispute as to which 
processes are significant and at what point in the life cycle the most important 
socialisation takes place (the first wave o f political socialisation research over-identified 
socialisation with childhood experience; the classic study in this field was Herbert 
Hyman’s Political Socialization in 1959),5 political socialisation is generally considered 
to be about the development o f the “political se lf’,6 involving a continuous learning 
process through both emotional learning and evident political indoctrination.7
Holmes identifies two main types o f socialisation: first, we have latent socialisation, 
which is primarily non-political and in which, while there is no overt, deliberate attempt 
to inculcate values, attitudes or behaviours these are transmitted anyway (parents often 
transmit political orientations to their children). There are numerous and complex 
agencies o f latent socialisation which exercise differential influences and vary in the 
degree to which they reinforce or contradict each other.8 They include factors relating 
to both past political traditions and experiences, and ongoing developments.9 Early 
stages o f the political socialisation process are the same in all political systems, 
regardless o f their degree o f complexity; it is always a latent, primary process - diffuse, 
particularistic, ascriptive and affective.10 The family and the primary education system 
are the major agencies o f initial socialisation. However, socialisation in any particular 
position in childhood is not thought to be sufficient to prepare a person for adult politics:
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with the appearance o f new issues, un unprepared adult is unable to cope without 
preparation.11 For adults, wider (but still latent) agencies o f socialisation include the 
workplace and the local community.
In contrast to latent socialisation, purposive socialisation is expressly designed to affect 
attitudes. In adult life purposive socialisation occurs through political groupings 
(political parties, interest groups) or associations with other milieux such as religious or 
ethnic groupings. Political parties were traditionally regarded as having interactive and 
educative functions for their members, sometimes in accord and sometimes at odds with 
the prevailing political culture. Kavanagh for example notes the important role o f  the 
German Social Democratic Party in ‘developing solidarity among the working class 
against other groups’.12 In modem democratic societies the socialising role o f  most 
political parties has declined, partly because o f the growth o f mass education but also 
because many parties began to orient themselves towards a wider electorate.13
The quest for the ‘‘Homo Soviéticas ”
The major importance o f purposive socialisation lies in the fact how well it teaches 
people to respond to the regime or party in certain expected ways. Durham Hollander 
observes that whereas civic education has a conservative function, in a revolutionary 
regime, the “initial thrust o f political education is the opposite - a radical alternation o f 
old attitudes and behaviours and the teaching o f new political view” until the 
consolidation o f power in the hands o f the new regime. It is only afterwards that the 
main task o f political socialisation will no longer consist o f political transformation but 
rather the preservation o f the status quo - but now with the additional problem of 
attempting to keep going the dynamism o f the revolution whilst at the same time 
protecting the new regime from the attendant political upheavals.14 At this point, 
political socialisation may become a more sinister process where individuals are 
moulded into typecast roles in order to serve the system. Recent history is full o f 
examples o f totalitarian regimes that have attempted to teach “correct” values and norms 
to their populations from early childhood. Not surprisingly, then, purposive socialisation 
was very prevalent in the communist world where the regimes made a huge effort to
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inculcate particular orientations and the current political Weltanschauung.15
The Soviet Communists were the trailblazers in purposive political socialisation and it 
was in the Soviet Union that it traditionally received the greatest attention and concern.16 
The Bolsheviks understood the role that political socialisation may play in the 
transformation o f the regimes when a new leadership is faced with the need to “educate” 
the population about the new order. Upon taking power, the Bolsheviks had two main 
tasks: to mould the population o f Russia according to their ideological pattern and to 
find and train hundreds o f thousands o f people for important positions at all levels o f the 
state, the army, the economy and the educational machinery.17 Communist regimes 
maintained a variety o f overt, explicit and purposive agents o f socialisation. Initially this 
programme was designed partly to counter the influence o f the family, notably in regard 
to religious or bourgeois values. In communist societies in general and the Soviet 
communist society in particular, the main purposive socialisation agencies were the state 
education system (including adult education), the media and mass organisations (the 
party itself, youth and trade union organisations, etc.). All ministries dealing with these 
matters were supervised by the Department o f Propaganda and Agitation o f the Central 
Committee o f the CPSU and lower-level party committees.18 The formal education 
system is an obvious example: not only did the compulsory study o f Marxism form an 
independent subject, but other subjects were also taught in a suitable ideological light.19 
In Soviet schools, the curriculum included courses with a purely political orientation 
(“fundamentals o f political knowledge” or political economy) which stressed only the 
Marxist-Leninist view o f reality. Marxism-Leninism was therefore presented as the basis 
o f all knowledge: social, political, aesthetic, scientific. Classroom ‘ritual’ was another 
source o f political learning: it consisted o f the teaching o f slogans, songs and stories 
which glorified the CPSU.20 During the education system, and after leaving it, young 
people would also undergo further moulding by other socialisation agencies as 
mentioned above.
The Bolshevik regime was therefore the first to not merely set itself propaganda goals 
but also - through political education - to aim to create a “new humanity” which was 
suited to live in a new society.21 In communist countries loyalty to the ruling party was
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therefore learned and this provided the ‘correct’ sense o f direction and self-assurance. 
The alternative was often a frustrating and frightening sense o f isolation and a purely 
negative rejection o f the system - and being rejected by the system.22 The successfully 
indoctrinated individual was equipped with prefabricated answers to all questions 
addressed to him, and he reacted to certain stimuli (“capitalists”) in foreseeable ways. 
He saw the world exclusively from the point o f view and in the light o f ideology, and 
was therefore able to act in any given situation on his own initiative in whatever way 
was required by the system. Trust in the party and dedication to it always helped to 
resolve many of the dilemmas as well as uncertainties inherent in life and the dangerous 
world situation (for example, in the Cold War period). Thus, the communist parties have 
often - but not always (cf. Poland) - succeeded in taking over and monopolising the 
omnipotent role previously played by religious institutions as the provider o f 
psychological relief and stability in the face of threatening and complex situations.23 One 
o f the main features o f Soviet political indoctrination was that it was also reinforced by 
a coercive system which was intended to force people to behave in a prescribed way: 
“Even if  an individual resists internalising the Soviet communist world presented to him, 
he is coerced to behave in ways which demonstrate that he has accepted it 
(‘demonstrations’ o f enthusiasm, loyalty, participation in mass campaigns, meetings and 
rallies).”24
"Etudierpour agir, agir en étudiant'*1*
Where communist parties enjoyed a political monopoly, everyone was subject to 
ideological education in schools, the media and culture and the workplace. At the same 
time, there was a separate and specific system of party schooling for party members and 
functionaries. These were the cream, the vanguard who needed more specialist 
knowledge as provided by the specialist divisions o f Agitprop and party schools. 
However, in non-communist countries the agencies o f  socialisation are under state 
control and that o f other social forces - they are conservative. The communist parties 
therefore developed their own socialisation programme for members and ancillary 
organisations to counter the wider cultural and political hegemonic discourse. This 
generated an alternative subculture or counterculture.26 New recruits had in most cases
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already been exposed to a number o f other agents o f political socialisation such as the 
family {“Je suis né de sang communiste, ” said one respondent27) or what Lavau calls 
“l ’adhésion d ’imprégnation”;28 peer groups, school or workplace, a student or a 
communist youth organisation, and a trade union. Joining the party was therefore often 
the next logical step which took the person’s political commitment one degree further.29 
The party continued the process o f purposive political socialisation by disseminating 
information, organising debates, enabling its members to understand politics and to 
express their opinions, and - in the case o f a select body o f people - by providing them 
with a theoretical and practical political education programme in party-run training 
schools.30
The Soviet system of party schools was thus mirrored in communist parties in Western 
democracies and political education - in general terms, the “inculcation o f and 
identification with the goals and values o f a political community”31 - therefore formed 
an important part o f the socialising process o f the party activist. In addition to that, 
political education also constituted a method by which political recruitment into specific 
roles in the party and its various organisations was effected.
In Western democracies communist parties traditionally recruited mainly from the most 
disadvantaged social categories32 for whom the party functioned as “an important and 
even irreplaceable agent o f political socialisation”33, compensating for their social, 
educational and cultural handicaps. This was particularly important in the case o f  the 
French Communist Party: first, because the majority o f PCF activists came from the 
lower social classes; and second, because the party’s “particular and rigid world view” 
(Marxism-Leninism) had to be taught in order to maintain ideological unity between “/e 
communisme des intellectuels" and “/<? communisme des militants de la base”.34 
Through political education, the PCF sought to control both groups. In the case o f the 
former, the leadership had to ensure that the ability o f the intellectuals to innovate and 
criticise would remain within the limits set by the official party line.35 According to a 
former French communist party member, a good communist leader needs “enough 
intelligence to take the initiative in the carrying-out o f orders, but not enough 
intelligence to question those orders”.36 As for the militants, they had to be provided
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with political training which would enable them to integrate the political and cultural 
world o f  communism and help them internalise the objectives o f the party.37
The element o f “continuity” (that is to say, the training schools as a continuing aspect 
o f the daily processes o f the political education o f a cadre) was the leitmotiv running 
through the communist pedagogy. The fact that communist theory was being constantly 
applied and tested in action meant that the Communist had to be continually studying 
and learning. The concept o f the “unity o f theory and practice” also demanded that there 
be no separation between training and party life. In communist party practice every 
activity therefore had some pedagogical value, be it reading or selling the party press, 
attending meetings, participating in campaigns, demonstrations or strikes, and so on. 
According to the head o f the Central Division o f Cadres o f the Italian Communist Party 
in 1952, a “good Communist”, in order to have a “complete” political education, had to 
go through three stages o f schooling: first, he had to “participate in the working-class 
struggle and that o f people o f  all backgrounds”. Second, a Communist had to 
“constantly be present at party and union meetings, where the mass struggle is set out, 
with experience and results discussed”. The third stage o f political education comprised 
“study of every kind, attendance at party school and courses and all personal application 
to the study o f the classics o f Marxism-Leninism”.38 The student’s general political 
socialisation into the party - through cell meetings, campaigns, selling o f the party 
publications and all other party activities - thus controlled his time and movements, 
whereas his specific political education additionally exercised control upon his thought 
and thinking process, making his commitment total as he prepared to enter the inner 
circles o f  the party.
The party schools were therefore not intended to be divorced from the general process 
o f moulding cadres but rather to complete this process. Their importance lay in the fact 
that in that process they occupied key points, “nodes o f intense development”.39 Kriegel 
emphasises that “these schools were not centres for the formulation o f doctrine or for 
research”;40 they were intended purely “for the cadres, unswervingly dedicated to the 
training o f political leaders needed by the party”, to mould professionals, or in the 
Leninist sense o f the term, “professional revolutionaries”.41 In the words o f Meyer, in
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order to succeed in their aim o f creating “perfect cadres”, the schools were to “eradicate 
every vestige o f  non-Communist beliefs and to replace them by the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology; to implement the psychological transformation o f the person into a Communist 
person; to emphasise the unity o f theory and practice; to utilise pressure, intellectual and 
psychological, as the decisive tool o f training; and in climax, to inculcate a final and 
absolute loyalty to the Party as the final and sacred agent and executor o f History”.42
A measure o f the high importance attached to the training schools is demonstrated by 
the way in which the students were selected. The selection process was carried out 
directly by the leading committees o f the party echelon immediately below that on 
which the training school was to be conducted; and the ratification (or rejection) o f 
nominations was decided by the leading organs o f the echelon at whose level the school 
was organised.43 Kriegel underlines the fact that the students “were not volunteers” .44 
According to Marcel Rosette, who directed the PCF’s central schools in 1956-63, at a 
given point during their party career, ‘promising’ militants were simply “told to do the 
schools” .45 The suitable candidates had already been socialised into the party and their 
recruitment to party schools was based on the manifestation o f leadership capacity and 
considerable experience in organisational work. They had thus been “tested and 
observed in action” and found to demonstrate complete attachment and loyalty to the 
party. A working-class background, trade union work (preferably in large enterprise) and 
elective mandates were also important in the selection process. The fact that the students 
could not “just volunteer” for party training did not mean that they were without 
motivation - quite the opposite. Predominantly, “going to school” was considered as a 
“mission”, an honour and a responsibility.46 During their period o f political training, the 
students also expected to learn more about the party and Marxism to help them in the 
“fight against social injustice and poverty”, and to gain personal goals in the field o f 
self-development ("un épanouissement personnel").41 Without exception, political 
education was not seen “officially” as an avenue to a career since “careerism” and 
“promotion” were considered as dirty words.48 *
For all that, attendance in party schools offered distinct rewards. As Offerlé puts it, if  
the division o f political work often seems to the outsider “une domination sans partage
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des dirigeants sur les dirigés ”, it is possible only because those who are dominated are 
satisfied with the advantages they are drawing from the situation.49 For most students, 
participation in party training schools opened up opportunities which were more 
satisfactory than those that were available outside.50 In many ways, trained militants had 
a chance to succeed socially on the basis o f “unconventional” criteria which required no 
particular technical proficiency or scholarly attainment. As a large proportion o f the 
students came from a working-class background, many o f them came to owe their entire 
political, educational and cultural progress to the party and its teachings.51 In socio­
cultural terms, “quitting production” and becoming a party functionary, a “militant de 
la plume”52 or an “artisan de l ’histoire”,53 frequently meant a new life dedicated to 
previously unknown intellectual activities: reading, writing, discussion, a “life enriched 
and stimulated by people and events”.54 These were the functionaries whose importance 
for the party apparatus as the implementors o f democratic centralism was underlined in 
Chapter 1. They occupied diverse functions at different levels o f the apparatus and had 
come to depend on the party, directly or indirectly, for their livelihood and prospects. 
In return for their material security, they accepted the need for conformism, ideological 
prudence and unwavering loyalty to the party;55 to such people, indoctrination would 
appear as liberation rather than restriction. They were the equivalent o f Lenin’s “army 
o f professional revolutionaries”, an inner circle founded upon the official duties 
performed within the party. In the words o f Duverger, their existence had created “a 
bureaucracy, an oligarchy ... which exercised power, retained it and transmitted it by 
means o f co-option”.56
In the French Communist Party, the bureaucratic oligarchy assumed the form o f 
“technocratic oligarchy” which meant that in principle, the courses organised for the 
party cadre had to be attended before they could expect a post o f leadership.57 A training 
period therefore almost invariably led to an increase in responsibility and a higher or 
permanent status in the party apparatus or its various mass organisations and 
movements, thus registering a distinct advance in the student’s party situation.58 
Although any accurate measurement o f any outcomes o f formal political instruction in 
terms o f political and career advancement is a virtually impossible task (it would 
necessitate access to party membership records and, in the case o f the higher cadre, to
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their highly confidential “biographies”), interviews with the PCF’s former education 
chiefs and central school directors (Etienne Fajon,59 Francette Lazard, Marcel Rosette, 
Charles Fiterman, Nicholas Pasquarelli, Henri Martin, Jean-François Rivière and Lucien 
Bossu) established that attendance in party schools undoubtedly contributed to progress 
in the party - indeed, for certain cadre levels it was a strict requirement (naturally, all the 
PCF’s central school directors fulfilled this criterion; their backgrounds will be 
discussed in the subsequent chapters). This was also confirmed by all former students 
who were interviewed: each stage o f their schooling coincided with a move to a more 
responsible or higher position. According to Lavabre, who has researched the cadre 
profiles o f the Paris Federation during the period 1965-77 (the Paris federation was the 
largest PCF federation in France at that time), the more important the federation, the 
more rigorous was the training of cadres: “La scolarisation au sein des écoles du Parti 
est la règle. ”.60 (In 1977, only 15% o f the federal cadres in Paris had not attended a party 
school at central level.61 ) In addition, Elleinstein records that out o f the 1522 delegates 
who participated in the PCF’s 22nd Congress in 1976, only 283 had not attended any 
party training school.62
Unlike other types o f parties (such as partis d ’intérimaires or partis de patronage63), 
mass parties or partis de militants have rarely been in a position to reward their 
collaborators in financial terms or by means o f patronage, and have therefore had to 
develop other types o f rewards in order to retain their support.64 Thus, the rigid 
organisational hierarchy of the Communist party was in fact a pre-requisite for the 
system o f rewards65 o f a mass party (which the PCF became in the mid-1930s). Gaxie 
points out that one o f the notable characteristics o f these parties is the proliferation o f 
their closely-linked hierarchic echelons;66 indeed, in his Report to the PCF’s 16lh 
Congress Georges Marchais claimed that “ ... [with our] thirty thousand members 
responsible for cells, 25 000 section leaders, 3300 federal leaders, with our 1400 mayors, 
21 000 municipal councillors and 150 departmental councillors ... with our tens o f 
thousands o f communists responsible for mass organisations and movements, we have 
cadres totalling more than 100 000!”.67 In the structured training system (schooling 
began at the elementary level for newcomers, sharpened its focus at the intermediate 
federal or district level, and culminated in the central schools, with high-fliers often
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completing their education in the Soviet Union) each training level attended at the 
various stages o f a person’s party career therefore usually represented an initiation into 
a new level o f  responsibility and authority, and directly responded to the needs o f  the 
hierarchical party organisation. In the Communist party, the possibility o f advancement 
therefore essentially played the same role as does the social mobility o f the elite in 
society; militance reinforced with theoretical training thus offered an even more 
effective channel for self-realisation.68 To this must be added that the nature o f  the 
rewards could also be merely symbolic and psychological (affection, admiration, 
prestige),69 sometimes just a matter o f being able to quench one’s soif d apprendre - a 
theme that would reoccur time and time over again in the personal testimonies o f former 
teachers and students o f the PCF training schools. In their case, political education 
became “a means o f transforming [one’s] orientation to life from a simple passive 
acceptance o f their surroundings to the excitements o f intellectual mastery”,70 a 
satisfaction o f acting in accordance with one’s convictions.71
During the learning period, then, through cognitive and affective processes (all political 
socialisation includes an affective component, the inculcation o f love, loyalty and 
respect, and usually negative feelings o f differing types for other political systems),72 the 
student was expected to gradually internalise as his ‘own’ the party’s political norms. 
In other words, he became increasingly politically socialised. The teaching about the 
party’s history, its heroes, its traditions and its contributions to the nation and the 
country further enhanced the student’s partisan pride and identity.73 This and the reading 
o f carefully prescribed popular literature (Soviet novels, short stories and reportage o f 
Soviet life as well as films) not only fostered emotional links between the students 
themselves but also between them and their “heroic and glorious Soviet comrades” and 
the entire international communist family.74 The very real physical isolation from home 
and family during the prolonged study period (one to six months in France, up to two 
years in the Soviet Union) was compensated by the fraternal atmosphere o f the training 
establishments. This further fostered emotional dependency and encouraged bonding, 
thus contributing to the creation o f a tight-knit core o f loyal party activists. As will be 
seen in the subsequent chapters, the “total school experience” - lectures, classes, group 
debates and discussions (conducive to attitude forming), personal study periods (likely
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to develop self-discipline), the communal meals and celebrations, periods o f “ organised 
relaxation” and sports, excursions, practical work sessions, relations between students 
and instructors (instructors were often set up as “models o f behaviour” and mentors), 
and so on - was a carefully planned exercise, the purpose o f which was the 
reinforcement o f the students’ emotional attachment to each other and to the party. The 
training schools in fact reproduced a miniature version o f the communist counter- 
community where a small group o f people, put together for a specific purpose “bonded” 
and formed strong (sometimes life-long) attachments. In this controlled environment, 
another indispensable psychological tool o f the communist pedagogical methodology 
was put to use: this was “criticism and self-criticism”, the “prodding, and delving 
examination o f intellectual and psychological motive”,75 which was to be constantly 
learned and practised in party schools. It had its place among the other fundamental 
educational instruments and constituted a definite ritual o f continuous testing. However, 
M eyer’s reference to the extremely rigorous form o f self-criticism concerns mainly the 
Komintem schools and some cadre schools organised in the USA in the 1950s; in the 
case o f the PCF, this is not supported by the available evidence. However, as will be 
seen in the subsequent chapters, a milder form o f criticism and self-criticism was 
practised in the French schools also: this practice commenced at the beginning o f the 
school with each new intake o f students having to take an inventory o f their own 
motives and expectations;76 continued throughout the training process; and culminated 
at the end o f the school period when students presented an evaluation o f the school, o f 
the teachers, o f their own experience and o f their own transformation into a “communist 
person”.77
Thus, the students became politically socialised not only through the deliberate 
orientation o f the teaching dispensed, but also through their entire holistic learning 
experience. It is obvious that acquisition o f earlier political socialisation on the 
emotional level had already acted as a suitable springboard for what was a further 
enhancement in the form o f specific political training for carefully selected people. If  
political socialisation had begun in childhood, had been strengthened through peer 
groups, in work and trade union related activities and party work, members had already 
been integrated into a certain subculture where they had learnt to “manage” their lives
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in accordance with communist values and standards. In fact, it was a precondition o f 
formal political instruction that its recipients should have already been exposed to some 
or all o f the above mentioned agents o f socialisation. The subsequent formal instruction 
provided to a “chosen” group o f people by the party schools was the final piece in the 
jigsaw that made up the fully trained and politically socialised cadre; as Meyer puts it, 
the schools “in their artificial intensity were the forcing beds”78 o f that process.
The function of Scientific Marxism in political education
Maurice Thorez wrote in his autobiography “Fils du peuple “La doctrine scientifique 
Marx-Engels-Lénine-Staline, la théorie révolutionnaire du Marxisme-Léninisme est une 
boussole permettant de fixer à coup sûr la route de la classe ouvrière. ” 79 At this stage 
it is therefore important to give some thought to the function o f the science o f Marxism 
in the programme of political education for party members and activists.
One o f the objectives o f  communist indoctrination was the mastery o f the science o f 
Marxism-Leninism and the ability to use the dialectic in order to arrive at the correct 
decisions in any situation. For this reason, Marxism-Leninism became an article o f  faith, 
and communist parties justified their leadership o f working classes on the grounds that 
only the party was completely “immersed in the science o f Marxism-Leninism” :80 
“Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement. This cannot 
be insisted upon too strongly,” wrote Lenin in “What is to be done? ”.81 A communist 
party could only fulfil its task as the leader and vanguard o f the proletariat i f  it 
scrupulously followed the teachings o f Lenin. This, then, made the trained militant an 
individual with a mission and with systematic knowledge - an interpreter and a teacher 
o f the theory. Thanks to his theoretical training and his practical experience in applying 
the theory in the field, the militant was able to “make correct judgements, forecast the 
future, never lose sight o f his goals and never give way to irrelevant feelings”.82
What gave the theory its real weight and importance was the fact that it was considered 
as “scientific” - the only true science o f society.83 The task o f the communists was not 
to search for factual knowledge, as that had already been achieved. Rather, their task and
- 6 5 -
mission was to teach the science o f Marxism and Marxist analysis. The Soviet view 
traditionally relied on that element o f Leninism which, albeit briefly ( What is to be 
done?) stressed the party’s vanguard role, i.e. its guidance o f the working class, based 
at least partly on its superior understanding o f Marxism. When the Party came to power 
it became the institutional incarnation o f Marxism-Leninism, and its “propagandists” 
and “agitators” were the experts in conveying this “scientific truth”. Almond compares 
the approach o f the Communist to “his science” to that o f the priest to “his theology”: 
the science never changes, it is only “enriched” and “interpreted”. That way, communist 
theory was never considered as “wrong”: it was constantly tested in action and amplified 
or modified (“enriched”) according to needs and circumstances.84 This, then, was the 
“unity o f  theory and practice”.
Who could then be trusted to “enrich” the theory? In truth, a very small number o f 
people were worthy o f this task: “It may be said without fear or exaggeration that since 
the death o f  Engels, the master theoretician Lenin, and after Lenin, Stalin and other 
disciples o f Lenin have been the only Marxists who have advanced Marxist theory and 
who have enriched it with new experience in new conditions o f the class struggle o f the 
proletariat,” declared Stalin in the “History o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union 
(B) ”.85 Stalin’s definition conveniently gave wide latitude to communist party 
leaderships who therefore were “legitimised to enrich” Marxism. As a result, leaderships 
appropriated the right to all ideological primacy: the leaders became ideologues, as well 
as already being interpreters and teachers.86 The “knowledge” became therefore a 
powerful and versatile tool for complete control o f the political training system and by 
extension, for the maintenance o f the authority o f the leadership. Only the communist 
leadership could profess certainty about many uncertain things; only the leadership 
trained in this “supreme blend o f art and science”87 could comprehend the true political 
essence.
By implication, then, communist theory had to be studied and mastered. This process 
came in three stages: first, the militant studied the theory; second, he applied it in 
practice; third, he learned from the experience.88 After that, he in his turn, had to assume 
the political education o f the working classes and the development o f  its class
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consciousness ( “ What is to be done? ”). Therefore the party - the “informed elite” o f the 
working class - was able to legitimise its raison d ’être as the creator o f  the elusive 
“communist person”, the end product o f political education whose mastery o f Marxism- 
Leninism implied total devotion to the party.
Traditionally, communist training courses consisted o f three main levels based on the 
Soviet model. At the basic level, there were the elementary schools designed for the 
members and militants o f the cells to equip them with the rudiments o f Marxist theory 
and party organisation through a series o f  weekly evening classes. At the next level, 
residential district (or federation) schools were organised for party cadres over a one or 
two-week period, usually in a boarding-school environment. Their purpose was to add 
to the basic knowledge already acquired in order to enable the militants to be active at 
middle levels o f the party apparatus. At the apex o f the school system were the central 
schools organised at national level, with courses generally lasting between one and four 
months. The central schools were for cadres already trained at lower levels and who 
already held responsible positions at district or departmental level; these schools were 
also important for promotion in the party. In addition to the national training schools, 
“promising” cadres were also sent to the higher party training establishments in the 
USSR and other socialist countries.89
Apart from the organisational aspects outlined above, there were important similarities 
in the curricula o f all communist party schools; the essential features o f these had been 
derived from the Soviet model set up in the 1920s and developed over the years. Since 
the purpose o f the training schools was to provide a firm foundation o f communist 
belief, the central themes taught were traditionally uniform, with the exception o f 
specific national issues. The main subjects taught by all schools were Marxist economics 
(“political economy”); Marxist philosophy (“historic and dialectic materialism”); 
political theory consisting o f Marxism-Leninism together with the history o f the CPSU 
(up to the 1960s with national variations); history o f the Communist Party in question 
and o f the labour movement; and special courses in organisational practice and 
techniques. Text books generally included the classics o f Marx, Engels, Lenin and (until 
1956) Stalin, and works by national party leaders as well as congress resolutions and
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decisions o f the party leadership. Indeed, the following quotation could have been taken 
from any Communist Party educational publication at almost any time: “The aim o f our 
educational work is to impart to our members an understanding o f Marxist-Leninist 
theory, but in such a way as to make it real and living, a meaningful guide and help in 
their practice, to their political activity in the new, complicated conditions o f today. This 
we must seek to do by treating fundamental principles correctly, developing from them 
what is familiar, thus leading our comrades to a deeper understanding o f the relevance 
o f Marxist-Leninist theory to this actual struggle in which we are engaged.”90
“O/i ne naît p a s  communiste, on le d e v i e n t the “ideal Communist”
The Communist is made, not bom. Having now examined the “moulding process”, we 
need to consider what kind o f end product it aimed to turn out. One o f the most 
important functions o f the party training system was to select potential cadres and mould 
them into trustworthy party militants who would serve in the party’s middle and top 
apparatus.91 Intrinsic to such moulding was a definition o f the militant: what was 
expected o f him, how he could best serve the party, and what political beliefs, 
expectations and behaviours were considered desirable. At the point o f recruitment and 
entrance into the movement, the communist party presented the new members with an 
exclusive and explicit model, a model which in reality did not exist - even though the 
parties always had in their midst historical or fictional persons who were depicted as 
realisations o f that model.92 The intention was gradually to develop the “ideal 
Communist” from the raw material o f recruits and the rank-and-file o f the party. 
However, the purpose o f political education was not to radically change attitudes or 
behaviours, nor to produce too sophisticated an end product - the main intention was 
simply to create continuity and homogeneity. In the following section we shall attempt 
to construct an “identikit” o f this “ideal Communist” created from the raw material 
through the training process and the testing in action which singled out those who had 
the necessary qualities and potentialities.
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What, then, should one look for in recreating the image o f the “perfect Communist”? 
Almond suggests that the ideal image o f the communist militant is a kind o f hybrid 
influenced by both Western European and Russian models.93 This is a logical conclusion 
bearing in mind the origins o f the creators o f Marxism and Leninism-Stalinism. The 
image o f the socialist or communist militant in Marx was that o f a leader, guide and 
organiser o f the proletariat, o f an individual who educated the working class in its 
function o f conquering political power. The militant described by Marx and Engels had 
much in common with the later Leninist and Stalinist doctrinal conception, but also 
differed in many fundamental ways. Almond explains that revolutionary militants in 
both Marxism and Leninism-Stalinism were conceived as “scientific socialists” acting 
in full knowledge o f the laws o f history and the social process. They were above all 
“rational calculators” o f the various means available to achieve the dictatorship o f  the 
proletariat. They were the “vanguard o f the working class”, good organisers and 
tacticians. Their allegiance was to the international proletariat and not to their own 
nation; they were the builders o f the new, humane society. The legitimate goal was the 
establishment o f the dictatorship of the working class, and for this, a good party member 
had to be able to clarify, prepare and lead the working class from its present condition 
- anytime, anywhere - to the seizure o f political power.
But there were also differences between the Marxist and Leninist models. M arx’s 
conception o f the party was not sharply differentiated from the conception o f the 
proletariat: the leadership would differ in degree, not in kind, from the rest o f the 
proletariat. Lenin’s communist militant, on the other hand, was considered a very special 
type o f person, a member o f a kind o f aristocracy, sharing an esoteric knowledge which 
the average proletarian could not digest. Only the militants - who “knew” - could 
effectively evaluate situations and then proceed to apply the correct Marxist-Leninist 
analysis to them, whereas the simple proletarian needed to be guided by the initiated 
elite. In the words o f Guralsky, the Komintem’s delegate in France in 1924, “The 
armour o f a revolutionary party must comprise a vast network o f professional 
revolutionaries.”94
There were further differences: according to Almond, in Lenin only the communist
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militant could be a full-time revolutionary, dedicated to a professional revolutionary 
calling; in Marx, the revolutionary leadership differentiated from the generalised 
activism among the proletariat only by a more correct sense o f direction and a greater 
degree o f activism. But the most important difference between the two militant models 
was in the domain o f organisation. In Marx, the leaders were involved in vague and 
undefined organising activity: in addition to the party, they also organised vast 
proletarian groups such as trade unions, study circles, etc. Lenin on the other hand held 
the militant to be part o f a highly disciplined and centralised party which in its turn was 
responsible for organising other social formations into dependent, manipulable 
“transmission-belt” groups.
These special features o f the Leninist militant model were largely the result o f 
specifically Russian influence, and they were much contested both by the more 
westernised moderate Russian socialists and within the international movement. Almond 
correctly states that it was this Russian component o f Leninism - Leninism which he 
views as a “marriage o f Marxism with the extreme Russian revolutionary current” - 
which was finally responsible for that explicitness, exclusiveness and extraordinary 
emphasis on tactics which forms part o f the baggage o f the communist militant.
What is a cadre?
The next area to examine in getting closer to the image of the “ideal Communist” is the 
function and position o f the communist party cadre since it was the specially selected, 
trained and indoctrinated cadre who personified the image o f the perfect militant.
The cadres formed the core within the formal communist parties, and they represented 
Lenin’s “organisation o f professional revolutionaries”.95 In “What is to be done? ”, Lenin 
clarified his ideas: there must be a “dozen tried and talented leaders... professionally 
trained, schooled by long experience and working in perfect harmony such as were not 
bom  by the hundreds”.96 They had to be “men who devote their entire lives, and not 
simply their free evenings, to the revolution”.97 This special group o f trained and 
dedicated people was going to be a professional army, an army o f cadres adapted for the
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non-military warfare o f the 20th century: “We must have ‘our own men’ ... everywhere, 
among all social strata, and in all positions from which we can learn the inner springs 
o f the state mechanism. Such men are required for propaganda and agitation, but in a 
still larger measure for organisations.”98 The Bolshevik conception o f leadership was 
that o f the general staff o f an army; Lenin frequently spoke o f the party being the 
“general s taff’ o f the working class.99 Stalin, too, was extremely fond o f military 
metaphors: at a Central Committee Plenum in March 1937, he divided the party into 
leaders and the led. There were 3,000-4,000 senior leaders, the “generals”; 30,000- 
40,000 middle-rank officials making up the “officer corps”; and the 100,000-150,000 
lower-level leaders who were the “NCOs”.100
However, not everybody was eligible for this kind o f organisation - recruits had to be 
carefully selected. “A working man who is at all talented and ‘promising’ must not be 
left to work eleven hours a day in a factory,” wrote Lenin in What is to be done?101 Yet, 
Lenin insisted that the proletariat was not to form the whole o f the new political elite as 
priority was to be given to intellectuals: even though, in order to create a homogeneous 
“army”, “all distinctions between workers and intellectuals must be dropped”.102 Thus, 
the heterogeneous recruits were, after training and moulding, to constitute a new social 
and human type, bound by military obedience to a general staff which decided every 
change o f tactics. These selected people in their turn would select others, and wherever 
they penetrated, from trade unions to the most harmless looking formations, there would 
be the “small compact nucleus, which uses the host for its own ends”.103
Writing in the PCF’s theoretical journal Cahiers du bolchevisme (later Cahiers du 
communisme) in 1948, Marcel Servin, the secretary o f the PCF’s Cadre Committee, 
described the function o f the cadre as follows:
“They [cadres] are communists who have emerged from the mass o f the 
party members and have distinguished themselves in terms o f struggle, 
devotion, and foresight, and who have been chosen to assume 
responsibilities within the party organisations; who are active (militants) 
and trusted by party members.”104
The prevailing political situation determined what kind o f cadres were needed at any
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given moment. Although the cadres formed the party elite, they were not necessarily 
recognisable by a title or in positions o f organisational leadership. In communist-speak, 
a cadre was someone who was “trained and ready to do anything, anywhere, for 
communism”; the party “could not exist without its permanent and solid cadres, without 
a certain continuity which would survive people and tactics. [The party] must be able 
to count on the loyalty o f its leading militants. When all is said and done, the party is 
only as good as its militants.”105
A three-lesson booklet published in 1948 by the Communist Party o f Great Britain 
described the role o f the cadre much in the same way:
“Who are our cadres? And how can we develop them? Our existing Party 
cadres are all those members who accept some responsibility, however 
small, for the carrying out o f Party policy and leadership. But the extent and 
quality o f the Party leadership depends on the extent to which we develop 
and train thousand o f new cadres. [...] The qualities we seek to develop are 
loyalty and devotion to the Party, contact with the people, the ability to work 
with the people and support for our policy as well as recruit to the Party, 
and self-reliance and initiative. [...] Cadres must be trained. [...] Without 
strengthening their grasp o f scientific socialism, members will not develop 
their conviction and loyalty to the Party. ” ¡06
In his Questions o f Leninism, Stalin depicted cadres as the
“men who have the correct party line, who understand it, consider it as their 
own political line, are ready to apply it, know how to implement it and are 
capable o f bearing the responsibility for doing so, o f defending it, offighting 
for it - without which the political line is in danger o f remaining only on
a  107paper ,
All this clearly fitted in with the Leninist idea o f the Bolshevik party; from Lenin’s 
theories on the revolutionary elite it also followed that if  the revolution was to be made 
by a carefully selected, trained and indoctrinated elite, then that elite had to be schooled 
and educated in order to receive an adequate ideological and organisational training.108 
This was particularly important at those periods when the communist parties were 
‘opening up’; i.e. when there was an influx o f new - mainly young - members (after the 
Liberation, for example, 75% o f the PCF was composed o f new members109).
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It was often said that every Communist already had an “unshakeable conviction o f a 
special calling”. This comes out in a particularly striking way in a remarkable speech 
delivered by Stalin on the eve o f Lenin’s funeral 26th January 1924.1,0 In this passage 
Stalin emphasised the specificity o f the communist person:
“We Communists are people o f a special mould. We are made o f special 
material. We are those who comprise the army o f the great proletarian 
strategist, the army o f Comrade Lenin. There is nothing higher than the 
honour to belong to this army. There is nothing higher than the title o f  
member o f the Party founded and led by Lenin. It is not given to all to be 
members o f such a party. It is not given to all to withstand the stress and 
storm that accompanies membership in such a party. In departing from us, 
comrade Lenin has bequeathed to us the duty o f holding aloft and guarding 
the purity o f the great title o f member o f the Party.” ' 11
But if  the members o f the communist party already were people o f a “special mould”, 
then the cadres had to be even more special: “men o f steel, hard, inflexible, rapier 
edged” like Stalin (the word stal in Russian means ‘steel’).112 All militants had to 
therefore strive towards the “ideal image” and many guidelines directed the communist 
parties in their choice o f cadres.
In the PCF, Marcel Servin outlined in 1949 the political qualities necessary for 
communist cadres considered for promotion:113
First, the cadres had to demonstrate devotion and loyalty to the Party, the working class 
and the nation, tested in the face o f the enemy (in battle, prison, court, etc.); second, they 
had to show initiative and a sense o f responsibility, i.e. the ability to find one’s bearings 
independently and not be afraid o f assuming responsibility in decision-making;114 third, 
qualities such as political solidness, the courage necessary to implement the party line, 
and a spirit o f intransigence toward all deviation in the party were considered essential; 
fourth, the cadres were expected to be bold and courageous, ready to face difficulties 
without fear or struggle. Finally, all communist cadres had to have the closest possible 
contacts with the masses and the ability to convince, organise and lead the masses. 
(Stalin had also expressed this requirement in the following terms: “I think that the 
Bolsheviks remind us o f the hero o f the Greek mythology, Antaeus. They, like Antaeus,
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are strong because they maintain connection with their mother, who gave birth to them, 
suckled them and reared them. And as long as they maintain connection with their 
mother, with the people, they have every chance o f remaining invincible.”115)
As for personal aptitudes o f the communist cadre, it was only possible to detect them if 
the party knew the cadres or the potential cadres intimately, studied their qualities and 
failings in order to find the most suitable post for the militant in question. Maurice 
Thorez put it in more concrete terms: “One must not entrust the editorship o f  a 
newspaper to a militant who is a capable organiser but who writes badly or with 
difficulty; nor must one entrust organisational work to a comrade who may well be an 
excellent propagandist but a hopeless organiser.”116 That is why those in charge had to 
have “thorough knowledge” o f each and every militant before proposing a candidate for 
promotion.
How, then, were cadres selected for promotion? Servin advocated a continuous, 
systematic process o f observation and supervision o f the cadres, carried out not only by 
their superior echelons but also by the mass o f the party members. Particularly 
indispensable in the selection process was a “useful criticism” o f the failings and errors 
o f the militant aspiring to promotion. The purpose o f this criticism was to stamp out all 
signs o f any amour propre which would only lead to more mistakes: “Fraternal but 
serious criticism o f errors committed enriches the serious and devoted militant. [...] It 
also reveals any ‘unstable element’ to whom it would be risky to entrust 
responsibilities.”117 The inability to accept criticism was therefore considered a serious 
shortcoming.
It is interesting to note that, despite the straightforward and seemingly clear-cut 
instructions concerning the development and promotion o f cadres, there remained 
obstacles blocking the selection process. Servin lamented the reluctance to promote 
young cadres and women (he criticised in particular the generally poor effort made to 
send women to central schools, the shortage o f working-class cadres [sic] as well as the 
damaging effects o f copinerie or non-political criteria in cadre development).118
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The perfect cadre: an example of the “ideal Communist”
Following the brief outline given above in which we examined the principal qualities 
and characteristics required o f the “ideal Communist” and the “perfect cadre”, it is only 
appropriate to take a look at a representative o f this rare and special race. As stated 
previously, we must be quite clear that the ideal type never existed in real life but had 
to be invented and created as a model toward which militants should strive. In France 
this model - for thirty decisive years o f party history - was Maurice Thorez.
Thorez’s autobiography Fils du peuple gives clear guidelines as to what characteristics 
and qualities un homme communiste should possess, and how Thorez came to fulfil these 
criteria. The image of the “perfect Communist” did not exist only for the edification and 
inspiration o f the rank and file; it was an essential element in the everyday lives o f  all 
cadres, and was drawn upon in party schools at all levels. Maurice Thorez fitted - and 
was made to fit - the ideal image more than any other French Communist (an image, 
which was clearly carefully constructed on the basis o f Stalin’s personality cult, as is 
shown by Bernard Pudal who has analysed the presentation and packaging o f both Stalin 
and Thorez119).
Fils du peuple was published in 1937 and it was intended to contribute to the promotion 
o f Thorez’s growing cult o f personality. However, die main emphasis o f the work is, as 
Pudal points out, on the very “ordinariness” o f Maurice Thorez: he is presented simply 
as the “product o f history in which he is immersed”120, namely that o f  the French people 
in general and that o f the working class in particular. Thorez becomes the “people’s 
representative” only through his own hard work, which makes his achievements unique 
and at the same time ordinary, and thus attainable by any communist militant willing to 
follow the same path. Pudal notes that Thorez’s qualities are nothing more than the best 
qualities o f his class; his experience has been gained in his own social milieu through 
its dramas and struggles; his encyclopaedic knowledge is the result o f personal study and 
systematic training. Fils du peuple is therefore presented as the complete apprenticeship 
manual for the aspiring communist militant.121
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However, Fils du peuple was never an autobiography as such. As usual with the Party’s 
image-building propaganda projects, any dubious elements had been omitted or glossed 
over. The work was purely for party propaganda purposes: in Pudal’s words, Thorez 
“lends his personality to an exemplary trajectory, that o f the political promotion o f a 
working-class communist militant”.122 Underlined once more is the fact that Thorez’s 
life is no different from the personal social history shared by all communist leaders 
whose trajectories are very similar to his.
How is Thorez portrayed in his autobiography? First o f all, he naturally fulfils the most 
essential requirement o f the perfect militant by being o f working-class origin, “/ils et 
petit-fils de mineur", the ‘fils du peuple with no specific distinctive features (as yet). But 
the people he lived with were no ordinary people: they were "un peuple militant'’, with 
his grandfather a "militant modeste, courageux, irréprochable et fidèle ”.123
Another significant feature was Thorez’s insatiable hunger for learning. Pudal quotes 
from Fils du peuple: “I passed my primary school certificate. [...] I came first.” Later, 
after having been forced to leave school early to find work, Thorez never ceased to 
regret that he had not been able to continue his formal education; this led him to 
methodically explore every area o f knowledge through a veritable programme o f self- 
education: “I started my education by reading abundantly ... I was devouring ... I read 
Marx and Engels again in their entirety ... So that I could read Marx and Engels in the 
original language, I decided to learn German o f which I already had some basic notions 
. . .”124 Thorez also learned Russian and Latin and systematically read all the essential 
works o f French classical literature. The key words in all his endeavours were "maîtrise 
de soi ", "soif d ’apprendre ” and “discipline de soi absolument détrminée ",125 There is 
a very illustrative passage in Pudal’s book which describes the way in which Thorez 
worked:
[...] In the mornings, Thorez studied his dossiers and read. [...] He enjoyed 
his conversations with Picasso, Aragon, Éluard and other intellectuals ("his 
interlocutors did not often have the last word"). He paid meticulous 
attention to detail: when writing speeches, he always wrote with a pen and 
corrected type-written scripts again and again - even at the point o f  
delivering a speech, he was still correcting. " Work well done " was one o f
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his favourite expressions. He would not “suffer mediocrity, slovenliness [...] 
everything about him was meticulously organised". Thorez’s secretaries 
(Cogniot, Joannes, Dupuy - all with a good educational background126) 
praised his energy, his obstinacy, his insistence on precision, his refusal o f  
all vulgarity, his seriousness and punctuality. Thorez hated “empty phrases, 
slovenliness, all Bohemian way o f life"}21
Furthermore, Thorez naturally had a close contact with the masses and identified with 
the working classes and peasants. He was also portrayed as a combative militant, orator 
and propagandist, absolutely loyal and devoted to the Party and his class, to the point 
o f sacrificing his freedom to the cause.128 By 1931, Maurice Thorez’s “personal 
courage had led him to the leadership o f the PCF”.129
Pudal has analysed other, equally interesting and typical itineraries o f militants130 which 
might also have been chosen to describe the “ideal Communist”. The important thing 
to remember, however, is that none o f the official biographies bears any resemblance 
to the real lives o f the persons whose trajectories they narrate. Pudal points out very 
clearly the contradictions, omissions and downright lies which were used to construct 
all official biographies based on the PCF’s system o f values.131 Even before the 
publication o f Fils du peuple, Marcel Cachin had set out the main qualities o f  the 
“model Communist” in a small booklet called “Nos 72! ” which consisted o f the brief 
biographies o f  the PCF’s 72 deputies and senators after the victorious 1936 legislative 
elections. All information was carefully selected and Cachin’s abstract gives the general 
drift o f each biography: the model militant stems from the people; as a deputy, he 
serves the people and is its voice in parliament because he is the people’s legitimate and 
deserving son, a son whose destiny bears the scars o f battle in which his qualities were 
forged.132
Conclusion
This chapter focused primarily on the moulding process for communist cadres. We first 
examined the process o f political socialisation in general and one specific instrument 
o f  that process in particular, namely political education. It was shown that purposive 
socialisation acted as an induction into a certain political culture, whereby an
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indoctrinated individual was equipped with the tools needed for survival and 
participation within that culture. Political socialisation into the party was also shown 
to take care o f the management and control o f an individual’s time and movements. 
Political education on the other hand was designed as an additional tool which would 
work on and control the person’s - the cadre’s - mind, his thoughts and thinking 
processes, thus committing him ever deeper to the cause and to loyalty to the party. 
This commitment was further secured by both material and psychological (symbolic) 
rewards bestowed on the graduate o f a party training school. The crucial importance o f 
the party political education system as the refining touch in the entire process o f 
moulding a cadre was thus established.
We then continued with a short analysis o f the function o f scientific Marxism in the 
communist political system. The importance o f ‘going to school’ was further enhanced 
by the ‘scientific’ nature o f Marxism: it was seen that as a “true science o f society”, and 
gave the political education programme intellectual credence and a theoretical 
foundation o f the required gravity. Its theoreticians, teachers and interpreters were 
embodied in the communist party leadership which thus came to exercise complete 
authority and total control over the political training system. In this system the students 
became the grateful recipients o f a scientific way o f thinking which equipped them with 
the qualifications self-esteem necessary for a new life style within the party apparatus 
and its mass organisations. Their “scientific” training and advancement in the party also 
made them less likely to abandon their commitment.
Finally, we set about examining the characteristics and qualities necessary for the “ideal 
Communist”. To this end, various criteria and guidelines were studied in order to 
achieve an illustration o f the desired end product, the definition o f the “perfect” militant 
cadre. The persons who approximated to this ideal constituted a distinct elite group o f 
people within the Communist party, and it was found that they shared number o f basic 
qualities and characteristics: in fact, the “perfect model” had to have almost unlimited 
versatility in order to tow the present party line and yet quickly adjust to changes in it. 
Thorez’s exemplary trajectory contained all the necessary ingredients, which 
transformed him from a working-class Communist militant into the leader o f his party
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and a Minister o f State and made him the legendary hero in whom all the qualities 
imagined in the perfect Communist combined. Thorez was unique but at the same time 
ordinary, part o f a select, elite group, a professional revolutionary who was confident 
in the final triumph o f communism.
However, what emerges from this analysis o f the “ideal model” is an extremely 
complicated picture. As already noted above, it is unrealistic to expect that any one 
individual should possess a fully comprehensive set o f the desired qualities. 
Nevertheless, the basic analytical model o f the “ideal Communist” which we have 
constructed from communist doctrine will prove useful in a number o f ways in the later 
parts o f this study. In particular, it will help us to understand a certain aspect o f  the 
PCF’s steady (albeit not always readily perceptible) decline as, for much too long, the 
criteria for the “ideal model” remained stuck in a time warp. An obvious example 
would be the disappearance o f the professional revolutionary, who vanished in Western 
European democracies long ago. Nor did the “model“ take into account the social 
changes that started to transform French society (among others) from the 1950s 
onwards when the fils du peuple d 'origine ouvrière started to fade away. In the final 
analysis, the Soviet-created Bolshevik model existed for far too long; the conclusion 
must therefore be that since that model was the intended end resu lt o f party training, the 
political education system continued to insist on the marketability o f an original 
prototype which was well beyond its sell-by-date.
Following this overview o f the theoretical aspects o f political education, the historical 
origins and early evolution o f the PCF’s training system will constitute the principal 
theme o f the next chapter. In the 1920s - the starting point o f our account - all 
communist education was in its infancy, but the urgency to establish a proper system 
o f party schools to provide systematic and organised political education had already 
made itself felt in the Soviet Union. This system was soon to be exported to other 
communist parties world-wide.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ORIGINS: FROM CHAOS TO ORDER (1920-39)
This chapter will examine the origins and initial development o f the political education 
system o f the French Communist Party in the context o f the Party’s early life, i.e. from 
the split o f  the French Socialist Party (SFIO) at Tours in 1920, which resulted in the 
formation o f the PCF, up to the beginning o f the Second World War. This early life o f 
the “party o f  a new type” can be divided into three periods. The first period (1920-24) 
was marked by a continuing socialist influence, internal and external conflict and 
ideological confusion; the second period (1924-34) was dominated by the Comintern- 
imposed bolshevisation programme, which brought about profound changes in the PCF 
(and all other CPs); the third period (1934-39) was characterised by the anti-fascist 
Popular Front strategy which made the PCF into a mass party and an important national 
force. The brief outlines o f the above periods in the PCF’s early history will also serve 
a more specific purpose. They will highlight the real need which existed for an efficient 
political education programme in the French Communist Party, and will demonstrate 
how the further development o f the embryonic training system was shaped by the 
changes within the PCF during its “apprenticeship” period.
The origins and early development of the PCF’s political education system
The French Communist Party was bom at the Congress o f  Tours in December 1920, 
when the majority o f the delegates o f the French Socialist Party voted to join the Third 
Communist International (Comintern). As a consequence o f this adherence to the 
Comintern, the new SFIC (Section française de l ’Internationale communiste which 
became Parti communiste français in October 1921') assumed the challenging task o f 
“grafting Bolshevik theory and practice onto the several powerful and often 
contradictory traditions o f indigenous French socialism”2 in order to become a “party o f 
a new type” in the true Leninist sense. The PCF’s first few years were thus a “period o f 
apprenticeship in the application o f Leninist-style strategy and tactics”.3
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To start with, the French Communist Party’s policy-making organs remained in the 
hands o f bourgeois intelligentsia (as was also the case in the Soviet party). O f the 32 
members o f the Executive Committee o f the First Congress o f the PCF, only four were 
workers and the rest were “intellectuals ... or those generally disposed in their favour”.4 
The Party lacked ideological unity, and knowledge even o f basic Marxism was sketchy. 
The political views o f many of the founding members were still far from Leninist: in 
Philippe Robrieux’ words, as late as 1923-24, the PCF remained an “amalgam o f French 
traditions: amongst its leaders Louis Sellier was social-democrat, Alfred Rosmer an 
anarcho-syndicalist, Marcel Cachin a guesdiste and Albert Treint a pacifist”.5 Not 
surprisingly, then, in early 1923, more than two years after the Congress o f Tours, Lenin 
told two prominent trade union leaders, Pierre Semard and Gaston Monmousseau, in 
Moscow: “There is at present no communist party in France. Do you want to build 
one?”6
The PCF also had to sort out its relationship with the Comintern. Despite its affiliation 
to the international mother organisation, the early years o f the French Communist Party 
saw a series o f conflicts break out, and there were deep divisions among the French 
Communists in their attitudes to the Comintern.7 Initially, the Comintern itself restricted 
its own interventions, but judging that the progress o f the PCF was very slow, it 
subsequently speeded up the “co-ordination process” . The battle was to be protracted 
as the PCF took a long time to come to heel and to accept the Comintern’s policy shifts 
and demands for increased working-class representation and influence. The 
centralisation o f the PCF’s organisational structures and subordination to the Comintern 
- the Party’s “bolshevisation” - began in earnest in 1924 and lasted until 1934, when the 
transformation of the leadership structure was completed with Maurice Thorez finally 
becoming the party leader.
It is against this backdrop o f initial confusion and internal and external conflict that we 
need to examine the origins and early development o f the political education system in 
the French Communist Party. The early period o f Communist political training in 
France has been extensively researched and written about by Danielle Tartakowsky, on
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whose work much o f the following information is based.8
For a few years after the foundation o f the PCF it was the bourgeois-educated 
intellectuals who trained the party cadres, its journalists and deputies (although in fact, 
there had been no systematic “cadre training” in the SFIO: cadres were mainly recruited 
amongst the “traditional intellectuals”, and it was not even necessary to be a party 
member in order to be eligible for a training course as virtually anybody sufficiently 
interested in the matter could attend what amounted to no more than “w«e suite de 
conférences plus ou moins érudites ”9). In the new party training was first taken up by 
the école du propagandiste headed by Charles Rappoport who had already run a 
Communist-Marxist school since 1919. The schools were Rappoport’s own invention 
and student recruitment was based on “voluntary participation” on the lines o f  the old 
universités populaires.10 The first propagandist school was set up by the Seine 
Federation in January 1921 and it was aimed at party activists, or as Rappoport put it, 
“future activists”, who were selected for training by the Paris region’s communist 
sections. The six-month course consisted o f two weekly lessons, and the objectives 
seem to have been realised to some extent as 23 students o f the 107 (21%) went on to 
occupy divers positions o f responsibility in the party and 10 stood as candidates in 
various elections.11 The syllabus included subjects such as history and theory, the Party, 
political economy, the Russian Revolution and Russia, labour movement abroad, the 
peasant question, war, and the international situation. Explicit and sometimes naive 
references were made to Marxism alone: thus, in a lecture concerning “la femme du 
communisme primitif au communisme futur’’, a certain Madeleine Rauzé wrote with all 
sincerity: “J ’ai essayé de faire quelque chose aussi marxiste que possible. ”12
Tartakowsky observes that Rappoport’s propagandist school was in fact nothing more 
than an extension within the Communist Party o f  the old socialist schools, as no new 
elements had been added. This is easy to understand given the heterogeneous 
composition o f the party at the time. Hence the Comintern considered Rappoport’s 
schools as a real threat to the homogenisation o f the PCF and sought to minimise his 
efforts : “Le parti tâche naturellement par des écoles marxistes et ses écoles 
propagandistes de former des cadres. Cependant, il ne faut pas se faire trop d ’illusions
- 8 9 -
sur la portée de ces écoles. ”13 With the centralisation o f the PCF’s internal structure 
through the process o f bolshevisation now imminent, the issue o f creating a political 
training programme which would satisfy the Comintern’s demands had to be tackled.
“Bolshevisation” and party schools
The slogan “bolshevisation o f the communist parties” was adopted by the Fifth Congress 
o f the Comintern in 1924. It was in fact an old issue that the 21 Conditions should have 
dealt with: the transformation, in Leninist terms, o f  old western social-democratic 
parties, with their democratic and parliamentary traditions, into tight, disciplined 
“instruments o f  revolution” based on the model o f the Russian communist party.14 The 
practical meaning o f bolshevisation was expounded in the theses on tactics adopted by 
the Comintern: “The basic features o f a genuine bolshevik party are: first, the party must 
be a real mass party; second, it must be capable o f manoeuvre and its tactics should not 
be sectarian or dogmatic; third, it must be revolutionary, Marxist in nature; fourth, it 
must be a centralised party, permitting no fractions, tendencies or groups - it must be 
fused in one mould', fifth, it must carry out systematic and persistent propaganda and 
organisation in bourgeois armies.”15 As the bolshevisation o f the French Communist 
Party was begun and the centralisation o f its internal structure and its subordination to 
Moscow commenced, these theses were now invoked. The PCF’s bolshevisation 
process was to be completed by the end o f 1924, but this turned out to be an optimistic 
timetable as the setting up o f a leadership nucleus and party apparatus was not 
accomplished until 1930. The final stages were completed in 1934, when Maurice 
Thorez finally consolidated his power as the undisputed leader o f the French Communist 
Party.
The initial process o f adaptation concerned the party organisation: the PCF was to be 
organised on a basis o f factory cells (rather than those based on communes) to preserve 
its working-class image. The second stage was the removal o f the autonomy enjoyed 
by the lower bodies in relation to the higher ones. It was replaced by the organisational 
principle o f democratic centralism, which (as we have seen in Chapter 2 above, in
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practice) meant the decisions o f the higher organs were binding on the lower echelons. 
The development o f democratic centralism took place simultaneously with the 
Comintern-imposed proletarianisation o f the party. There was an obvious causal 
relationship between the two events: democratic centralism was the ideal tool for 
enabling the working-class leadership to remain in control, as it allowed the co-opting 
o f the leaders rather than their free selection.16
The most significant and lasting effects o f bolshevisation were thus the subordination 
o f the PCF to the Komintem and the proletarianisation o f the party leadership. After 
Lenin’s death, Stalin had replaced the traditional intellectuals by new-style party-trained 
recruits from the “factories, the mines and the shock brigades”17 to help form his power 
base within the party apparatus. Parallel power struggles and changes took place in the 
French Communist Party, and they culminated in the development o f a rigidly Stabilised 
party in the 1930s. Thus the new generation o f French communist leaders promoted in 
the 1920s consisted mainly o f workers: Jacques Duelos had trained as a pastry cook; 
Pierre Sémard was a railwayman and became the general secretary o f the party in 1926; 
Henri Barbé, a mechanic, reached the Central Committee via the Jeunesse Communiste; 
and Albert Vassart, a metalworker, joined the Central Committee through the CGTU 
Metalworkers’ Federation. Most important o f all, Maurice Thorez, from a mining 
background, accomplished a meteoric rise becoming the party secretary in 1930 and its 
leader four years later. By 1929, 70 per cent o f the Central Committee was o f working- 
class origin.18 The process had thus taken ten years, but the transformation was 
impressive. In Kriegel’s words, “The consequences o f  this accomplishment were 
considerable: the communist party acquired a nucleus that was solid, stable and 
impervious to repression. Around it was a protective, more or less impenetrable wall 
o f militants, members and sympathisers. The change, in effect, amounted to nothing 
less than the replacement o f amateurs by professionals. ”19
As Tiersky points out, with hindsight it is easy to see why it was urgent that the mixed 
bag o f heritage and personalities, which was the early form o f the French Communist 
Party, should be homogenised, and that the existing conflicts concerning organisation, 
methods and aims should be surmounted. For the Comintern, theory was to be one o f
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the most important unifying elements o f communist parties and their memberships, and 
bolshevisation was the key to quelling the internal struggles:
“Bolshevisation ... means the final ideological victory o f Marxism- 
Leninism ... over the ‘Marxism’ o f the Second International and the 
syndicalist remains. [...] Only if  the communist parties acquire theoretical 
understanding o f revolutionary practice can they become leaders o f masses, 
conscious o f  their aims. [...] It is therefore the primary task o f the 
Communist International to make Marxism-Leninism the common property 
o f all members ... For this purpose, cadres must be created who are in full 
possession o f these theoretical weapons and who can in turn equip the 
broadest circles o f the party membership with them...”20
With this in mind, the Comintern set up a central school o f agitation and propaganda in 
Moscow. The school would be in overall charge o f communist political education, and 
each national communist party was also obliged to create a network o f schools at all 
levels consisting o f both a central party school and elementary party courses (evening 
classes, lecture series, one-day Sunday schools, etc.21) in order to tackle the question o f 
political training more systematically than in the past.
In the same vein, the Hungarian Communist Bela Kun wrote in his report to the first 
conference o f the Comintern Executive’s Agitation and Propaganda Services: “I think 
that now is the time to put on the agenda in all communist parties the Marxist-Leninist 
education o f all members and cadres so that Leninism becomes the common property 
o f  all communist party members.”22 Thus it was no longer Marxism but Marxism- 
Leninism (as codified by Stalin in his work "Principles o f Leninism ”) that was to 
standardise communist party ideology. This standardisation in the French Communist 
Party was carried out by Leninist schools (as opposed to Rappoport’s old Marxist 
schools, “tainted by social-democratic leaven”).23 In France the communist education 
programme was directed by the German Communist Party member Alfred Kurella, who 
had been appointed by the Comintern.24 The new Leninist schools were to marry theory 
and practice and reject all forms o f cultural education ( "valeur bourgeoise ”):
“L ’ouvrier veut posséder une éducation générale; bientôt, il oublie sa 
classe; car dans la société capitaliste, l ‘ouvrier ne peut pénétrer dans le 
domaine des sciences bourgeoises qu ‘à condition d ’abandonner la lutte et
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de rejoindre le rang de l ’ennemi. [...] Qui veut acquérir la science 
prolétarienne, doit se jeter dans la bataille, ”
wrote Kurella emphatically, undoubtedly as a natural reaction against the eclecticism 
practised by the social-democratic schools.25
Exactly at the start o f the bolshevisation programme, the Comintern also initiated the 
establishment o f  the first permanent central school in Bobigny in September 1924 with 
two full-time teachers, Alfred Kurella and Paul Marion. From time to time, the 
Comintern also sent other teachers, and party leaders also came to lecture on various 
topics.26 Leninism imposed its mark on the teaching programme and most cours were 
devoted to subjects that had not been featured in the social-democratic training 
programmes. No syllabi o f the first central school in Bobigny have been found, but 
Tartakowsky has been able to reconstruct some o f the topics taught from the federal 
school programmes. These were the international situation; colonial questions; the high 
cost o f  living; bloc des gauches et fascisme; bolshevisation o f the party; the conquest 
o f masses; Marx and Engels; the Second International; the Imperialist war; history o f 
the Bolshevik Party; the Third International; the Russian Revolution; Soviet Russia; 
Bloc ouvrier et paysan (BOP); trade union unity.27 Sixty students took part in the first 
central school course in Bobigny: 53 men and 7 women. There were 47 workers and 7 
employés which indicates that the instructions concerning the students’ social origins 
seem to have been heeded.28
In general terms, the early central schools achieved mixed results. Their ambitious 
programmes proved too extensive for the type o f student they were aimed at and the 
intensive pace meant that most subjects could only be touched upon in a very cursory 
manner, which further confused the students and made it difficult for them to digest the 
courses taught.29 One o f the first students, Albert Vassart, wrote later that out o f  the 60 
students on the first course, 30 left the Party less than five years later, and a further eight 
in the 1930s. When the war broke out, only about ten former Bobigny students were 
still party members (including Jacques Duclos and Fernand Grenier) despite the fact that 
the school had become so well known that instead o f speaking about the French 
Communist Party’s bolshevisation many referred to its “bobignisation”.30 On the
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positive side, however, the immediate results were not inconsiderable. The schools had 
contributed to the setting up and running o f factory cells as prescribed in the 
bolshevisation programme; trained cadres were dispatched to regions where politically 
educated leadership was lacking. Many became instructors in their turn and taught in 
regional and local schools up and down the country. Despite the “wastage” mentioned 
above, at least twelve students entered the Party’s Central Committee (two in 1925, 
eight in 1926, one in 1929 and one, Fernand Grenier, in 1945).31 At this stage, however, 
most o f the Communist Party’s new generation o f leaders (Thorez, etc.) had not attended 
any party schools; out o f necessity, their learning took place in the field.
Changing strategies of the PCF and their effect on the political education system
The new Politbureau elected at the Congress o f Lille in June 1926 differed greatly from 
that o f the pre-bolshevisation period (only two members, Cachin and Sellier, remained). 
New leaders had emerged from the CGTU (Confédération générale du travail unitaire) 
and Jeunesse communiste, and Maurice Thorez had risen to the Politbureau through the 
Party’s provincial organisation. The Lille Congress also marked the end o f the hard 
leftist orientation, the proponents o f which (Albert Treint and Suzanne Girault) were 
excluded from the Politbureau. The natural reaction resulting from the change o f tack 
was the Party’s attempt to approach other parties o f  the left; this policy was 
subsequently labelled “right-wing” and “opportunistic” when the “class-against-class” 
tactic32 was imposed on the French Communists by the Comintern in April 1927 as a 
part o f the overall Comintern strategy. For the Comintern as a whole, this period was 
one o f narrow sectarianism; for most o f its sections, including the French Communist 
Party, it meant growing political isolation and increasing subordination to the 
international Bolshevik community centred around the Soviet Communist Party.33
Electorally, the new tactic had disastrous consequences for the PCF. The anti-alliance 
electoral strategy o f the French Communists clashed with the change in the electoral law 
(which favoured alliances) and the Party’s parliamentary representation went down from 
26 seats to 14 in 1928. In addition, the party activists found the new strategy
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incomprehensible, and internal dissension spread when the Comintern accelerated its 
swing to the left after Stalin had broken with Bukharin in the spring o f 1928. A new 
witch-hunt against right-wing tendencies commenced in the Comintern sections after the 
Sixth World Congress o f the Comintern in July-September 1928 when the organisation 
became almost entirely an instrument o f Soviet foreign policy. The premise on which 
it had been founded - that the survival o f the Russian Revolution depended on the 
revolution in the rest o f  Europe - had been completely and conveniently reversed. 
Profound changes were therefore required in the French Communist Party to comply 
with the new orders.
The party leadership underwent a complete transformation at the 1929 Congress at 
Saint-Denis, and Thorez’s promotion corresponded to the first rééquilibrage o f the 
currents present in the French Communist Party. This upheaval was followed by yet 
another turn in Comintern strategy: there was now a gradual return to political reality 
in the course o f  which the leadership o f Barbé and Celor34 was eliminated in 1931 and 
Thorez was enthroned as the official party leader (although not yet as general secretary). 
Thorez was, however, flanked by the Comintern’s “professional international 
revolutionaries” including Eugen Fried, Anna Pauker, Emo Gero and Georges Kagan.35 
Each member o f the Comintern team was personally responsible for a given section o f 
the PCF’s Central Committee (organisation, trade unions, education, etc.), and in fact, 
Fried’s team took over the real leadership o f  the Party during the winter 1931-32 after 
the elimination of the Barbé-Celor faction. In Mortimer’s words, the PCF had thus been 
finally “sovietised” and “taken completely in hand by the Stalinist machine, and 
politically domesticated to an extent that probably no other party ever was”.36 As to 
Eugen Fried and his Comintern colleagues, it was their incomparably higher cultural 
level and vast political experience which was to impose far-reaching changes on the 
PCF’s attitude towards party education and intellectuals.
During the “class-against-class” period the PCF’s membership dropped sharply from an 
estimated 52 000 in 1925 to around 30 000 in 1930 and to 28 000 in 1933 (some 
estimates are as low as 18 000).37 In addition, the Party was forced to live in semi­
illegality because o f the French government’s repressive action against Communists.38
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The lack o f clear and co-ordinated leadership in the Party had an obvious effect on party 
activities: this was particularly true in the case o f the party education, which was 
relegated to the background with just piecemeal measures taken here and there.
After the promising start at Bobigny, the central school programmes at national level 
now came to an abrupt end with the departure to Moscow o f Alfred Kurella in 1927. 
Even before Kurella’s departure, Bobigny’s other permanent teacher, Paul Marion, had 
been selected to study at the first International Lenin School which had opened in 
Moscow in 1926 (see below).39 All education work was transferred to the regions 
themselves; they organised regional schools based on course material prepared centrally 
and approved by the Comintern.40 In order to standardise the course structures and 
content, two Comintern instructors were made responsible specifically for co-ordinating 
the training in the regional schools. They were Victor Fay, a member o f the Polish 
Communist Party,41 and Vital Gayman, the secretary-general o f L ’Humanité. A good 
illustration o f the functioning of these schools is provided by Danielle Tartakowsky and 
the account that follows is largely drawn from her research.42
The first series o f schools took place between July 1929 and March 1930. They differed 
from the central schools o f the earlier period in many respects. Although under central 
control, they were organised by the regions and student selection was therefore based 
on “regional characteristics” ( "un modèle réduit de la région ”, as Tartakowsky puts it). 
Nor was there any longer a marked preference for working-class cadres. The aim was 
now less to “teach the elementary notions o f Communism, doctrine and its principles ”, 
but rather to “complete, co-ordinate and make more systematic both the theoretical and 
political knowledge that the cadres had acquired in the course o f their activism in the 
Party” (p. 232). Victor Fay taught history and theory, but the regional party leaderships 
were required to provide instruction in political and practical subjects as they were more 
familiar with the specific activities and problems of their region. Political education was 
often considered an unnecessary additional task by the regional party leaders, and Fay 
lamented their indifferent attitudes: “[For them] it was just extra w o rk ... There were so 
few people and so much work. All that they saw was that some o f their cadres were 
going to disappear for a fortnight and after that, maybe for even longer.” (p. 238) In
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these circumstances it was not surprising to see a considerable drop in course standards 
and relaxation o f the selection criteria.43
Some socio-professional details are known about the regional school students in the 
Paris region, Marseilles, Centre-East, Lyons, the Alps region and the Languedoc. 
According to filed reports, the average age o f the students was 27 years and they were 
predominantly working-class (more so than the average membership o f the Party at the 
time). Almost half were steel or building workers. Most were skilled workers (iouvriers 
qualifiés) and most worked in small companies. 39.4 per cent had joined the PCF 
between 1925 and 1927, 46 per cent between 1928 and 1930. Only 14.8 per cent had 
been party members before 1923 (6.7 per cent had joined in or before 1920). 
Tartakowsky points out that most o f those who had joined before 1924 had been trade 
union members before becoming communist party members; the conclusion is therefore 
that they were probably led to join the PCF through their trade union activities.44 As to 
their political or trade union responsibilities, the students generally occupied higher 
positions than those in the previous party schools. The students’ progress was carefully 
monitored and reports were compiled on their leaving.45
The Central Committee meeting in July 1930 also brought about a change o f direction 
in the training o f the party cadres. “We need,” declared Thorez, “new resources, new 
cadres but we must also make efforts to re-educate the old cadres. It is inconceivable 
that we should have to find a new cadre for every new ‘tournant ’ o f the Party.” 
Consequently, between 1930 and 1939 - gradually and always depending on 
international and national circumstances - all party activity was critically reassessed, and 
activists underwent a reeducation programme whose aim was to reverse the PCF’s 
tendency towards a repli pur is te f  This also meant the end o f the regional school 
experiment, as the emphasis was now placed on the further education o f already trained 
cadres. Much o f this subsequent systematic political education took place in the 
International Lenin School47 in Moscow, and for this reason it is appropriate to take a 
look at this establishment, o f which - despite its reputation - little was known.
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The International Lenin School
Until the mid-1930s, all formal higher level political training o f French communist 
leaders took place at the International Lenin School in Moscow. The first plans for the 
establishment o f the ILS were drawn up as early as May 1923 by the French Communist 
Boris Souvarine. In 1925, Bela Kun further elaborated the principles o f the new 
international communist school: “It will not be a simple pedagogic establishment - it 
will group together well ‘developed’ militants, leaders with a certain amount o f 
experience and theoretical knowledge, all under the direction o f competent comrades.”48 
The school was officially opened in 1926, three years after the initial decision to do so 
by which time the situation in the Soviet Union had completely changed with the death 
o f  Lenin and the rise o f  Stalin. This had a considerable impact on the further 
development o f the ILS, which became the tool o f the Soviet Party and Stalin. Henri 
Barbé, member o f the Comintern’s Executive Committee, Secretariat and Presidium in 
1928, writes in his memoirs: “[This school] was completely in the hands o f the 
Communist Party o f the USSR. The director was a Russian woman, Comrade 
Kirsanova ... All the administration was taken care o f by the Russians. Almost all 
teachers were Russian or naturalised foreigners and members o f the Soviet Party.”49 The 
Comintern financed the ILS and considered the students’ training period an investment 
for the future revolution.
There are no exact figures for the numbers o f students who passed through the ILS. The 
school started off rather modestly with a few dozen students, but soon expanded to 
become an international institution o f higher party education with almost a thousand 
students being trained every year. However, the school did not exist “officially” and it 
operated in great secrecy. Arvo Tuominen, the Finnish Communist Party’s general 
secretary 1935-39, confirms in his memoirs that no records were ever published and 
adds that it was “most inadvisable to make enquiries relating to student numbers”.50
Subjects studied at the ILS followed the general lines o f the curricula o f all Comintern 
schools. In the first year, there were five main subjects: political economy, history o f 
the labour movement, history o f the Soviet Party, its structures and the Russian
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language. Three subjects out o f five thus treated the Russian aspect only, and this 
Russification increased over the years. Theoretical studies o f Marxism-Leninism were 
not the only reason for the students to be sent to Moscow: they also went there to be 
tested and selected in view o f their subsequent party careers. “Testing” meant 
confronting them with the realities o f Soviet life and noting down their reactions to 
measure the extent o f their allegiance to the cause, the Kremlin and the Comintern. 
“Selection” enabled the Comintern to get rid of the “founder generation” o f Communists 
and replace them with younger Comintern apparatchiks who were judged to be more 
reliable.51 There were also courses dealing with the practical problems o f political 
fieldwork. Students were trained in organisational methods (organising and conducting 
meetings), infiltration techniques and all aspects o f clandestine work (secret recruitment, 
insurrectionary techniques, street fighting, secret communication, conspiracy and 
demonstration techniques).52
Stalin’s purges in the mid-1930s also affected the ILS as it became closely involved with 
the disputes among the Soviet leadership. From 1936 onwards, the school’s activities 
were considerably curtailed because o f the Spanish Civil War. Its operations were 
transferred from the new purpose-built training complex in Moscow’s Lenin Hills to the 
other side o f the city.53 Student numbers dwindled rapidly, and during the Second World 
War the ILS was closed down.
Many former ILS students later became leaders o f their respective national parties. 
Waldeck Rochet, Gus Hall, the general secretary o f the CPUSA, Josip Broz Tito, 
Wladyslaw Gomulka and the Finnish communist party leader Ville Pessi all attended the 
International Lenin School.54 However, apart from Waldeck Rochet, very little is known 
about the careers o f the French ILS students in the PCF. Henri Barbé noted in his 
memoirs Souvenirs de militant et dirigeant communiste that “five or six selected groups 
o f students sent to Moscow between 1927 and 1933 numbered about 100 people in all. 
O f these students, only ten at the most are currently [Barbé wrote in the 1950s] 
members o f  the Party. O f the 24 students who were at the ILS at the same time as 
Waldeck Rochet [1930-31], only five are presently party members. The other 19 left 
years ago.”55 Barbé hazards no guesses as to their reasons o f leaving, but his remarks
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concerning the students’ practical “learning experience” may well contain some key 
factors. As described above, the ILS students were also provided with “practical 
training” which included excursions within the USSR to factories and farms. This 
method involved student “assessment” and therefore also carried certain risks as to their 
loyalty to the cause. An incident recorded by Barbé illustrates the point. After much 
theoretical work on economic problems in capitalist societies and economic progress in 
a planned economy (the USSR), the French students were sent to a Soviet factory as a 
part o f their practical coursework. For the first time, they came into contact with the 
“concrete management” o f a “socialist” factory and also the “authentic social life” o f 
Russian workers and their families. The contradiction between theory and practice 
could not have been greater and upon their return to the school, a violent argument broke 
out within the French group - no longer about the difference between the capitalist and 
Soviet systems, but this time about the disparity between the theoretical courses 
concerning socialist production in the USSR and the actual reality which the students 
had observed. Only one student stood firm in defence o f his pro-Soviet ground, 
opposing the others: it was Waldeck Rochet, who denied the facts just witnessed.56 The 
last French student contingent returned to France in March 1937 after 18 months o f 
study at the ILS.57 By this time the Popular Front strategy o f the PCF was in full swing 
in France.
The Popular Front: more education for more members
The course o f  events before, during and after the Popular Front is well known and 
documented. However, a sketch o f its essential features will establish a background for 
the evolution o f the PCF’s political education system just before the outbreak o f the 
Second World War.
Despite the problems caused by the oscillating tactics imposed by the Comintern the 
Popular Front tactic in 1936 marked a coincidence o f Soviet and French communist 
interests. It succeeded within the PCF because Soviet foreign policy initiatives matched 
the interests o f  potential communist party allies (this was, o f  course, to be an essential
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condition o f subsequent communist “reintegrations” into French politics). The initiative 
for the shift in the Comintern line (according to Soviet historians) came from G. 
Dimitrov in April 1934 and the PCF officially adopted the new policy at its Ivry 
Conference in June 1934. By the autumn o f 1934, Thorez had begun to use the term 
“Front populaire”,5* and in July 1935, the 7th Comintern Congress approved the new 
policy, thus enabling the PCF to adopt the strategy officially.59
The new strategy paid off very quickly as the legislative elections held in April 1936 
produced a left majority and the PCF spectacularly increased its number o f seats in the 
National Assembly from 12 in 1932 (8% o f the vote) to 72 (15% o f the vote). The 
election victory naturally brought up the question o f Communist participation in the 
Popular Front government. After much soul searching, the Communists declined to 
participate in the Blum government o f June 1936 and opted for “loyal support without 
participation” managing thus to situate themselves at the same time “within” and 
“without” the established power structure.60
Yet, despite the PCF’s participation in coalition politics, there was no corresponding 
moderation in terms o f the Party’s internal organisation or its ties to the Soviet Union. 
On the contrary, it adopted the mode o f functioning o f the Soviet party and tended 
towards complete monolithism. This became more than evident at the PCF’s 8th 
Congress at Villeurbanne in January 1936: Robrieux observes that the delegates had 
been carefully selected by the section des cadres and were “elected” unanimously by 
their federations (which was easy, as there was “une seule liste, un seul candidat pour 
poste vacant").61 Unanimity was, however, easier to apply at the top than at the base o f 
the Party, and in order to impose the new rigid rule at all echelons, the PCF had to 
possess the right kind o f cadres and a system o f ideological conditioning. Important 
changes therefore took place in the composition o f the Central Committee and 
Politbureau between 1932 and 1936 as the apparatus had to be renewed and also 
trimmed down in order to comprise trustworthy and ideologically sound cadres who 
would implement the new party line without any questions. According to Pudal, this 
was the time when le groupe dirigeant fondamental was formed and it subsequently 
remained solid for decades to come: “[M. Thorez] procède à l'éloge du groupe
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dirigeant dont il peut exhiber, pour la première fois dans l ’histoire du PCF, la 
cohérence et la légitimité interne. ”62 Two years later, at the Congress o f Arles in 1937, 
“la cohésion du groupe dirigeant est à ce point raffermie que Maurice Thorez peut 
offrir aux délégués assemblés l ’image d ’un comité central resté soudé”.63 An 
illustration o f this is Waldeck Rochet, who was a Central Committee member in 1934 
and became the party leader in 1964 after 34 years o f Thorez at the helm. From now on, 
the leadership therefore provided an important source o f much needed stability which 
however, ultimately, became a force o f stagnation.
Now, a reliable but narrow top echelon no longer sufficed for a party whose membership 
was increasing at an incredible speed. The Popular Front had made the PCF into a mass 
party: membership rose to 87 000 in 1935; at the end o f 1936 there were 235 000 
members, and a year later the Party had 302 000 members. The peak was reached in 
1938 with 319 000 members.64 There was an urgent need to find - or to create - militants 
who could and would act in accordance with the new party strategy. The party 
education system therefore took on a more important role than ever before.
The PCF’s Seventh Congress in 1932 had voted through a special resolution concerning 
the Party’s theoretical work in order to encourage the regions to pay more sustained 
attention to educational work within political activity as a whole. The resolution had set 
out an extremely ambitious training programme which, in 1935, still remained largely 
unfulfilled. “Trois ans après le 7e Congrès, le retard de l'ensemble du Parti sur le front 
théorique persiste, ” wrote Etienne Fajon in May 1935.65 Fajon had every reason to 
criticise this lack o f effort; he had been appointed in 1935 to take charge o f the PCF’s 
training system, which he had found in a chaotic state. Fajon’s appointment was a major 
step forward for him in the party hierarchy since with the Party’s membership explosion 
during the Popular Front, political education had now become a key issue.66
Thorez’s brief to the new education chief was short and simple: he was to avoid, at all 
costs, the sclerotic schémas o f previous training programmes and the dangers o f 
dogmatism. Basing his proposals on Stalin’s writings (in his “Fundamentals o f 
Leninism”, Stalin said that “theory is the synthesis o f experience o f the labour
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movement o f all countries”), Fajon drew up a new regional training plan comprising 
three main elements: causerie mensuelle (a series o f monthly educational talks, usually 
on a topical subject), a reading programme o f party literature and publications, and a 
new permanent elementary school network.
The cornerstone o f Fajon’s training plan was the establishment o f the elementary school 
network. In preparation for the courses, the communist leadership drew up a simple 
brochure, ‘'Que veulent les communistes ”. This consisted o f four lessons: Capitalism, 
Socialism, The Communist Party, and Communist Policy.67 Students were to be 
recruited among new party members and those who had not previously followed a party 
training course. The course selectors were also to ensure that each school recruited a 
good number o f women and young people. Teachers were to be found among the best- 
trained militants with considerable practical experience and good organisational ability. 
The four weekly sessions were to be followed by an autocritique o f the school and a 
follow-up o f the students’ subsequent activities, so that the Party could make the best 
possible use o f  their aptitudes and talents.68
Fajon also set up the PCF’s first section d ’éducation, and contrary to previous practice, 
he chose to appoint "de jeunes universitaires communistes de premier rang",69 in other 
words, intellectuals who had been shunned by the party instructors in the past. Maurice 
Thorez himself played an important role in the réintroduction o f the intellectuals into the 
party education system. Bernard Pudal explains this by the fact that the Party leadership 
needed the intellectuals to create a communist culture for “Thorezian cadres” in order 
to legitimise the dominant position o f the latter. Pudal also points out that 
“reintegrating” the party intellectuals would simply not have been possible before: 
“organic” intellectuals had to first conquer the leadership positions; second, they had to 
acquire a sufficient amount o f theoretical education; and last, they had to elaborate the 
ideology o f their own pre-eminence.70 Another decisive factor in the new direction was 
the influence exercised by the Comintern team of intellectual “minders”.71 Fajon’s main 
collaborators were Georges Politzer and Jacques Solomon. Politzer (“le type même du 
philosophe militant, sincère et et totalement engagé dans le communisme stalinien ”72) 
was a philosopher and political economist who had joined the PCF in 1929, and
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Solomon was a physicist and researcher who lectured at the Collège de France. Both 
were devoted party activists, Politzer directing the centre de documentation and 
Solomon being a member o f the rayon secretariat o f the 5,h arrondissement in Paris. 
Other intellectuals drafted in to help with the setting up o f the new education section 
included the historian Jean Bruhat and Hubert Roffe, who became deputy for Lot-et- 
Garonne in 1936 and was to direct the first 6-month central school in 1937.
The first tangible success o f the education section was the elementary school organised 
in April 1935 at Gennevilliers in Paris. Fajon and Politzer both taught there every 
Thursday night, and Fajon proudly noted that some o f his very first students 
subsequently did well in the Party: three became officers in the F.F.I. (Forces françaises 
de l ’intérieur) and two others were elected deputies and mayors in their own towns. 
Pleased with his efforts, Fajon felt justified in declaring: “Le train était mis sur les 
rails. ”73
Towards the “total school experience”
To start with, the Party-produced Guide du professeur des écoles élémentaires74 offered 
detailed instructions as to the practicalities o f running an elementary school. Each 
school would begin with an introductory session during which the teacher would deliver 
a 30-minute exposé about the importance o f political education, draw up a list o f 
students and arrange the time and place for the next meeting. Students would buy their 
study brochures and also pay for the brochures for those who were unemployed. 
Meetings were generally held once a week, with lessons lasting two-and-half hours. 
The lessons were divided into three parts: le cours lasting 45-50 minutes, la répétition 
o f 45 minutes and les travaux pratiques. The cours had to be “concrete and simple, with 
clear examples”, avoiding figures, phrases, scientific terms and long quotations. 
Students were encouraged to take notes in an exercise book, leaving a wide margin for 
corrections and explanations. Questions would be allowed after the lesson if  there had 
been problems with comprehension. Répétition (or recapitulation) consisted o f a virtual 
reconstruction o f the lesson in question-and-answer form to establish how well the
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students had digested the information imparted by the teacher. Travaux pratiques 
included preparing a tract or a poster which would be checked and corrected the 
following week. The best and worst examples were analysed and students were 
expected to “defend” their work. At the close o f every elementary school there was an 
autocritique which would focus on the school experience as a whole: the organisation 
o f the school, the teacher’s performance and the study programme would be evaluated 
by the students whilst the teacher would assess the work o f every student. The second 
part o f the conclusion de l ’école was the utilisation des élèves focusing on the optimum 
deployment o f the students, depending on their aptitudes and ability.
As for study materials, each student was given a reading list to cover the content o f the 
lessons. Ecole élémentaire du Rayon du 13e arrondissement de la Région Paris-Ville 
distributed the following reading list to its students in 1935:75 The Communist Manifesto, 
The Programme of the Communist International, Lenin’s Karl Marx and his Doctrine 
and State and Revolution, Stalin’s Theoretical and Practical Leninism and Two Worlds, 
Vive la Commune (Album de L ’Huma), and the Theses o f the XIII Plenum o f the 
Comintern. These were to be read and revised continuously whilst “avoiding 
mechanical learning which would be o f no use to the militant in a given situation when 
he would have to manage on his own, following the party line”. In 1935 in particular, 
the following statement seemed particularly apt: “Les événements marchent si vite, que 
celui qui ne se tient pas au courant reste sur place; cela veut dire qu ’il recule par 
rapport au mouvement. Il faut donc se tenir au courant de la ligne actuelle du Parti. ” 
Following the elementary schools, the first regional schools under Fajon’s direction 
were organised in the autumn and winter o f 1935. They were either two-week internats 
or evening schools. Additional lecture topics and more detail distinguished the teaching 
programmes o f these regional schools from those o f the elementary schools. The 
courses consisted o f around 15 cours (political economy, study o f capitalism and 
imperialism, the State, bourgeois State and the socialist State, the fascist State and the 
democratic State, the Party, its role, policies, history, organisation, etc.) which Fajon 
him self taught in many regional schools together with a “trainee” teacher learning the 
ropes.76 The regional schools were judged a success and opened up new horizons for 
many cadres in their quest for political education and self-improvement. André
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Parinaud, who was to teach within the party education system in the postwar years, 
confided to Etienne Fajon after attending a regional school in Paris in 1935: "Ma route 
s ’est trouvée changée. Du combat d ’instinct au combat certain.’’11 This was the 
sentiment o f many students: they had been given the tools to carry out their chosen task 
- and they had officially entered the area o f moral commitment.
Paul Bouthonnier was the organiser of a 12-day regional school in the Lyons region and 
his report78 gives a very accurate picture o f the functioning o f the regional schools at that 
time. The school took place in June 1936 in Villeurbanne in “extremely comfortable 
surroundings” (considered essential for a “successful learning experience”). The 
teaching programme included lessons on the basic issues o f Marxism-Leninism as 
mentioned above, and on practical tasks such as designing a poster or writing a tract or 
an article. Students worked individually and in groups {travail collectif). They were 
assessed during and after the school period to ensure that the Party could make the best 
possible use o f their specific talents and personal qualities. There was one notable new 
dimension (albeit very modest to start with), namely culture générale: two mornings 
were devoted to visiting museums (in this case, the Guinnet Museum and the Museum 
o f Decorative Arts). This new aspect, which was in line with the reintegration o f the 
intellectuals into the education system, was to be a permanent feature o f all postwar 
regional and central school programmes. Bouthonnier also kept detailed records o f the 
social composition o f his body o f students (which he considered “excellent”): out o f 32 
students, 21 were factory or other workers; seven were employés, two were artisans and 
three small shopkeepers. Most students were young: 19 were under 30 years o f  age, 
nine were between 30 and 35, six between 35 and 40 and one was 41. Only three were 
women. The school ended - as usual - with a repas fraternel, and the education 
experience as a whole was considered fructueuse, as the school was expected to 
“considerably strengthen the quality and numbers o f the cadres in the region” .
With the elementary and regional school networks becoming established and the 
activities o f the International Lenin School being curtailed, the next logical step was to 
prepare a permanent training programme at central level. No permanent central schools 
had functioned properly since Bobigny, and in 1936 Fajon received the green light from
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the leadership to prepare an experimental six-month central school programme. The 
school was organised at Bezons, on the outskirts o f  Paris, in an unoccupied building 
which was ready for demolition and on loan to the Education section by the mayor o f 
the town, Louis Péronnet.79 At central level, student recruitment was naturally founded 
on much stricter criteria, and the party leadership would examine in minute detail each 
student’s credentials. As noted in Chapter 2, potential students at this level already 
occupied important positions in the party or its mass organisations; this demonstrated 
that they were devoted and loyal to the Party, had a sufficiently disciplined attitude as 
well as a capacity for initiative and close links with the masses. Once selected, the 
students were relieved o f all other party duties so that they could concentrate fully on 
their studies.80 The teaching programme drew its inspiration from Lenin’s precept, “our 
theory is not a dogma but a guide for action”, and also from the directives issued by 
“notre grand Dimitrov” who did not want the schools to train “des exégètes, des 
raisonneurs et des maîtres de la citation - non! Ce sont des combattants pratiques, 
d ’avant-garde pour la cause de la classe ouvrière qui doivent sortir de leurs murs. ”81
As to the course content, the Paris region’s one-month central schools (seven were 
planned between October 1936 and January 1937) proposed to offer the following study 
programme: political economy (8 lessons); problems related to the State (3 lessons); 
history o f the French nation (4 lessons); materialism (3 lessons); the Party and its 
organisational problems (8 lessons); party policy (9 lessons); and lectures on topical 
subjects (4 lessons). The main principle o f the programme was to apply theory to real- 
life problems and everyday preoccupations to produce combattants pratiques who would 
solve the PCF’s desperate cadre shortage. With more time available, the teaching o f 
culture générale was increased in the central school programmes, with lectures on 
literature and visits to various museums and art galleries. Teaching methods were based 
on “concrete examples” and lessons normally lasted an hour and were followed by 
questions de contrôle to assess on-the-spot comprehension. Students worked in small 
groups, revising lessons from their notes with better students expected to show solidarity 
by helping the weaker ones. Working in groups was intended to teach the importance 
o f travail collectif, which was essential in party organisations and committees. The 
practical work carried out in the central schools was an extended and more involved
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version o f the regional school tasks, designed to prepare the student for real-life militant 
activity in the field. Daily activities were minutely programmed and 12-13 hour days 
were the rule. The director of the school, André Caresmel, gives an example o f a typical 
timetable which gives an indication o f the intense pressure that the students were 
working under in order to adhere to their rigorous schedule o f classes:
9 .00-10 .00 A  plenary discussion
10.00-10.15 Break
10.15-11.15 L esson
11 .15-11 .30 Break
11.30-12 .00 R eading o f  newspapers
12 .00-14 .00 Lunch
14.00-15 .00 L esson
15 .05-16 .00 Practical work
16.05-17 .00 Personal reading
17 .05-18 .00 M eeting o f  working groups
18.00-20 .30 Dinner
2 0 .30 -22 .00 Personal reading
Without exaggerating, Caresmel drily remarked: "Comme on peut en juger, la tâche qui 
attend nos élèves n 'est pas mince. ”82
Up to this time all PCF higher party training had taken place at the International Lenin 
School in Moscow. However, as that establishment was now reducing its teaching 
programmes and its increasing Russification was, in the words o f Fajon, “considered 
inappropriate for the needs o f the French Party”,83 the PCF decided that it was time to 
set up a permanent higher party school in France. Also according to Fajon, this was 
because communist parties were now “maturing” and a centralised organisation such as 
the Comintern was becoming an "obstacle après avoir été une aide ”84 which was a shift 
worth noting. The first permanent school was set up at Arcueil where the PCF bought 
a disused workshop with an adjoining building, but as there was no room for overnight 
accommodation, the students had to sleep in "les hôtels les plus modestes des environs, 
à deux, et parfois trois, par chambre ”. Nevertheless, the students’ soif d'apprendre was
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so great that the surroundings and material difficulties had no impact on the business o f 
learning.85
The organising o f the permanent six-month school was such an enormous undertaking 
that the party educators felt the need to approach the Comintern, after all, for some 
practical and material help. This was readily forthcoming in the person o f Fritz 
Glaubhauf, a Comintern special envoy and member o f  the Austrian CP. He arrived 
under the name o f “Albert” but was soon nicknamed la Lumière by his French 
colleagues because o f his dazzling intellectual qualities.86 The director o f the new 
central school was Hubert Roffe, who also lectured at the Université nouvelle and had 
been elected as a parliamentary deputy in 1936. The first six-month school was held 
from February to August in 1937 and the courses were mainly entrusted to party 
intellectuals: philosophy was taught by Politzer, political economy by Solomon, history 
o f the French labour movement by Jean Bruhat and Paul Bouthonnier. Fajon himself 
still lectured on general political questions, in particular the Popular Front, whereas 
other topical subjects were taught by members o f the relevant sections o f the Central 
Committee (thus, Waldeck Rochet, for example, from the section agraire lectured on 
agriculture and Jacques Duclos from the propaganda section dealt with his specialist 
subject).87
At this level also culture générale was the important new addition to the study 
programme. According to Glaubhauf,88 Politzer in particular attached a great deal o f 
importance to the need to compensate for the lack o f education o f the working-class 
students in this domain. It was particularly important for these students to learn to 
express themselves in writing and speech. For this, the PCF used the extensive talents 
o f the plethora o f communist intellectuals (members or sympathisers): Jean-Richard 
Bloch and René Maublanc lectured on literature; Joseph Billet, deputy curator o f  the 
Louvre, organised guided visits; Paul Langevin, professor o f Collège de France and 
member o f the Académie de Sciences, taught natural sciences. As already mentioned 
above, this was a complete break with the previous practice whereby intellectuals had 
been deliberately been kept out o f influential positions. The timetable also specifically 
designated short periods for the reading of party newspapers, in particular L ’Humanité,
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to enable the students to keep up-to-date with news, political events and, above all, the 
current party line.
Inevitably, there were problems o f comprehension amongst the students on the 
demanding six-month course, as most had only an elementary education and no 
experience o f intellectual work. On the other hand, some, “favorisés dans leur 
adolescence ”, were more used to studying and expressing their thoughts both in writing 
and speech; they were the ones to “watch” as their “judgement was sometimes deformed 
by the orientation o f their previous studies”.89 As Pudal points out, apart from the 
minimum education needed to attend party schools, there was also “maximum”: some 
committed the sin o f not being sufficiently educated, others had studied too much. 
Therefore, to avoid any “deviation”, the students’ notes were checked in minute detail 
and then assessed.90 The equality o f all students was underlined: as an example o f  the 
equal treatment meted out Fajon describes the manner in which Maurice Thorez (whose 
personality cult was then beginning to grow) came to meet the students at Arcueil, 
“asking everybody questions about their lives and their problems, about their regions, 
their tasks in the Party, what they thought about the school. He willingly also answered 
all their questions. [...] These meetings [with the students] all helped to create a good 
atmosphere: I don’t remember there ever being problems between the workers and the 
intellectuals o f  any ‘promotion'; co-operation and fraternity characterised all relations 
between the militants.”91
The school’s directors insisted on strict discipline, with a rigorous timetable which kept 
the students occupied throughout the day. Work started at 8 o ’clock in the morning and 
continued until late at night: “On ne perdait pas une minute, sauf pendant les 
récréations, où le billiard était très fréquenté. ”92 Each Tuesday afternoon was reserved 
for travail pratique in relevant party organisations and students were collected by car 
by les camarades de banlieue (one o f whom always arrived in a hearse!). Group spirit 
and attachment to the Party were enhanced by excursions and by participation in “all 
public demonstrations which were organised in Paris” at that time. The students were 
even “made to feel the presence o f the great Lenin” in a most concrete way by following 
the bicycle route Lenin had taken from Orléans to the Bibliothèque nationale in Paris.
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The final act o f bonding was, as usual, the traditional fête de clôture which was presided 
over by Marcel Cachin himself who joined the students led by '‘''notre Bretonne, 
Madeleine Marzin ” in a singsong o f popular tunes.93
The “total school experience” which was now operating on all three levels was thus on 
its way to moulding students into loyal activists who, in their turn, would provide 
trustworthy, predominantly working-class leadership material for the Party and its mass 
organisations in the battle against the hostile outside world in the most difficult 
circumstances imaginable, during and after the Second World War.
Conclusion
This chapter has focused primarily on the origins and the initial development o f  the 
PCF’s political education system during the Party’s early years 1920-39. It was shown 
that whilst there existed a desperate need for politically trained militants and cadres in 
the PCF, the Party was unable at the start to set up a coherent and systematic training 
programme to respond to that demand. This was largely due to the internal chaos in the 
Party and to its protracted battle against the Comintern’s domination. The PCF’s 
frustrated attempts to set up a permanent party school network illustrate well both the 
confusion and the internal chaos o f the first years o f its political life. They also reveal 
the gradually more organised but still rather fruitless pursuance o f Soviet-style training 
as received via the Comintern instructors or the International Lenin School that 
characterised the implantation o f Marxist-Leninist education in the PCF. It was not 
until the bolshevisation process was completed that the PCF leadership was able to 
prioritise political training, which was then entrusted to Etienne Fajon who could 
arguably be called the Father o f communist political education in France. Once the 
PCF’s ideological purity and working-class domination o f the leadership had been 
achieved as a result o f tire successful implementation o f the bolshevisation programme, 
it was possible to give the political education system the basic shape, structures and 
stability that it would rigidly maintain for close to 60 years.
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By the end o f the period under scrutiny, the reorganised political training system was 
providing a solid basis and a sound framework for the training o f large numbers o f 
militants and cadres who had joined the PCF during the Popular Front. Having become 
a mass party, the PCF would now be in a position to reward its trained cadres by 
promoting them within its expanding apparatus. Intellectuals were no longer shunned 
as teachers, general cultural subjects were introduced into the teaching programme to 
improve the educational standards o f the students, and older party members were 
retrained to update and improve their knowledge. Undoubtedly the permanent school 
network functioning on three levels also contributed to the maintenance o f the recently 
forged party unity and cohesion after the turbulence o f the previous decade. It should 
also be noted that already, coupled with the PCF’s organisational principle o f democratic 
centralism, the complete party education system was developing into an excellent tool 
for preserving the working-class leadership’s pre-eminence and authority.
This, then, was the situation o f the PCF and its political education system in 1939 at the 
outbreak o f the Second World War. During the Occupation no organised political 
education was provided, and the party school network painstakingly built up by Fajon 
perished completely. All political education had to be restarted from the beginning 
following Fajon’s return from Algiers, where he had spent most o f the war. This will 
be the starting point for the next chapter: with the PCF becoming a dominant force in 
French politics after the war, the party education system had to be quickly resurrected 
and built up to train the huge numbers o f new members flocking to the Party, and to 
cope with the new challenges presented to it by the early Cold War era.
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CHAPTER4
FROM GOVERNMENT TO GHETTO (1944-64)
The re-launching o f the PCF’s political training network in 1944-47 and its subsequent 
organisation and functioning up to the end o f the Thorezian era in 1964 provide the 
setting for this chapter.
To start with, we shall examine the immediate postwar period, when the PCF became 
the dominant party in French politics, performing brilliantly in elections and 
participating in postwar governments. A short account o f the general political 
background and o f a specific party context will provide a useful point o f  departure for 
a closer examination o f the re-launching o f the political education system. From 
extremely meagre beginnings, the PCF was able not only to reconstruct, in a very quick 
and systematic manner, an extensive school network but also to considerably increase 
its propaganda output and general activity amongst the French population through its 
various mass movements.
The backdrop for the second part o f this chapter will be the changing political 
circumstances in France from the end o f the “tripartite” period in 1947 to the bombshell 
o f the 1956 Khrushchev report and the end o f Thorez’s leadership o f the PCF. During 
this period, the political isolation o f the PCF became an undeniable fact, and the Party 
found itself in the bizarre circumstances o f still being France’s biggest party in electoral 
terms and yet reduced to operating at a level quite disproportionate to its size and 
representativeness. This complex political situation obviously raised fresh theoretical 
and practical problems, to which the resurrected party education system had to respond 
in order to ensure that members, militants and cadres would be theoretically equipped 
to deal with the changes from the correct ideological standpoint.
“Le Parti des Fusillés ”
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Thanks to its Resistance experience, the PCF emerged from the war organised, 
disciplined and motivated and basking in the prestige o f the victorious Red Army. The 
Party enjoyed a series o f glorious electoral successes: in the 1945 legislative elections 
it won 26% o f the vote, in June 1946 26.2% and in November 1946 28.6%. There were 
communist ministers in all postwar governments up to May 1947 (save for the one- 
month socialist government o f Léon Blum in December 1946). The communist 
participation in government was considered to be an efficient, pragmatic and competent 
performance, and their contribution to the reconstruction programme, political and 
economic co-operation and the introduction o f important social measures gave the Party 
both credibility and experience which in turn further increased its popularity and its 
already swelling membership.
The famous party slogan in 1945 was “produire, produire, produire! ” . Producing was 
now the “highest form o f class duty” as it “strengthened the unity o f the working class 
with the working people o f the middle class, with the peasant masses, in order to ensure 
the country’s existence”.1 The PCF’s new moderate line was also reflected in the 
reunified CGT, which advocated wage restraint: not a single strike took place under the 
communist Minister o f Labour, Ambroise Croizat, while de Gaulle remained head of 
government. Yet, the Party’s role in the postwar period was somewhat controversial. On 
the one hand it was seen as a creeping infiltration o f the state and on the other, as 
evidence o f a real desire to integrate legally which, given the chance, might have 
produced an authentic form of French communism independent from the Soviet brand. 
There was a kernel o f truth in both visions. The PCF systematically sought to penetrate 
the welfare state machinery, for example, in order to create a “more advanced 
democracy”. However, at the same time, as a government party, it was obliged to tone 
down its objectives. Hence, in November 1946, Maurice Thorez gave his famous 
reassuring interview to Times declaring that there were “other paths to socialism than 
the one followed by the Russian Communists” and that there was a specifically “French 
road” which was democratic and, by extension, peaceful.2
The first meeting o f the Party’s Central Committee since 1939 was held in August 1944 
under the presidency o f Marcel Cachin, since Maurice Thorez was still in Moscow
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waiting for an amnesty for desertion in October 1939. One o f the spin-offs o f the Treaty 
o f Friendship and Alliance, which had been necessitated by the political situation in 
France and signed by Stalin and de Gaulle, was the amnesty o f Thorez; he was able to 
return to France in November 1944 (with Stalin’s instructions to fully adhere to the 
government line as directed by de Gaulle).3 Although the PCF had a carefully selected, 
working-class leadership there were tensions and differences among those Communists 
who had spent the war years in Algiers (the deputies who, as the party legend went, had 
followed le chemin de l ’honneur having been deported to Algiers), those who had 
escaped to Moscow (notably Thorez and his wife Jeannette Vermeersch) and the Paris- 
based leadership o f Duclos, Frachon and Lecoeur. In addition, the Resistance leaders 
found it difficult to adjust to reimposed party discipline: Auguste Lecoeur, the PCF’s 
illustrious Resistance hero, spoke o f Communist Frenchmen as opposed to French 
Communists.4 Consequently, the internal party machine faced three main tasks. First, 
the prewar leadership had to regain complete control; second, the Party had to establish 
an “acceptable” war record for 1939-44 (in particular, a plausible interpretation for the 
period 1939-41); and third, the huge numbers o f new members flocking to the Party had 
to be integrated, assimilated and politically trained.
The first problem was tackled progressively over several years by keeping Resistance 
leaders away from responsible positions in the Party, and by finally purging them in the 
early 1950s. To deal with the second problem it was necessary to demonstrate that 
anything and everything to do with the Resistance and heroism had in fact emanated 
from the old leadership. Thus, a complete memorial myth was woven around the 
Communist martyrs to give all the credit to the Party.5 The isolated acts o f  resistance 
(disapproved by the Party at the time) against the Germans before June 1941 were now 
cited as proof that the Party had not been wrong at the beginning o f the war. As for 
Maurice Thorez, it was thanks to the ‘'magnifique appel lancé dès le 10 juillet 1940par 
Maurice Thorez et Jacques Duclos ” that Paris, finally, had liberated itse lf.6
The third task facing the PCF - assimilating and integrating the mass o f new members 
- was, then, closely linked to the first two as it involved the training and subsequent 
promotion o f a new generation o f Communists, most o f whom lacked both theoretical
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knowledge and practical experience and knew virtually nothing about the Party’s past. 
This task also included the retraining o f those surviving militants who had “remained 
prisoners offormules dépassées ”.7 Reliable cadres were urgently needed to operate in 
the Party’s multilevel internal apparatus and to serve the Party in the public services, 
works councils, social security system, nationalised companies, municipalities and mass 
organisations. The Party was also setting up a complete “commercial circuit” in 
capitalist style: publishing houses, press services, banks and other commercial 
enterprises where both specialist knowledge and political training were needed.
Resurrecting the education network
The last central schools had been held in 1936-39, and during the PCF’s clandestinity 
the party school network had completely perished. Some elementary schools had been 
run sporadically in great secrecy during the war, and brochures had been printed and 
smuggled in from Switzerland.8 However, it was only after the Liberation that Etienne 
Fajon, returning from Algiers, was able to start picking up the pieces again in order to 
relaunch the political training programme. The prewar central school premises at Arcueil 
were used again to start with but because o f “difficult material conditions”(the building 
was now too cramped) the school was moved to Viroflay in the Paris region at the end 
o f 1945. The elementary and federal school networks were restarted at the same time. 
Despite the hard core o f fully indoctrinated and dedicated militants, there was a shortage 
o f trained and politically sound instructors at all levels given that so many leading cadres 
had perished during the war (for example, Fajon’s colleagues Georges Politzer and 
Jacques Solomon had been shot by the Nazis).9
Marcel Rosette, the future communist mayor, senator and member o f the Central 
Committee, who was to direct the Party’s central schools in 1956-63 (his background 
will be discussed below), paints a vivid picture o f the resumption o f training activities 
in the immediate postwar period:10
“Les cadres ne pouvaient pas se former par la seule expérience 
quotidienne, il fallait un bagage théorique. Il fallait passer par les écoles 
- à l'époque, la question ne se posait même pas! Je veux dire que c 'était
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chose normale que d ’aller à l ’école! Une chose normale!... Moi, aussitôt 
la guerre terminée, j ’étais dans l ’école élémentaire de mon village [près 
de Bourg-en-Bresse]. 360 habitants et on était tous les membres de la 
cellule. On a fait l'école, on a suivi les cours, on avait les brochures; on 
a fait l ’école pendant cinq semaines de suite. Quelqu ‘un présentait les 
brochures, les cours; après, il y  avait des discussions. Il y  avait des 
ouvriers, des paysans, et dans toute la France, c ’était comme ça! Eh oui!"
According to official party reports,11 by 1947 the school network was running fairly 
satisfactorily: in 1945-47, three central schools (two of 3 months, one o f 4 months) with 
93 students took place and in addition, there were 14 specialised central schools (3-4 
weeks) for various sectors o f activity (party organisation, press, education, etc.) or for 
mass movement activists (peasants, women, youth, trade unions). 381 students attended 
these schools. Apart from the central school programme, the Party organised 234 two- 
week federal and interfederal schools for 4453 students during the same period. In order 
to accommodate the vast numbers o f students, the elementary schools were divided into 
three main groups: preparatory courses during electoral campaigns for section committee 
and cell bureau members; basic Marxist-Leninist training courses for party members; 
and elementary schools based on six brochures in section schools.
Statistics show the immense scale o f the immediate postwar “education enterprise”: in 
1946, the circulation o f the party internal education bulletin, APPRENDRE, rose from 
10 000 to 20 000 copies; in August 1945,15 000 cours éléctoraux were printed and in 
April 1946, this number had increased to 20 000. In September 1945,100 000 copies 
o f each elementary school brochure were distributed to party members (a total o f  600 
000). In July 1946, 20 000 copies o f each Marxist-Leninist training course brochure 
were published in a series o f four brochures, i.e. a total o f 80 000. The party rules were 
also considered to be essential study material and in November 1946, 700 000 copies 
were printed, in addition to the 375 000 copies already distributed in January 1946. The 
number o f internal party documents published between July 1945 and December 1946 
(study materials, journals, information leaflets, party rules, etc.) was 3 912 000 and the 
total number o f brochures (propaganda material, etc.) was 10 168 000. Between June 
1945 and December 1946, an astonishing 86 million tracts - propaganda publications 
presenting various aspects o f the PCF policy and achievements such as “Les ministres
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communistes au travail”, ‘‘Les députés communistes au service du peuple et de la 
République ” and “Des Français en qui on peut avoir confiance” - were published.12
The organisation and functioning of the party schools
Elementary schools were aimed at ordinary party members as the first stage in the 
process which was to mould them into trained militants by teaching them the rudiments 
o f Marxist culture. In principle, all members were expected to attend, and each section 
was to organise one or two schools a year with a minimum o f ten students. The 
elementary schools had six weekly sessions which were based on party-produced 
brochures detailing the programme o f each lesson.
A typical elementary school13 would be run as follows: the opening session (séance 
d ’ouverture) outlined the material organisation o f the school - timetable, meeting place 
(party headquarters, a private home, the backroom o f a café), the organisation and 
objectives. As from the second session, each lesson began with a revision o f the 
previous one (15 minutes). Then, under the guidance o f a comrade o f the superior 
echelon (federation), students discussed the questions evoked in the brochure which they 
had studied in advance. Discussions were ‘free’ but the responsable was supposed to 
intervene in order to correct “a grave political error”. The closing session (séance de 
clôture) was devoted to a critique de l ’école: students were asked to evaluate the school 
and the teachers’ performance and to suggest improvements where appropriate. Finally, 
the director o f the elementary school prepared a report on the functioning o f the school 
and on tire students; the student reports played an important role in the promotion o f the 
students to the Section Committee.
Permanent federal schools were permanent in the true sense o f the word until 1949, after 
which they were only organised four or five times a year as student numbers began to 
drop. Although each federation organised its own school, they all functioned according 
to the general guidelines issued by the Central Committee. Students were mainly 
members o f the section bureaux and those under 30 years o f age constituted a specific 
target group (the upper age limit for federal school students was 35-40). Courses lasted
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two weeks and the aim was to give the students enough theoretical knowledge to enable 
them to act independently in order to implement the party line. In fact, at the end o f the 
intensive two-week period the federal school students often felt quite cut off from reality 
before they learned how to usefully apply their new-found knowledge and to think “en 
communiste": “Le militant quitte l ’école pénétré de théorie et il lui faudra quelque 
temps pour retrouver une vision plus réaliste des choses. ”14 The importance o f the two- 
week federal school at this stage was that it made the students realise that they were in 
fact on their way to joining the cadre group o f the Party. This “promise” o f new 
responsibilities further strengthened their conviction and justified the time spent on the 
course. The best students also got a taste and motivation for additional study which 
would win them further promotion within the party or its mass organisations (see 
Chapter 2).
Finally, the central schools, the apex o f the system, trained experienced Communists - 
“good militants” already in responsible positions but needing to perfect their theoretical 
education - for higher leadership positions in the Party.15 Consequently, students were 
mainly federation leaders, deputies (MPs), and leaders of mass organisations at national 
level. Courses generally lasted between one and four months and focused on a greatly 
expanded syllabus which was more detailed than that o f the federal schools (history, 
political economy, Marxist philosophy, public speaking, organisational leadership, and 
so on). Teachers were usually drawn from the ranks o f the Central Committee, the 
Politbureau and the Party Secretariat. Apart from having considerable militant and 
political experience, central school students had to be long-time party members who had 
proven themselves completely reliable politically. Students were paid their normal salary 
in full for the whole school period so that they could concentrate entirely on their 
studies. At the end o f the school they were required to give an assessment o f the school 
and the teachers; likewise, the teachers in turn submitted detailed reports on each student 
for cadre promotion purposes.16 Thus, as indicated in Chapter 2, more advanced degrees 
o f ideological training went hand-in-hand with more advanced degrees o f involvement, 
commitment and higher rewards.
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A central school programme o f 194717 will serve as an illustration o f a typical postwar 
training course at the highest level. The one-month school organised for promising 
militants working in the trade union movement took place in July 1947 with 23 students 
from 22 federations. The director o f the school was Victor Joannès (the best student on 
the first permanent six-month central school under Fritz Glaubhauf in 1937 and by now 
risen to become a member o f the Central Committee; see Chapter 3) and the students 
represented mainly the steel and building industries (nine and seven respectively). Eight 
had been party members before the war, four had joined during the clandestine period 
and eleven since 1944. Thirteen students had federal-level responsibilities and five were 
section leaders. Ages ranged between 25 and 35. Only one woman attended this central 
school (see note 16). The extensive study programme included 11 cours généraux 
(including the topical theme of "La question de la guerre et les problèmes de la Paix”) 
and 12 cours spéciaux focusing on trade union related issues (for example, "Le syndicat 
et les problèmes de la production ”, a lecture given by the communist minister Charles 
Tillon). Practical work was also included in the form o f article and tract writing, and the 
preparation o f meetings and work plans for trade union branches. Guided visits took 
place to the railways’ repair shop at Vitry, the Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers, the 
Renault factory at Billancourt and the Musée d'Histoire in Montreuil. The students also 
participated in the demonstration on 14th July to celebrate Bastille Day. The school’s 
film programme was a mixture o f nationalism and communism: "La Marseillaise ” and 
"Lénine en octobre”.
At all levels students were required to study congress reports, speeches, brochures, the 
party press and Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist classics. There were precise instructions for 
reading the party press, in particular L ’Humanité: the militants were expected to glance 
through the party organ every morning before going to work in order to familiarise 
themselves with the principal themes and articles. By the end o f the morning or “by 
midday the latest”, the main articles written by party leaders Cachin and Cogniot had 
to be read while the whole paper was supposed to be scrutinised by the evening so that 
useful articles could be cut out and filed away for further reference.18 In 1947, emotional 
links with the heroic Soviet comrades (see Chapter 2) were strengthened through the 
“recommended reading list” which included the following, carefully prescribed novels
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originating from the USSR: “La chaussée de Volokolamsk” by Alexander Beck, “Les 
Indomptés ” by Boris Gorbatov, ‘‘Les Jours et les Nuits de Stalingrad" by Konstantin 
Simonov, ‘‘L'Invasion" by Leonid Leonov and "L’Arc-en-ciel” by Wanda 
Wasilewska.19 Apart from Soviet films, the education section bulletin APPRENDRE 
also recommended French (communist) made documentaries: "A la conquête du 
bonheur" (Paris rising from the ruins after the Liberation, thanks to the efforts o f  the 
working class, guided by the PC); and "Renaissance” in which communist élus were 
organising the reconstruction o f their towns and villages, “ces ouvriers, ces paysans de 
notre Parti, devenus des administrateurs modèles ”.20
APPRENDRE regularly reported on the organisation and functioning o f party schools 
(see APPENDICES 1 and 2, p. 235), mainly to praise those which had made a good 
effort and to criticise those which were lagging behind and needed tighter control. In 
the December 1946 issue21 the bulletin concerned itself with the federal schools: “The 
successive federal schools have caused a slowing down o f the education work. Many 
federal schools have not been able to function, but this lagging behind must be 
remedied. [...] All too often, [the federations] are blaming material and financial 
difficulties [for their lack o f enthusiasm]. However, these difficulties can be overcome, 
and we can give examples o f federal schools which will serve as an inspiration for our 
comrades!” The report sent in by the Indre-et-Loire federation provides an illuminating 
example o f the purpose o f the complete “training experience”: not only did the students 
attend school in order to be politically educated but also to learn the importance o f esprit 
de parti and solidarity:
"Our school took place on a farm in a commune about 10 kilometres from 
Tours. The farmer let us have three rooms in the house: one for cooking and 
eating, another for sleeping in and the third as a classroom. The Party lent 
us beds and chairs and straw mattresses. Cooking utensils were lent by a 
local hotelier and the farmer. Furniture for the classroom was also 
provided by the Party. The three women students stayed with the mayor.
The rooms were decorated with photographs o f our comrades o f the Central 
Committee, with greenery and branches. Boxwood branches were shaped 
to read: ‘Apprendre pour mieux lutter. " The school was well organised and 
there were three copious meals every day. Communal living, good discipline 
and studying in a group produced excellent results, creating a team spirit, 
a feeling o f solidarity, and developing our competitive and party spirit.
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Because the students are not occupied by their everyday life after school 
hours, they can fully concentrate on their work here; the intellectual yield 
is excellent...
The farmer was won over by our example and dynamism and he joined the 
Party at the end o f the school. So did the young girl who was employed to 
do the cooking (and who up to that time was inorganisée). ”
The comments o f APPRENDRE need no further elaboration: ilQu 'en pensez-vous, 
camarades des autres fédérations? ”
“Le g rand  schisme”
The rapid progress o f the PCF’s political training system described above shows the 
Party’s determination to satisfy its immediate need for militants and cadres in the crucial 
early postwar period. By 1947, however, the PCF was facing new national and 
international challenges. On the national level, the communist participation in 
government came to an end in May 1947; on the international level, the proclamation 
o f the Truman doctrine and the September 1947 Zhdanov report marked the beginning 
o f the Cold War.
The departure o f the communist ministers from the government in May 1947 and the 
emergence o f de Gaulle’s Rassemblement du peuple français (RPF) altered the entire 
political scene in France for years to come. Both the Communists and the RPF were 
ruled out as potential coalition partners, and anti-communism became the focus o f  the 
governments o f the so-called troisième force. “Le grand schisme ” o f the left was so 
deep that, throughout the early period o f the Cold War, the PCF - despite still being 
France’s biggest party in electoral terms - was inescapably reduced to more or less 
symbolic actions22 which, moreover, had to be carried out through ancillary 
organisations rather than the official party structure. Thus, excluded from governmental 
coalitions and gradually eliminated from its positions acquises in society, the PCF was 
henceforth guided by the Unholy Trinity o f the Soviet Union, the Cominform (which 
was set up in 1947 to replace the Comintern)23 and Stalin. As a result, the party policies 
and slogans underwent a radical change. The Cold War strategy o f the PCF came under 
three main themes: the struggle for national independence; the struggle for peace; and
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The first slogan, “the struggle for national independence”, was mostly concerned with 
the Party’s battle against American imperialism and directed against the Marshall Plan, 
“the plan o f enslavement and war”, which was officially introduced by the USA in June 
1947. The Plan was condemned as “an imperialist trap” which was designed - amongst 
other things - to thwart the industrialisation o f the countries aided, France included, and 
thus to “put their national independence under threat”.25
The second theme, “the struggle for peace”, became the mainstay o f the communist 
strategy as it enabled the Party to break through its isolation whilst simultaneously 
furthering Soviet foreign policy objectives. In 1948, the Communists succeeded in 
merging the two existing peace movements in France as the Mouvement de la Paix and 
by 1949, they controlled the whole organisation.26 The peace issue not only became an 
excellent terrain d'entente for the PCF; the movement itself was to serve as one o f the 
points o f connection between Communists and non-Communists and to keep the PCF 
fully occupied, as endless signature campaigns were run during the next few years.27 The 
Peace Movement was also generally popular because o f fears o f  another war and o f 
German rearmament; in addition, its platform was vague enough so as not to advertise 
too obvious a communist domination.
The third theme was that o f a “government o f democratic union”. The PCF proclaimed 
that the peace could be “definitely” saved and national independence recovered only by 
a change o f policy and a “government o f  democratic union”, namely a government “in 
which the working class and its communist party would have the place they deserved 
alongside other democrats who are sincerely dedicated to justice and liberty”. Such a 
government, although led by the Communists and modelled after the first governments 
in the People’s Democracies, would also include socialist and Christian groups.28
a government o f democratic union.24 All themes were faithfully reproduced by the
political training programme.
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The PCF’s internal life during this period was characterised by two main factors: the 
increasing leadership conflicts and the growth and consolidation o f the communist 
“countercommunity” and sub-culture.
The hardening o f the party line after 1947 made it necessary to close ranks and “purify” 
the top leadership. As a result, the purge o f the anciens résistants29 at the 12th party 
congress in April 1950 set in motion a period o f prolonged internal confusion which was 
further aggravated by the sudden illness o f Secretary-General Maurice Thorez in 
October 1950 and his subsequent departure (for specialist treatment) to Moscow, where 
he remained until April 1953. The rudderless PCF underwent a series o f conflicting and 
confusing tournants as the different factions fought for control and other prominent 
party leaders were purged (notably Thorez’s dauphin Auguste Lecoeur, André Marty 
and Charles Tillon).
Thorez was trying to direct the PCF from the Soviet Union; in order to counteract the 
threat o f  any further weakening o f his position, his closest supporters decided to give a 
new impetus to his cult o f personality. This carefully orchestrated programme 
strengthened Thorez’s position despite his physical absence, and his invisible leadership 
in fact became one o f the most unifying elements o f  party life, in particular as the 
communist countercommunity (or countersociety, as some observers call it) had by that 
time become sufficiently solid and systematically organised to survive.30 During this 
early Cold War period the countercommunity became more definable and more 
inflexible as it concentrated on reinforcing and consolidating its lifestyle. “The 
Communist Party does not only take an interest in its militants, it also takes care o f their 
families, their wives, their children. It does not snatch the combattant du peuple from 
his or her family but integrates this family in the fraternal phalanx o f the combattants 
du peuple ... The Party never forgets those it holds dear to its heart!” wrote Thorez in 
Fils du Peuple.31 Any clear distinction between the public and private life o f  the 
militants disappeared: in addition to party work, there was trade union work, activities 
in party-linked organisations, party political training, outings, picnics, fêtes, bals 
populaires, carnivals, etc. Family life revolved around party activities as militants often 
married militants and their children subsequently joined the communist youth
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organisations. In the words o f Claude Poperen, central school student in 1954 and 1959- 
60 and a future member o f the Central Committee and Politbureau, the 1950s communist 
countercommunity was a “total experience”: “If  you went to a dance, it was a dance 
organised by the Party or by the Communist Youth. Almost all my friends were in the 
Party or the trade union [CGT-Renault, Billancourt]. Hobbies, study and leisure time 
were all linked to the Party. Le Parti, c ’était tout; ma vie, c ‘était le Parti. ”32
“A ppren drepou r m ieux lu tter”
The new political developments raised fresh theoretical and practical problems, and 
called for changes in the existing teaching programmes as well as for the introduction 
o f new themes and methods in keeping with the instructions o f Cominform. To this end, 
a Section centrale du travail idéologique headed by François Billoux was set up to work 
directly under the leadership. As Annie Kriegel put it, the section soon became “le 
centre d ’impulsion, dans son domaine de compétence, de la stalinisation du Parti”A3 
A major initiative undertaken by the new section in the 1950s was the launching o f a 
structured, systematic personal study programme (Etude individuelle) based principally 
on Thorez’s autobiography Fils du Peuple, Stalin’s L ’Histoire du PC(B) de l ’URSS, 
Thorez’s Oeuvres and the communist classics.
The first année d ’études o f the home study programme was officially inaugurated on the 
14th anniversary o f the publication o f Fils du Peuple, on 26th October 1951. The aim o f 
the programme was twofold: to encourage the militants to study at home, supported by 
their local party organisations and by a personal conseiller d ‘étude, and at the same time, 
to increase Thorez’s personality cult and his authority in the Party by structuring the 
study programme around his works. Planning was meticulous: after enrolment for the 
complete academic year, the students attended a séance solennelle d ’ouverture to mark 
the importance o f the step they had just taken. They then got down to the work which 
was presented to them in the party education bulletin APPRENDRE and the theoretical 
journal Cahiers du communisme in the form o f monthly programmes. The most 
important o f Thorez’s Oeuvres was, o f course, Fils du Peuple. Using this as a text book, 
the life o f  the “ideal Communist” was studied systematically chapter by chapter,
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“attentivement, la plume à la main ”, In Bernard Pudal’s words, the biography was the 
complete apprenticeship manual for the aspiring activist in which Thorez “lends his 
personality to an exemplary trajectory, namely that o f the political promotion o f a 
working-class communist militant”.34 More able students would extend their study by 
making use o f the numerous references made to L ‘Histoire du PC(B), and to the classics 
o f  Marxism-Leninism.35
The study method was simple: students noted down difficult passages, looked up all 
unfamiliar words in a dictionary, and read again. Exercise books and their correct use 
played an important part: the left-hand pages were divided into three columns, first for 
noting down salient points, then for their explanations, and finally, for the theoretical 
ideas emerging from them. On the right-hand pages students wrote down the ideas 
gleaned from the text in the light o f  their own militant experience (see APPENDIX 3, 
p. 236). Finally, each reference to Oeuvres or L ’Histoire du PC(B) given in the study 
programme was studied separately.36
In the spring o f 1952 APPRENDRE published an interim assessment o f the personal 
study programme, “un bilan satisfaisant”. Thousands o f militants had enrolled, and 
after five months o f diligently mining the prescribed texts for priceless nuggets o f 
theoretical truth, they were now “convinced that studying theoretical works greatly 
facilitated the application o f the Party’s political line” because “it was better 
understood”.37
In the following years, the study o f Thorez’ Oeuvres was made even more systematic, 
and topical issues linked to the current political situation were added to the programme 
(for example, in October 1952, the topical theme was the draft amendment o f  the 
Statutes o f the Constitution o f the CPSU(B)). In addition to the monthly study 
programmes, France Nouvelle ran question-and-answer columns linked to the study 
themes, and special conférences éducatives were written by Central Committee 
members.
La Bataille du livre
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Closely linked with the personal study programme was the intensive campaign launched 
in 1950 to publish and distribute antiwar and “progressive” literature on the orders o f 
Cominform. This was the "bataille du livre ”, which was intended to play “a decisive 
part in the struggle for Peace”. Moreover, the production and distribution o f “suitable” 
literature for the ordinary party members and their families or “less engaged” friends 
was a logical step from the theoretical and political brochure aimed at the militants.38
The bataille du livre was not only used to popularise the struggle for peace, it was also 
simply an additional counterattack against American literature, "la littérature pourrie ”. 
As a result, many mediocre and “parochial” writers suddenly found fame with an 
enthusiastic audience - and what was more, a dream audience as it was mainly working- 
class, which, in Kriegel’s words was, in accordance with the criteria o f the period, 
“doublement méritoire et exaltant! ”.39
Linked to the book campaign was the creation o f special party libraries, bibliothèques 
de la bataille du livre (BBL), which were set up in the offices o f party cells, sections and 
mass organisations. The literature stocked in them was divided into four sections: (1) the 
basic works o f Stalin and Thorez; (2) works “absolutely indispensable for a cell” such 
as Marx, Engels, Lenin, more Stalin, and party publications; (3) works qualified as “une 
série d ’ouvrages plus gros et aussi très importants", i.e. more Lenin and Stalin and 
theoretical publications; (4) a special section for Soviet novels, “carefully selected 
amongst the best”.40
The school experience
We shall now examine some o f the early Cold War themes and the everyday reality o f 
the party schools. This is a vast area, but three examples will serve to evoke the style, 
political content and ethos o f the period. These are "La politique communiste ” as taught 
in the elementary schools in 1949; the description o f a three-week central school for 
instituteurs in 1952; and finally, personal accounts o f teachers and students both in the 
PCF’s central schools and the International Cadre School in Moscow.
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“Lapolitique communiste”
This elementary school brochure devoted to the party policy in 1949 spelled out clearly 
the themes o f national independence and peace: “The political line o f the Party is 
determined by the new international situation and by the American plan o f enslavement 
and war.” Blum and de Gaulle were “the American agents in France”; party policy was 
based on “union and action - Peace must be saved”; the Politbureau affirmed its 
solidarity with the USSR by declaring that “the people o f France will not, will never go 
to war against the Soviet Union”. Only a government o f democratic union - the third 
main theme - would guarantee French independence and Peace. Thus, “all together, 
under the flag o f national independence, fighting for 'la Paix, le Pain et la Liberté ’, we 
shall save France”. Under the heading o f “Socialism and Communism”, the glorious 
achievements o f  the USSR were painted in glowing colours: “The Soviet Union is the 
only country which has, at present, achieved the stage o f socialism and which is 
marching boldly towards the building o f communism.” The brochure was adorned with 
pictures and drawings o f Soviet achievements: the tall chimneys o f the Stalin Factory 
at Magnitogorsk; machinery at work at the Dimitrov Kolkhoz in Moldavia; combine 
harvesters working in Soviet fields and a certain N. N. Kuklina, a Stakhanovist worker, 
organising a village laboratory. The brochure ended, as usual, with a questionnaire 
monitoring the student’s progress throughout the lesson.
Comrade Vagneron, a primary school teacher from Besançon, attended a special three- 
week central school course for primary school teachers in September 1952. The study 
programme was divided into five basic cours covering theoretical questions, five 
specialised lessons {"De la religion ”, “Caractère et contenu de classe d ’enseignment”, 
“Social-démocratie et Front unique ”, “Parti et syndicats ”, “Les problèmes de la 
presse”)  and four main lectures specially aimed at the instituteur audience. Five more 
themes appeared under travaux dirigés: “Notre philosophie", “Le 19ème Congrès du 
PC (B) et le projet des statuts", “Notre politique d ’union avec les catholiques”, “Le 
Parti et la défense de la laïcité" and “Sur les méthodes d ’enseignement”. As to practical 
work, the students had to prepare a general assembly for the autumn’s rentrée.
- 134-
Prescribed reading included the usual selection consisting o f Fils du Peuple, Histoire 
du PC(B), Lenin, Stalin, Zhdanov, Suslov, Cherpakov, as well as speeches, interventions 
and articles by the PCF leadership.41
Training in action
Marcel Rosette became the director of the PCF’s Central School in Viroflay (Yvelines) 
in 1956 after having been through the training process himself. Rosette’s rise through 
the “system” is a triumph for the party schools: bom in 1925 and a party member since 
1942, he first worked in a factory for a year but became a full-time party official (first 
secretary o f the Ain Federation o f the PCF) in 1948 after participating in the elementary 
school in 1945, federal school in 1946 and the one-month central school in 1948. 
Rosette’s rise continued after the four-month central school in 1951 and he was elected 
to the Central Committee in 1956. In the same year he also became the director o f  the 
Central School in Viroflay (Yvelines) and remained in that post until 1963. He gives 
the following description o f the functioning o f the Central School in the 1950s:42
“The daily programme in the Central School consisted o f three stages: 
a lesson in the morning, a lecture in the afternoon with continued study 
late into the night and a “répétition" between 8.30 and 9.30 the next 
morning before lessons started. This was followed by a discussion or a 
debate. The students also had "travaux dirigés they were given written 
questions in advance and, after doing the necessary reading, wrote down 
their answers which were then discussed in a group. Practical work 
might involve the preparation o f a tract or a speech. Saturdays were 
devoted to a “revue de presse the students were given the morning‘s
papers (of all political persuasions), and in the afternoon, a discussion 
took place on the basis o f the newspaper reports. A couple o f political 
topics were usually chosen for closer examination o f the various 
standpoints - it was all very interesting, and we discussed what the 
others were saying... ”
According to Rosette, there were some 30 students on each four-month course (two 
courses were organised each year) and 35-40 students on the one-month courses (8-10 
courses a year) in the 1950s. The students were predominantly workers with very little 
formal education. They were carefully selected and the main rule was that “all cadres 
went to school, at all levels ”.
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Jean Récanati, a journalist with L ’Humanité, has described his personal “learning 
experience” in his autobiography "Un gentil stalinien ”.43 He had joined the Jeunesse 
Communiste in 1944 at the age o f 19; typically for that period, his reason for joining was 
his “great admiration for the Communists, especially for the Soviet Union, which was 
winning the war”. Nine years later, in March 1953 (on the day Stalin died), he found 
him self in the Central School “où se formaient des ingénieurs d ’une autre espèce 
Récanati describes the school as “a closed world whose only environment and food 
were the thick placenta in which we were swimming”. 44 In this “placenta” the students 
listened to lectures, studied “studious explanations o f texts: speeches by party leaders, 
communiqués o f  the Politbureau, editorials o î L ’Humanité, and above all, The History 
o f the CP(B) o f the USSR, the fundamental manual. ”45
Récanati describes going to Central School as “a great honour, since one had been 
chosen at the end o f an unfathomable but vigorous selection process ... we knew that 
being chosen as a student was a mark o f what elsewhere would have been called 
advancement... ”46 The authority and hierarchy o f the Party were drummed into the 
students right from the beginning: their study brochures contained pictures o f  the 
members o f the Politbureau shown in order o f importance. The first one was o f course 
Maurice Thorez, followed by Jacques Duclos and André Marty. These were the party 
leaders, the “ideal cadres”, who had blazed a path that others would follow. They were 
the representation o f the “perfect Communist” o f a special mould described in Chapter 
2: the inspiring and essential element in the everyday lives o f  all cadres, the model to 
be emulated by the cadre school trainees. Récanati felt in awe o f these "têtes 
solennelles, vivant Panthéon, dont je  tenais à m ’imprégner”; he was convinced that 
“these comrades really were a superior species”. The students tried to “measure up to 
their given task, to become more savants, to better master the science o f Marxism- 
Leninism, to become, above all, better Communists” . However, in the end, knowledge 
seemed to matter less than “a certain way o f being ... and for this, the comrades from 
working-class origin seemed to be predisposed by nature whereas the others, who had 
not been so ‘fortunate’, had to strive hard to achieve this.” An example o f this was the 
school’s deputy director Caiman who came from a working-class family in Pas-de- 
Calais (both his father and grandfather were miners - " l’aristocratie la plus
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authentique”, as Récanati puts it). To his eternal shame, Caiman had been “educated 
out o f  his class” to become an instituteur: “//  en était accablé, il vivait sa mutation 
sociale comme une mésalliance qui avait gâché son lignage. ”47
Years later, Récanati came to examine his experience at the central school. For him, the 
schools consolidated the esprit de parti; not so much because “the militants there 
learned things but because o f the general climate o f the establishment”. The training 
period required both humility and obstinacy: the students had to be aware o f  the class 
struggle not only in its “visible form” (work v. capital, the socialist camp v. the 
imperialist camp, etc.) but also - and perhaps even more importantly - in its “malign and 
less visible form, that is to say, the ‘inner’ class struggle.” The good Communist had 
to know that the “bourgeois evil exists in all o f us and must be detected and weeded out; 
one had to be ‘pure’ in order to be worthy o f participating in ‘communion’”. The idea 
o f ‘inner’ struggle thus became a vital instrument o f control in the psychological 
transformation o f the person into a Communist person, in particular in the case o f 
students from an intellectual background. Every deviance from the party could be 
depicted as “bourgeois” tendencies within the ‘se lf , as unworthiness or weakness and 
therefore, a source o f immense personal guilt. In Chapter 2 we established that one o f 
the functions o f the cadre schools was indeed to “eradicate every vestige o f  non- 
communis beliefs and to replace them with Marxist-Leninist ideology”. It is therefore 
hardly surprising that Récanati should compare his school experience to his (later) 
psychoanalysis: “I noticed in the course o f my psychoanalysis that I had ‘studied’ at my 
desk at the School as I had spoken on the couch.” In his mind there was no doubt: “This 
School works on people’s souls as much and even more than on their brains.”48
Learning in Moscow
The next stage after the central school for some students was the International Cadre 
School in Moscow, which had been reopened as the Institute o f Social Sciences. This 
was the case for Guy Poussy49 who participated in the first six-month course o f the 
Institute from August 1962 to April 1963. The French group which was sent to Moscow 
consisted o f ten students, o f whom eight stayed six months and two completed a year's
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course.50 The group included two women51, the average age o f the French students was 
30-35 years, and they were all party functionaries from at least the federation level. They 
were mostly o f working-class origin.
The CPSU informed the various CPs how many students o f different nationalities could 
be received in Moscow as “there had to be a suitable mixture” from parties in Western 
Europe, the Third World and elsewhere. Before leaving for Moscow, the French 
students were told by the PCF that they “were representing French communists and that 
they should remain, first and foremost, French communists in the USSR”. The students' 
expenses were met by the Soviet party and they received a grant o f 180 roubles per 
month (the equivalent o f a wage earned by a highly qualified Soviet worker52) to include 
their expenses in Moscow.
Bom  in 1933, Guy Poussy had joined both the CGT and the PCF in 1951. He had 
trained as a metal turner {CAP de tourneur) and at the time o f leaving for Moscow, was 
the organisational secretary o f the Val-de-Mame federation and had already completed 
the elementary and federal school levels as well as the one-month central school. Now 
he had the choice o f  further study in Paris or Moscow: “ Mon seul diplôme, c ‘était le 
CAP, j ‘avais 29 ans, alors [...] d'aller à Moscou, à l'université, c'était présenté un peu 
comme ça - université, école inemationale - ça, ne se refusait pas, quoi! ” In accordance 
with the stringent selection procedures (see Chapter 2), the decision to send Poussy to 
the International Cadre School was made by the PCF’s Central Committee and ratified 
by the CPSU. According to Poussy, those selected for training in Moscow had to have 
considerable experience o f high-level militant activity and also a “certain maturity as 
regards the USSR” in order to understand the “reality o f the Soviet Union”: “Tout frais 
émoulu, on envoyait quelqu ‘un, on aurait été déçu. ’’ Poussy had passed this test and was 
trusted to accept the Soviet reality for what it was and to remain “maturely” faithful to 
the Party.
The students lived in an internat with a huge library, sports centre, cinema, billiard 
room, and other facilities which emphasised their privileged, if  isolated, status; as 
Poussy put it, “Je ne crois pas que les étudiants russes avaient les mêmes conditions de
- 13 8 -
travail que nous!” The students were issued with a Soviet identity card that enabled 
them to travel within the area and ‘‘vivre une vie de Moscovite ”. The only obstacle was 
the Russian language, which the students could learn in addition to their compulsory 
subjects (which were taught in French or interpreted simultaneously).
Subjects taught included the history o f the international labour movement, the teaching 
o f which did not necessarily find an echo with the French students who questioned the 
“unique” role o f the CPSU in the way that this theme was developed ( ‘‘on était, quand 
même, un peu contestataires! ”). In addition, the history o f the CPSU was an important 
part o f the curriculum as were Marxist political economy and philosophy. Practical work 
and seminars featured on the programme, with a test every month.
Classes started at 9 a.m. and continued throughout the day with short pauses and a meal 
break. They included debates during which the Soviet teachers also wanted to know 
about France and the French party. The teachers were all university lecturers, and spoke 
excellent French (although lessons were often interpreted). Teacher-student relations 
were “good” and although the Russian teachers were discouraged from associating with 
their French students outside school hours, some o f them (the labour movement lecturer 
Efinova in particular) did in fact socialise a great deal and accompanied the French on 
their outings and helped them with their everyday problems.
At the end o f the school, there was a stage pratique which consisted o f a two-week 
fact-finding tour somewhere in the Soviet Union. Poussy's group chose to go the 
Uzbekistan where they visited state companies, collective farms and sites o f historical 
importance and met local party representatives. They concluded their six-month course 
by taking a fortnight's holiday in Leningrad in a party-run hotel.
Guy Poussy had mainly positive memories about his experience: ‘‘Moi, j ’en ai gardé un 
très bon souvenir, une très bonne expérience, pour tout prendre. Et les Soviétiques, et 
le régime, le système. Les Soviétiques étaient charmants! ” Poussy, o f course, had the 
advantage o f being in the USSR during Khrushchev's era. The French students felt that 
the “country was coming out o f Stalinism” and that “things were moving”. And yet, they
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also noticed a great many "blocages ” compared with their life in France and the 
functioning o f the PCF: “ A l'époque, on disait, ça c'est soviétique, nous, on est 
Français. ” "Figé” is the expression used by Poussy as too much reference was made 
to the past and not enough consideration was given to the changes and developments in 
the world or in the USSR. Khrushchev and his imperious ways were criticised by all at 
the cadre school: " [...] parmi les intellectuels, les professeurs, les étudiants, parce que 
Khrouchtchev était sans style, ne plaisait pas du tout, il prenait pour un Russe un 
paysan Poussy also criticised the Soviets’ “irritating” habit o f having an answer to 
everything: "C'était ce qui était insupportable! Ils ne se trompaient jamais, ils étaient 
sûrs d'eux, ils avaient une réponse à tout!” In fact, the French group felt almost 
claustrophobic at times; according to Poussy, the saving grace during the long course 
was their contact with Paris as the PCF’s Central Committee members who came to give 
lectures brought news from home which enabled the French to keep up-to-date with 
events in France. And o f course, "on avait L'Huma! C'était la meilleure correspondance, 
on avait un peu de décalage, mais heureusement, il y  avait L'Huma!”
Despite Poussy’s insistence on the “relative” lack o f restrictions on the foreign students, 
it is clear that the physical conditions at the school were designed to isolate the students 
from the rest o f the Soviet society. The school had created its own closed community 
in which the students were under constant and direct supervision. Virtually every 
moment o f their day - including periods o f “relaxation” - was organised, observed and 
scrutinised by their Soviet hosts. As in the 1930s, the schooling period served a dual 
function o f inculcating theory and assessing the communist personality: many activities 
were consciously organised to achieve conditions in which students were artificially 
“tested” as to the level o f their commitment and reliability (cf. study excursions and 
holidays - see also Chapter 3).
“L ’année 1956 va s ’ouvrir, p leine de prom esses”53
Stalin died in March 1953, and the PCF was inconsolable. APPRENDRE (see 
APPENDIX. 4, p. 236) devoted a special issue to “le chef, Fami, le frère de tous les 
travailleurs du monde”. However, by 1955 the education bulletin was eagerly awaiting
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the start o f  yet another study year: “L ’année 1956 va s'ouvrir, pleine de promesses... ” 
Despite these hopes, more upsets were on their way.
The external developments o f 1956 are well known and there is no need to repeat them. 
What concerns us here is the response o f the PCF’s political education system to the 
bombshell o f the 20th Congress o f the CPSU and Khrushchev’s secret report in February 
1956, and to the process o f déstalinisation which had begun at a moderate pace after 
Stalin’s death in March 1953.
The traumatised PCF never issued any ringing condemnation o f Stalin, but certain 
qualified admissions could be perceived in the teaching programmes. Thus, the May 
1956 issue o f Cahiers du communisme published extracts o f a speech by Thorez which 
was given at the end o f a special training course o f communist deputies.54 In his speech 
Thorez repudiated the cult o f personality and admitted that the cult had diminished the 
role o f the Party and the masses, ruined the principle o f collective leadership and harmed 
any development o f  criticism and self-criticism. But he made it clear that the CPSU’s 
20th Congress “did not constitute... in any way a weakening or a denial o f our principles; 
on the contrary, it was a more rigorous affirmation o f these principles which exhorts us 
to reinforce our ideological work.” Although the cult o f personality was criticised, Stalin 
himself was not: “Eh bien, non! The policy was correct. The mistakes he made change 
nothing about the fact that Stalin fought, with the Central Committee, against the 
Trotskyists, who would have led the Soviet Union to its destruction had they 
triumphed. ”
In October 1956 Thorez delivered a lecture, “L ’enseignement du marxisme-léninisme 
dans les écoles du Parti”,55 to the teachers o f the Central School. In his lecture Thorez 
outlined the teaching programmes and themes for the new academic year 1956-57. They 
were: socialism had become a world system and one third o f the world’s population now 
lived in socialist countries; war was no longer inevitable thanks to the philosophy o f 
peaceful coexistence; the pauperisation o f the working class in capitalist regimes was 
gathering pace; there were various forms o f transition to socialism; and, the need for the 
unity o f  working class, i.e. socialist and communist co-operation. These themes were
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fully accepted by the PCF as they corresponded to the Party’s own ideas; indeed, the 
Party considered itself as the forerunner o f Khrushchev’s views.
Perhaps the most notable point concerned the teaching o f history in the party schools. 
“In order to study the contemporary history (from 1917 onward),” said Thorez, “ the 
Party had, until now, relied mainly on the Précis d ’histoire du Parti bolchévik. ” “But,” 
he continued, “although this work remains an important document to which we will 
always have to refer, certain theses that it puts forward need to be treated with caution. 
On the other hand, although we must not neglect in any way the international 
experience, in particular the experience o f the glorious Communist Party o f the Soviet 
Union and o f the October Revolution, the fact remains that for us, the essential thing is 
the history o f the French labour movement. The decision o f the 14th Congress to prepare 
a work concerning the history o f our Party has come at the right moment. As from now, 
it is around this history that we must organise the study o f the contemporary period.”-56 
Thus, to underline the fact that the history o f the working-class movement and Marxism 
in France predated the foundation o f the PCF in 1920, earlier events such as the 
Revolution, the silkworkers’ insurrection in Lyons in 1831, June 1848, the Paris 
Commune and the formation o f the Parti ouvrier français were added to the teaching 
programme in an attempt to make a clear break from overt Stalinism at a sensitive time.
The person who had to deal with the practical side o f the changes was Marcel Rosette, 
who had just taken up the post o f the Central School director in January 1956:
“Moi, j ’avais ce problème: tout l ’enseignement, jusqu 'au XXe Congrès,. 
c'était du Staline, les oeuvres de Staline, et les oeuvres choisies de 
Lénine un petit peu, deux tomes seulement. Staline, Staline, Staline - 
toute la lecture, c ‘était Staline! Moi, j ’ai encore l ’Histoire du PCUS - et 
c ’est tout souligné, il y  a du rouge et du bleu partout! Eh bien, arrive le 
20e Congrès, là, on est passé à Lénine. Moi, j ’ai lu - j ’étais bien obligé 
de lire jour et nuit! - les 34 tomes de Lénine - eh oui! Il fallait 
reconstruire complètement l ’enseignement. Par exemple, je  ne me 
rappelle plus avec précision mais il y  avait un cours sur la nation - 
Staline avait dit que la Nation a ces cinq caractéristiques, une, deux, 
trois, quatre, cinq. Alors, après 1956, ce n ’étaitplus ça! Ce n ’étaitplus 
possible. Alors, j ’ai trouvé chez Lénine - ce qui n ’est pas étonnant - des 
remarques sur la Nation qui étaient, d ’ailleurs, beaucoup plus 
dialectiques. Alors, je  m ’en suis servi pour bâtir un nouveau cours sur
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la Nation! Et il a fallu, non seulement pour moi, mais pour tous les 
professeurs, qu ’ils en aient été conduits à complètement modifier 
l ’enseignement, le contenu, etc. Moi, j 'y  ai mis souvent du Maurice 
Thorez aussi. Pas brutalement, mais petit à petit. ”57
Claude Poperen confirms the change: “Yes, something did change: there was no more 
Stalin. There was a certain amount o f distance-taking - undeniably! In the one-month 
central school in 1954 we had studied the History o f the CPSU(B), but when I did the 
four-month school in 1959-60, it was no longer studied. It was a very noticeable change 
- it was very obvious.” Regarding Marcel Rosette’s description o f the changes taking 
place progressively, Claude Poperen remarked: ‘T es , progressively, yes! It was so 
progressive in relation to the 20th Congress that it took us 20 years to admit the existence 
o f the Khrushchev Report!”58
Thus, progressively, cautious programmatic changes trickled through the system. In 
1957, the elementary school Cours 2, "La construction du socialisme en URSS” set out 
the new ideas and mildly criticised Stalin: ‘In  the struggle against the class enemy and 
for the construction o f socialism, Stalin acquired a huge authority within the nation. The 
great successes were attributed to him exclusively whereas they were the work o f the 
Soviet peoples and the entire Party. At its 20th Congress the CPSU courageously put 
forward the question o f correcting the errors which were the result o f the personality 
cult. ” This clearly meant that as an old party line had become untenable, another one 
was to be substituted and conveyed to the students within the curriculum. If  errors had 
been made, the “system” was not to blame and was in fact able to take corrective action 
within the existing framework without tire need for any profound organisational changes.
The recommended reading list included nothing by Stalin: The Communist Manifesto, 
Lenin (State and Revolution), Khrushchev’s Report (Part 2), Fils du Peuple, and the 
Soviet Constitution were required reading. Furthermore, all the available material 
indicates that Stalin was slowly pushed out and there was a distinct decline in the 
quantity o f praise allocated to him in the education programmes. Philippe Robrieux also 
points out that up to 1956, the bios o f party militants had to state which o f Stalin’s 
works they had read; this question disappeared after the 20th Congress o f the CPSU.59
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“Changem ents à petits  pas  ”
The 15th Congress in 1959 saw some important leadership changes: Waldeck Rochet was 
promoted to the secretariat, Georges Marchais elected to the Politbureau and Roland 
Leroy to the Central Committee. One o f the objectives o f the Congress was the struggle 
against “le pouvoir personnel et toutes ses conséquences ” and the draft programme 
advocated "la restauration et renovation de la démocratie ”60 which was to be achieved 
by an alliance between the working class and other social categories. The Congress also 
discussed a tentative idea o f a common government programme o f the left. These 
strategies were included in the political education programmes for the early 1960s and 
taught across all levels.61 The prescribed study material defined the meaning o f the 
“Nation”, the national role o f the working class and, in accordance with the Congress 
objectives, promoted the strategy o f the unity o f working class and its alliance with the 
couches moyennes in order to achieve the stated goals.62 Also outlined were the “new 
possibilities for preventing wars” which were the result o f the success o f the “forces du 
socialisme et de la paix ”.63 As prescribed by the leadership to reinforce communist 
unity after the upheaval in 1956, the education programme focused on the PCF's own 
history, Marxist-Leninist ideology, strategy and policies (cadre training, party unity and 
structure). Only “unwavering party spirit” could overcome all difficulties and problems: 
“'Aussi, le devoir permanent de chaque membre du Parti est-il d'élever en lui-même et 
chez ses camarades l'esprit de Parti. ” Recommended reading consisted o f the 15th 
Congress documents, reports and speeches, Khrushchev's Reports to the CPSU's 20th 
and 21st Congresses, Lenin, Thorez, still one or two works by Stalin, Marx, and various 
party publications.64
In the aftermath o f the Khruschev report it was also necessary to increase the number 
o f schools and that o f “theoretically qualified” instructors who could link the 
Marxist-Leninist theory to the present political situation. "Les journées d ’étude sur le 
travail d ’éducation” took place in October 1960 at Choisy-le-Roi and as a result, 30 
federations organised 40 courses for almost 500 trainee instructors in the period 
September 1960 - September 1961. The aim of these short courses was to generally raise 
the theoretical level o f the instructors, to train them in teaching methods (how to use the
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brochures, how to direct the school, etc.), and to supervise the preparation o f teaching 
materials.65
From the organisational point o f view, the education sector claimed improved results for 
the year 1960-61 at all three levels (500 elementary schools, 140 federal schools and 
“more central schools” with no exact numbers mentioned). The students were reported 
to be younger than before (average age in federal schools was around 25 years) and their 
social composition was “more varied”.66
By the time o f the 16th Congress in 1961, the necessity for left-wing unity now 
constituted the central theme and the old slogan, “Ecarter tout ce qui divise, ne tenir 
compte que de ce qui unit", was taken up by Maurice Thorez.67 Waldeck Rochet was 
appointed deputy secretary-general; this was the beginning o f the slow aggiomamento, 
“changements à petis pas Although to critical observers many o f the changes or 
reforms seemed only skin-deep they were, nevertheless, reflected in the ideological 
activity in which the Party engaged. A new body, the CERM (Centre d ’études et de 
recherches marxistes) was set up;68 profound debates between party philosophers and 
intellectuals took place; Aragon published his Histoire de l ’URSS, a Khruschevian 
version o f Soviet history, in 1962; La Nouvelle Critique published a dossier on the cult 
o f personality in 1963; Pierre Daix wrote the preface for Solzhenitsyn’s “A Day in the 
Life o f Ivan Denisovitch”, and so on. Although much o f this and o f subsequent activity 
was clearly a case o f recognising past mistakes in order to better present a positive 
image o f the current situation in the USSR, it was also a small sign that the PCF was 
resigning itself, bon gré, mal gré, to the pursuit o f déstalinisation, albeit at its own pace 
and in its own fashion.69
Conclusion
The cumulative impact o f the harsh demands imposed on the PCF by the Zhdanov line 
in 1947 and the Party’s subsequent systematic opposition to government, its 
unconditional attachment to the Soviet Union, its unashamed idolatry o f  Stalin and 
systematic eulogy o f Soviet life, and its return to an “internationalist” and “classist”
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stance caused a steady decline in membership as it dropped from an estimated high point 
o f 800 000 in 1946 to around 250 000 in 1955.70 Other factors also contributed to the 
decline: the communist mystique o f the Resistance years was beginning to fade; France’s 
economic development, “les trente glorieuses ”, was beginning to take off; and the PCF 
had no real prospects for returning to power in the Cold War situation.
Within the isolated PCF, the often feverish activities o f the political education system 
therefore fulfilled many useful functions and its importance in propping up the 
communist movement during the early Cold War period is undeniable. First, the 
resurrected unified training system contributed to the maintenance o f unity and cohesion 
o f the rudderless Party in the absence o f a real purpose and its leader. The “school 
experience” - especially the complete progress through all the stages in which the 
students came to invest more and more o f their time, effort and life - moulded the 
students’ sense o f belonging, gave them a feeling o f comradely solidarity - seuls contre 
tous - and undoubtedly strengthened their esprit de parti. Second, the carefully planned 
catechism-like teaching o f the vital elements o f theory and practice, and o f current party 
themes, immediately provided the activists with ready-made solutions to the new 
situations which had arisen in the hostile world outside. At the same time, the system 
also maintained the status quo after the initial upheaval o f inculcating a new doctrine. 
Third, the hectic education programme eliminated a considerable amount o f 
“unproductive” leisure time which was replaced with structured study and party-related 
activities. Finally, the political education system constituted an effective mechanism for 
maintaining the leadership’s authority - especially in conflictual circumstances - as well 
as teaching and preserving the values, institutions and practices o f  the Party. It can 
therefore be argued that the Party’s ability to preserve the identity and cohesion o f its 
vast organisation and to maintain the morale o f the membership, whilst at the same time 
orchestrating multiple interest groups in the hostile political environment o f the era, was 
partly due to the way in which the party education system formed such an integral part 
o f party life and action.
As discussed in this present chapter, during most o f the Fourth Republic the PCF 
remained in a political ghetto, marginalised and cut off from any participation in power
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but enjoying the full support o f  the Soviet Union and the international communist 
movement. However, with the transformation o f both the international and the domestic 
environment, strong pressures began to build up both to force and to facilitate a process 
o f rethink and change in the Party. This was a complicated situation, as there were 
powerful influences within the PCF - namely the Thorezian leadership - advocating the 
status quo. Therefore, the adjustment to the new conditions was initially very slow: 
whilst the Party embraced with enthusiasm the theses o f peaceful coexistence and the 
peaceful road to socialism, it was extremely cautious in responding to the demands for 
an internal liberalisation programme. The “Soviet connection” was another source o f 
continual ideological and strategic tension as the PCF struggled to achieve a balance 
between its traditional international commitments and the domestic strategy necessitated 
by the budding alliance policy. The efforts made by the Party and its political education 
system to adjust to the new challenges presented by the period o f Left Unity will be the 
subject o f  the next chapter.
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C H A PTER 5
LOVE THY B R O TH ER  (1965-80)
The present chapter focuses on the development o f the party education system during 
the animated and challenging period o f left unity. We shall first examine the functioning 
o f the training system in the 1960s, as described by the then directors o f  the central 
school. The training programmes will be analysed in the context o f three main themes 
o f the era, i.e. the shifts in relations between the PCF and the PS; the role o f the working 
class in the PCF and the Party’s specific identity as the Party o f  the working class; and 
the effects o f the changes engendered on the relations between the French and Soviet 
parties by left unity. Students’ own accounts o f their “school experience” will provide 
more first-hand information about life in party schools. This information will be further 
supplemented by an investigation o f the previously untapped archives o f the Party’s 
central school (Ecole nationale), which will enable us to furnish more accurate details 
concerning the sociological composition o f the student population during the 1974-80 
period.
Although there were cautious modifications (see Chapter 4) in party thinking in the wake 
o f 1956, no significant changes appeared in the communist strategy until well after 
Maurice Thorez’ retirement as the secretary general at the 17th Congress in May 1964.' 
With Waldeck Rochet becoming the new secretary-general, a fundamental ideological 
change concerning the transition to socialism was introduced. Not only was the 
transition to be peaceful, but the idea that “only one party could lead the way to 
socialism” was abandoned. New party rules were introduced by Marchais (who now 
officially rose to the post o f secretary o f party organisation) with the intention o f 
improving internal democracy and organisation o f party cells. The Central Committee 
included 20 new members; this also, to a certain extent, seemed to mark the end o f an 
era. The main watchwords were "ACTION, UNION, COMBAT" as the alliance with the 
Socialists as a central plank in the communist strategy was reinforced. The study 
programmes were redesigned to correspond to the Congress Resolution but changes 
were superficial and cosmetic, in keeping with the cautious approach o f the Party.
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In the early days o f  the aggiornamento it was crucial to maintain a significant element 
o f the old status quo in order to preserve the identity and cohesion o f the Party which 
had taken a serious battering in 1956. To a large degree, this stability was provided by 
the rigid structure o f the party schools which continued to be run on the well-proven 
lines established in the 1940s and 1950s. This is confirmed by the extensive interviews2 
with Nicholas Pasquarelli, who was the director o f the PCF’s central schools in 1962-66 
after taking over from Marcel Rosette (see Chapter 4), and Charles Fiterman, 
Pasquarelli’s deputy. Both were experienced party men who had risen to their present 
positions through the PCF’s training establishments. Pasquarelli’s path to the top post 
at the Central School was typical: working-class origins (ouvrier professionnel qualifié, 
fraiseur-ajusteur in a metallurgical factory, both parents workers), trade union member 
{CGT-Métallurgië) and party member since 1953. In 1955, Pasquarelli was a member 
o f the federal committee, then o f the federal bureau, and from 1956 he was leading the 
Jeunesse Communiste at departmental level in Isère at which point he was asked to “do 
the schools”. Fiterman was the son o f a Jewish working-class family o f Eastern 
European origin, had trained as an electrician and joined the PCF in 1951, rising to the 
Central Committee in 1972 and the Politbureau in 1976.
Early aggiornamento at the central school
Most advanced students remained within the PCF’s own training system and attended 
the Party’s one and four-month central schools. The central school in the 1960s was 
situated at Choisy-le-Roi near Paris in a house that had belonged to Maurice Thorez. In 
1962 the premises were extended to accommodate 120 students on one-month and 
four-month courses. The school also organised shorter political training courses for 
specific target audiences (women, youth, trade unionists, etc.).
Teachers at the central school still consisted mainly o f  people from working-class 
origins rather than trained teachers, and they were usually members o f the Central 
Committee or the Politbureau. Towards the end o f Pasquarelli’s directorship, when the 
emphasis shifted towards the teaching of philosophy, more “specialised” teachers were
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called upon (for example, Roger Garaudy taught in the central school while he was a 
member o f the Politbureau). The initial choice o f teachers rested with the director, who 
also drew up a teaching programme based on the current party line and presented it to 
the Education Commission o f the Central Committee for approval. The director then 
contacted suitable people to teach the courses (see APPENDICES 5 and 6, p. 237-238). 
Each teacher then submitted an outline o f the proposed lecture or lesson which, once 
approved by the Education Commission, had to be adhered to. According to Pasquarelli, 
teachers who did not toe the line were “simply not asked again”.
In the 1960s, most students still lacked all formal education, and had only political and 
trade union experience. True to form (see Chapters 3 and 4), their lack o f education was 
more than compensated by their “thirst to learn”; as Pasquarelli put it, they were “des 
gens énormément à l ’écoute qui travaillaient beaucoup ’’ . They were o f all ages, from 
members o f  the Jeunesse communiste to middle-aged militants. Women were in a 
minority and represented only about 25% or less o f all central school students. Because 
o f the commitment o f time involved, the four-month schools in particular had few 
women although Pasquarelli claims that the situation improved by the end o f his term 
o f office.
No exact student numbers were available but according to Pasquarelli, there were 
between 20 and 80 students on the four-month course. The maximum number was 120 
which included the one-month school, the four-month school and various targeted 
training courses. Students were selected by federations which proposed “promising” 
militants to the Central Committee; the latter usually accepted the candidates without 
problem (see APPENDIX 7, p. 239, for Résumé d ’activité du militant which had to 
completed by the potential students). This was unsurprising as ‘‘people who came to 
central school had already understood, for the main part, the party line - they already had 
responsibilities in the Party”. The majority o f students were o f working-class origin but 
there were also a few managers, teachers, elected representatives, trade unionists, etc. 
Most already had responsibilities at a fairly high level in the Party (some were even 
members o f the Central Committee and Politbureau). Among Pasquarelli's students were 
the future Paris federation leaders Henri Fiszbin and Mireille Bertrand; in fact,
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Pasquarelli estimates that o f the 1991 Politbureau members about 25% had been 
“trained” by him.3
Given that the aim was to train communist militants, the theoretical aspects o f history 
(of the labour movement, the CPSU and the PCF in particular, and history o f France in 
terms o f the PCF, etc.), scientific socialism (strategy, tactics, party organisation, etc.), 
philosophy, and political economy were indispensable for providing a “scientific” 
understanding o f the evolution o f French society.4 In keeping with previous traditions, 
students were taught general culture (music, art, literature) and were prescribed 
background reading which consisted o f Marx, Engels, Lenin, and text books originating 
from the USSR.
Daily timetables were intensive and rigidly structured. A typical lecture would last from 
two to four hours and the students would have already done a considerable amount o f 
reading to prepare for it. A lecture was always followed by a discussion, usually led by 
the director o f the school. At the end o f the school, a general balance sheet was drawn 
up in which the students were asked to evaluate their learning experience. The director 
also prepared his own report and included an assessment o f  each student.5
Towards the the latter part o f Pasquarelli's directorship there was a shift away from the 
immobilism o f the Thorez era and Soviet-style texts: for example, Nikitin's book on 
political economics was abandoned and replaced with more Marx. The teaching o f State 
Monopoly Capitalism was mainly based on the PCF’s own material, which, in 
Pasquarelli’s opinion, in itself represented a major modification. This clearly 
corresponded to the changes in the Party’s ideological activity after Waldeck Rochet’s 
appointment as secretary general. Yet, although “advanced democracy” and the future 
Common Programme were the main topics o f debate, Pasquarelli felt that it was true to 
say that “ pour l'essentiel on restait encore un peu prisonnier, théoriquement, de tout 
ce qui était de l'URSS".
Control and the nurturing o f the communist community was, as in Moscow, furthered 
by dominance o f student leisure activities, including trips to places connected with the
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history o f La Commune and to Versailles in order to liven up the history lessons. The 
cultural aspect introduced by Etienne Fajon in the 1930s (see Chapter 3) was now firmly 
entrenched in the study programme with visits to museums, art galleries, concerts, the 
cinema and theatre.
In his report6 to the 18th Congress in 1967, Henri Martin revealed that during the decade 
following Khrushchev’s secret report, the PCF’s political education network had grown 
hugely: in 1957, there were 1000 students in 250 elementary schools as against 8078 in 
985 schools in 1967 (24% of whom were new members); the federal schools figures for 
1957 were 730 students in 57 schools; in 1967, this had risen to 1761 students in 157 
schools. The central school figures were from 1961 and 1967, with 290 and 569 students 
respectively in the various central schools. As 42.1% of the party members in 1967 had 
joined after 1959 and 60-65% o f the federal school students had been party members for 
less than three years, the schools were playing an essential role in introducing and 
updating the current party strategy and in steering the activists towards the Left Union.
Towards the Left Union
The Events o f  May 1968 as well as the invasion o f Czechoslovakia in August 1968 
forced the PCF to take stock o f its role and strategies. The result was the Champigny 
Manifesto,“Pour une démocratie avancée, pour une France socialiste ”. The strategy in 
the Manifesto consisted o f three main elements: left-wing joint action based on 
démocratie avancée, a nationalisation programme, and the PCF in the vanguard role as 
the party o f  the working class.7 The Manifesto also marked an important step towards 
a more realistic and open outlook, as it emphasised the Party’s intention to include les 
nouvelles couches sociales, namely the white-collared, so-called new working class 
(ITC: ingénieurs, techniciens et cadres). This, o f course, led to the perpetual ideological 
problem o f preserving unity in diversity as the Party was forced to expand its base into 
different groups. Not surprisingly, the unifying function o f the PCF’s organisational 
principle o f  democratic centralism, became all the more important since commitment 
to common strategic objectives and shared ideological values and beliefs had to be
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preserved and reinforced. Democratic centralism therefore remained intact, and the role 
o f the political training system in supplying trained activists to apply it remained crucial.
In response to the new strategy requirements, the October 1968 (revised) study 
programme included a 29-page brochure, “La marche de la France au socialisme ” 
which elucidated the ideas set out in the Manifesto.8 The brochure was divided into 
three main parts: “Why the struggle for democracy and socialism are inseparable”; 
“Why and how the peaceful passage to socialism is possible”; and “What the socialist 
society is like”. The new strategy was pluralistic, more realistic and open, and 
preparing for a strong left-wing alliance (although one stated condition for the left unity 
was that the socialists had to “abandon their class-collaborationist policies and commit 
themselves to fighting together with the PCF to win political power”). Also updated 
was the theme dealing with la lutte pour la paix. Notable modifications and additions 
included a note on the Czech invasion9 and criticism o f Mao Tse Tung for his 
“nationalistic warmongering and adventurist line”. The PCF’s main tasks in the struggle 
for peace were to put an end to the Vietnam War and to reinforce European security. 
Essential reading included Lenin, Thorez, the 18th Congress documents and various 
party publications including the Champigny Manifesto in its entirety. To circulate the 
ideas o f the Manifesto to wider party audiences, the Secretariat o f the Central 
Committee decided to organise a series o f three lectures to explain and comment on the 
salient points o f the party stance and strategy. Members o f the Politbureau prepared 
these lectures, and a special lecture programme was planned for the political training of 
instructors at section level.10
Despite the very “eventful” political year, the Party still managed to put in a huge effort 
to expand its political education work. As a result, much progress was made in all areas: 
18 500 participants at various education lectures; 8587 students in elementary schools, 
1591 in federal schools, 3365 participants in 264 study circles and 474 trainee 
instructors on 22 teacher training courses.11
The 17th Congress in 1970 was marked by a change o f leadership with Georges 
Marchais becoming the de-facto leader o f the Party because o f Waldeck Rochet's illness,
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and the run-up to the signing o f the Common Programme in 1972. Marchais’ rise to the 
top was marked by a mixture o f "ouverture et fermeture ”.n “Ouverture ” was reflected 
in Marchais’ style o f leadership: compared with the staid Waldeck Rochet, Marchais 
was presented as a dynamic leader, “simple et franc ”, popular with party militants and 
extremely combative in the media. “Fermeture”, on the other hand, applied to 
ideological issues, the functioning o f the party apparatus and the PCF-CPSU relations 
where the Party fell back on its old traditions. The Congress again confirmed the 
strategy of the left union and a common programme for a left-wing government. With 
these developments, there was the constant battle o f  having to reinforce and extend 
theoretical knowledge. “'Our theoretical education work is linked to the Party's 
ideological struggle and it must therefore correspond entirely to the political objectives 
o f the moment,” wrote Marchais in May 1971.13 The congress themes therefore again 
formed the basis o f the revised training programmes, i.e. the new stage in the State 
Monopoly Capitalism; advanced democracy as a stage towards socialism; unity o f  the 
working class and union o f all popular forces; the ideological and organisational 
principles o f the PCF; proletarian internationalism; national independence and 
international co-operation; and the struggle for peace.
In June 1971, Marchais published an important article in L ’Humanité, "La société 
française est en crise”, which was in fact the Party’s analysis o f  French society at that 
time and remained so for years to come. The Party’s theoretical work and teaching 
focused largely on this analysis o f  the crisis, and Jean Burlès, party theorist and central 
school director and teacher, further expanded the theme in his book “Le PCF dans la 
société française", 14 Under Burlès’ influence and as a response to May 1968, the 
teaching o f philosophy - the essence o f understanding that “toutes les choses sont en 
mouvement" - was improved and increased.
Henri Martin again gave a very detailed report15 to the 17th Congress concerning the state 
o f the party education system in 1970 (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below). The Party had 
acquired 44 000 new members and as a consequence, student numbers at all levels had 
risen once more. At elementary level, there had been a 21.4% increase in the number o f 
students (10 416 students) but even so it meant that only 25% of the new membership
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had received basic political training. Federal school student numbers were up by 29.3% 
but attendance and organisation were unevenly spread between federations (Martin 
complained that 12 federations had not held a single school since I960!). Central 
schools had been particularly busy during holiday periods and “double schools” had 
been run. Educational lectures (990) were held for 32 300 participants, 172 study circles 
were held for 3 800 people and special 1-3 day courses were organised for various 
target groups such as instituteurs, ITC, etc. At the central school level, it was planned 
to organise new-type recyclage courses to update and explain party strategy in the 
run-up to the Common Programme. Thus, in M artin’s words, the Party’s educational 
machine was in good health and was confidently expected to respond to the ideological 
demands posed by the Left Union period.
TABLE 5.1 Elem entary Schools 1966-73
Year
No. o f  
students 
participating
Accumulative 
increase/decrease 
on previous year
No. o f  
schools 
organised
Accumulative 
increase/decrease 
on previous year
1966-67 7 3 7 3 845
1967-68 8587 + 1 2 1 4 1007 +  162
1968-69 8 571 -16 998 -9
1969-70 10 4 16 +  1829 1 1 4 5 + 1 3 8
19 70 -71 7 1 6 5 -3 2 5 1 804 -341
1 9 7 1 - 7 2 8208 + 10 4 3 894 +90
19 7 2 -7 3 12012 + 380 4 1295 +401
Source: Archives o f the PCF, 2 place du Colonel-Fabien. Interview with Henri Martin, 
31.3.1992.
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TABLE 5.2 P arty  Schools 1969-72
Type o f school 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72
Elementary schools:
No. o f schools held 1145 804 894
No. o f students 10416 7165 8208
Federal schools:
No. o f schools held 168 150 178
No. o f students 2410 2271 2483
Educational lectures:
No. o f participants 32 200 18 500 10 280
Study circles:
No. o f circles held - 55 87
No. o f participants - 1175 2000
Central schools:
(one and four months) 
No. o f students 401 492 651
Source: Archives ofthe PCF, 2 place du Colonel-Fabien. Interview witli Henri Martin, 
31.3.1992.
"L 'union est un combat"
The Left Union period was an extremely animated one for the PCF and for that reason, 
we shall limit our focus on the presentation in the study programmes o f the most 
relevant themes, namely the process and problems o f the Left Union; the role o fth e  
working class in a Communist Party attempting to woo the middle classes; and the 
PCF’s changing attitude towards the USSR and the other socialist countries. As the 
primary archival material available for this period is particularly detailed and rich, we 
are able to present and analyse hitherto unexplored information concerning the students' 
sociological composition and their time spent at party schools.
The Common Programme was signed in June 1972, and in the July-August issue of 
Cahiers du communisme10 André Boursier (who taught at the Central School) wrote
- 160-
about the changes to the Party's education programmes prompted by "l'intensité de la 
bataille idéologique” which necessitated an even greater effort to master theory. Two 
modifications were introduced: first, the relationship between theory and practice 
(policy) was tipped in favour o f theory ("étudier la politique sur la base des principes 
théoriques")', and second, teaching was to be oriented towards the students’ personal 
work. The aim was to arm the future cadres with a real method o f thought and analysis 
and thus encourage them towards permanent study: "L'école ne peut former des 
'communistes accomplis'mais elle doit leur donner les moyens d'y parvenir.” According 
to Henri Martin, by about this time, the schools had gone back to reading Marx "in the 
original": "Dès 1970, on lisait directement Marx dans le texte; pendant une période, on 
lisait Marx à travers Lénine, avant, à travers Staline - ce qui était très mauvais... " This 
cut out a great deal o f unnecessary explanation and enabled the militants to take direct 
action on the basis o f Marxist theory; as Martin put it, "C'est mieux qu'attendre L'Huma 
du lendemain ou d'avoir une réunion de la direction pour répondre.”17
The schémas18 distributed to the federal school teachers in September 1972 by the 
Section d ’éducation illustrated the new trend towards the teaching o f more philosophy. 
However, the topical theme was naturally that o f  “unité et union populaire French 
society was portrayed as in a deep crisis, with the battle against the “conservative 
forces” now taking place in new conditions, thanks to the Common Programme. The 
unity o f the working class was the crucial prerequisite for the formation o f a wide 
“rassemblement contre les monopoles, pour une démocratie avancée Yet, the setting 
up o f a “front unique et l ’union populaire ” was not a matter o f circumstance, tactic or 
sentiment: it was a permanent feature o f  the class struggle and did not signify the 
abandonment o f  that struggle - in fact, it would be an enriching element. The students 
were reminded that the Common Programme did not “constitute an ideological 
agreement”, which was “neither desirable nor possible”. The PCF’s role within the Left 
Union was to provide the only guarantee o f  unity and for this, the Party needed to be 
“ideologically strong”.
As befitted the new era o f wooing the middle classes, the schéma outlining the theme 
“Les classes sociales et le rôle national de la classe ouvrière’’ devoted a substantial
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section to the growing importance o f “les couches intermédiaires des salariés ” and the 
increasing role o f the intellectuals. These couches intermédiaires no longer represented 
a single homogeneous category but rather a constantly changing mass o f people. The 
traditional groups were getting smaller; new groups were making their appearance 
thanks to scientific and technological progress; employés as a category resembled more 
and more the working class as a result o f capitalist exploitation; the ITC group was in 
a contradictory situation as both producers and collectors o f profit but was rapidly 
joining the working class; and finally, the number o f  teachers (intellectuals) was 
growing steadily. Therefore, “alliance - mais non intégration" was all the more 
necessary. This was understood by the Party in theory, but putting it into practice proved 
to be more difficult and posed a formidable problem to the political education system, 
which now faced the task o f providing training for many more members representing the 
new categories.
The study experience o f Bernard Pudal19 illustrates the problems encountered by the 
party education system, which had not caught up with the needs o f  the new type o f 
student. Pudal’s background was that o f a typical intellectual at the time: génération 68, 
student at the Institut des sciences sociales du travail o f Paris University, and a PCF 
member since 1968. As a cell secretary in Vitry-sur-Seine and intellectual, Pudal soon 
encountered the distrust o f the party apparatus, which was concerned about the arrival 
o f “ces étudiants barbus et chevelus ”. Nevertheless, in an effort to “check” him, Pudal 
was told to participate in a two-week federal school held in an internat in the early 
1970s. Impressed by the Party’s ouvriérisme, he was keen to “go and imitate the 
working-class members o f whom we [university students] did not really know anything 
at all” . The content o f the school programme made no impression on Pudal: “Je n 'ai 
aucun souvenir du contenu! Aucun! Aucun souvenir du contenu!" However, what he 
does remember is the atmosphere, a very “studious, warm atmosphere”, which he found 
very moving because he “was going to school with workers who had responsibilities in 
trade unions”. For Pudal, the training course thus represented his idea o f the “unity o f 
theory and practice”: it was a “kind of emotional and sentimental reconciliation with the 
Party” for the type o f student he represented who had “learned at university about the 
history o f the labour movement” and now sat at the party training school seeing it with
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his own eyes and was “part o f it”. His experience was “comparable to the Holy 
Communion” which was accelerated and reinforced by the mental and physical isolation 
during the school period. So overwhelmed was he by the atmosphere that during his 
fortnight, despite severe toothache, he could not bring himself to break away from his 
comrades to see a dentist: “Et pour rien du monde je  n ’aurais quitté l ’école, pour me 
faire arracher la dent - je  ne voulais absolument pas! Pour moi, c ’est surtout un 
indicateur du désir d ’être avec, d ’être de ce populisme dont on est porteur. Moi, j'étais 
porteur. ” Although he had “not gained anything” from the course content, he did not 
dismiss it as altogether unsuitable: “It was not the content, the training was not all that 
conservative for the workers involved. It was just not for people like me. In fact, the 
school was very much an occasion to test us, and I was a little suspect...”
Pudal was not the only one o f his genre. There were many others who, because o f their 
higher level o f education, were not suited to the kind o f training that the Party was still 
providing. Another notable example was Jean-Marie Argelès who was the secretary o f 
the Paris federation 1971-79 and an agrégé (holder o f the highest teaching qualification 
in France). He had “managed to avoid all party schools”20 until 1978, when he was 
finally persuaded to participate in a two-week stage de recyclage. Both Pudal and 
Argelès (Argelès had nevertheless taught in central schools) thought that the simplistic 
training programmes and methods were an important factor in the Party’s decline in the 
1980s. Although the party education officials were making attempts to adapt the 
syllabus and style to respond to the needs o f the new type o f student by including more 
philosophy and theory, the task was a most difficult balancing act since a certain amount 
o f “simplicity” had to be retained for the majority. As Pudal put it, “Les écoles 
élémentaires, les manuels, ça parait aux gens avec le baccalauréat un peu dérisoire... 
les cadres ouvriers, oui. ”
Partly to address shortcomings o f this kind, Marie-Hélène Lavallard (teaching Marxist 
philosophy at the central school) was asked to organise new theoretical training courses 
for wider audiences at all levels in the form of mass lectures, study circles and stages de 
perfectionnement théorique. They were to take place in special centres de formation 
permanente which would dispense political training à la carte.21
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A typical stage de perfectionnement22 in the 1970s aimed to update the thinking in the 
main areas o f philosophy, political economy and current party policy. These subject 
areas were treated in presentations and discussions and through a personal reading 
programme. The bibliography to read included Marx and Engels, Lenin, Cahiers du 
communisme (covering the 18th, 19th and 20th Congresses), the newly published Traité 
d'économie politique, the journal Economie et politique, texts by Waldeck Rochet and 
by the up-and-coming party economist Philippe Herzog, the Champigny Manifesto 
(1968), the PCF’s new programme “Changer de cap” (1971), the text o f the Common 
Programme, and Marchais's “Le Défi démocratique” (1973). An additional section was 
devoted to party history, Notions d'histoire, which covered topics such as the history of 
the international labour movement, the history o f the USSR, and also included lectures 
on the People's Democracies and the national liberation movements. French history was 
dealt with from the point o f view o f the French labour movement (Notions d ’histoire de 
la Nation et du Mouvement ouvrier français) and the history o f the PCF.
Cultural aspects were not forgotten, and lectures were given on Descartes, Molière, 
Diderot and the Encyclopaedists, Balzac, Aragon, Soviet literature and sciences. 
However, the comment made by Raymond Constans, who participated in the two-week 
update course described above and worked hard to catch up with the new thinking, 
speaks volumes o f the Party’s retard almost two decades after the CPSU’s 20lh 
Congress: "The schools enabled me to question ‘Stalinism’; from that point o f view, the 
1974 training course helped me a lot.” This short comment is an apt illustration o f the 
general resistance to change which had prevailed in the Party and within its political 
education system for almost two decades.
After the 21st (Extraordinary) Congress in October 1974, the PCF leadership decided 
that even greater educational efforts had to be made to maintain the Party's ability to 
respond to the growing Socialist threat. Etienne Fajon, the tireless organiser o f  the 
training system, was brought back to head the vital political education section once 
more. This seemed an odd choice at the time, given Fajon’s Thorezian credentials and 
well-known conservatism23 and is probably an indication o f the Party’s internal power
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struggles between the supporters and opponents o f the Left Union. Whatever the 
reasons, there was no doubt about his organisational ability: a year later, Fajon presented 
his report24 to the Central Committee for the period August 1974 - August 1975. At the 
highest level, two four-month and 12 one-month central schools had been held with over 
600 students participating. Special two-week courses for certain target groups (women, 
working-class activists, peasants) had also been organised at this level. As for federal 
schools, 220 schools had been run for 3327 students from 85 federations. Statistics for 
elementary schools had not yet been collated, but a new brochure had been printed and 
all 50 000 copies had been distributed. Henri Martin observed that for the last five or six 
years, elementary school student numbers had been virtually doubling: “What 
characterises most o f the new members - and especially the young people who are the 
most numerous - is their obvious soif d ’apprendre, a willingness to understand WITH 
the Party, IN the Party, the profound reasons for the crisis and to discover the means to 
really get out o f the crisis and to march towards a socialist society.”25 Thus, great efforts 
were being made to provide both old and new members o f the Party with new tools to 
move the Party towards “socialism in French colours”.
“Socialism e aux couleurs de la France”
The 22nd Congress in 1976 was generally considered by the Communists as a turning 
point in terms o f competition for ideological ground with the Socialists. Modifications 
to the training programme started to appear in the study programmes in the summer o f 
1976. Whereas philosophy and political economy were not subject to any major 
overhauls, “scientific socialism”, dealing with the application o f theory to the current 
political situation, underwent a number o f changes in order to reflect the new party line.
All levels o f political training incorporated the new ideas promoted by the 22nd 
Congress. The 1976 training manual, Les principes de la politique du PCF,26 elucidated 
the modifications as follows: "le socialisme aux couleurs de la France" did not 
correspond to the idea o f “dictatorship o f the proletariat” which is why the Congress had 
decided to abandon this notion. Moreover, although the PCF's revolutionary tenets were 
reiterated it was pointed out that "revolution is not synonymous with violence. Civil war
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does not figure in the objectives o f  our Party. " The changes that had taken place within 
French society were also explained to the students. According to the Party, the working 
class was expanding: "Far from getting smaller, the working class constitutes the 
essential body o f salaried workers", a result o f the changes in the composition o f the 
couches intermédiaires. Consequently, the leading role o f the working class in the 
alliance was not diminishing but growing. On the subject o f the Left Union, it still 
remained a "combat"', firstly, because the bourgeoisie was making every effort to break 
it, and secondly, because “this pressure was not without echo within the PS". This was 
why the PCF had to pursue its ideological and political struggle against “reformist ideas 
and practices”: "Pour une union forte, il faut un Parti communiste fort. " Battle lines 
were clearly being drawn up.
The second important topic emerging during the Left Union and closely linked to the 
alliance, was that o f the leading role o f the working class. The four-month school held 
in February-June 1976 had on the reading list an article written by Marcel Zaidner 
(teaching at the central school), "Les ouvriers en grand nombre dans les directions - 
pourquoi?". This was the Party's justification for workerism: the PCF was, after all, the 
party o f the working class - therefore, it was only natural that it should be led by workers 
(49.6% o f the Central Committee were workers in 197627). The CP was the only party 
to create the conditions for workers to participate directly in “the reflection, 
implementation and direction” o f political action at all levels. In this way, explained 
Zaidner, the Party had changed the situation in France: "Workers can be a leading, active 
and conscious force with a right to political leadership; a modem conquest o f the 
working class is the work o f the PCF. ” This was not to say that militants from other 
social classes were not given an equal chance: "All Communists have the same rights 
... that is the democratic rule o f the Party.”
Zaidner continued the same workerist theme in the Cahiers du communisme,28 also on 
the central school reading list. He explained that one o f the original features o f the 
Party’s cadre policy was that it favoured the training and promotion o f working-class 
cadres. Unfortunately for France, wrote Zaidner, workers had been kept out o f 
government since 1947. If  there were any workers in politics at higher levels, “it was
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virtually all thanks to the PCF”. All this tied up neatly with the realisation o f the PCF 
that it was not making enough headway in competing with the PS over the new middle 
classes; a return to the tried and tested was therefore going to be the only alternative.
By the end of 1977, the updating o f the Common Programme had become a crucial issue 
in the PCF-PS alliance. The four-month school held in September 1977 - January 1978 
presented the students with "Dossier no. 1: PS - front de classe, union du peuple de 
France (Diffusion strictement intérieure) "29 which contained a number o f key articles 
on the subject for the students to study and discuss.
Guy Perrimond's article in the Dossier, "Eurocommunisme et compromis historique" 
(originally published in L'Unité, 18-24.11.1977) reviewed the 60th anniversary o f the 
October Revolution in a critical way which was typical o f  the “independent” mood 
reigning in the PCF: "Enrico Berlinguer, s ’il se rend à Moscou, ne songe qu'à critiquer; 
Santiago Carrillo, lui, est contraint de se taire et Georges Marchais, plus simplement, 
est resté à Paris. " Apart from distancing itself from the USSR, there were other facets 
to the PCF's Eurocommunism: like the Italian and Spanish CPs, the French party was 
simply forced to introduce these policy shifts because o f the changed (and changing) 
domestic political situation (i.e. the growing popularity o f the PS) - or perhaps it was 
even tempted to try its own "compromis historique" as Perrimond suggests. The PCF's 
dilemma in the approach o f the 1978 legislative elections was outlined clearly and 
openly and for this reason, it is worth quoting here in its entirety:
"[Face à cela] le PCF n'avait aucune alternative que changer ou aller [,..] de 
l'opportunisme - l'union du peuple de France - au sectarisme - la situation 
actuelle. Et parfois, ce qui n 'a rien d'étonnant, pratiquer les deux en même 
temps. Qui n'a pas été étonné par les modifications brutales du PC sur l ’armée, 
sur l'Europe? Qui n'a pas trouvé étranges certains appels à la bourgeoisie non 
monopoliste, à l'Eglise? Dans l'incapacité, compte tenu de la réalité française, 
de proposer un véritable compromis historique comme le font - avec quelques 
difficultés d'ailleurs - les communistes italiens, le PCF voulant tout à la fois 
protéger ses terres préservées [...], son organisation et quelques principes 
qu'elle n'a pas encore mis en question, et tenter d'élargir l'alliance au point d ’y  
noyer le PS, le PCF donc ne pouvait que retrouver des habitudes que l'on 
espérait perdues. [...] Ce repliement sur soi - masqué par un oecuménisme 
militant - est le signe de la profonde crise d'identité que connaissent les 
différents PC, et notamment le PCF. La dialectique de l'union le contraint en
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effet à des choix encore déchirants. OU accepter la logique du processus et, en 
même temps que poursuivre la dérussification, s'engager dans une 
'déstalinisation' véritable. C'est-à-dire, modifier ce à quoi les communistes 
tiennent 'comme à la prunelle de leurs yeux'. OU tenter d'être à la fois plus 'à 
gauche' et plus 'ouvert'sans toucher au Parti lui-même et à ses principes. C'est 
ce qui se passe en ce moment. [...] Il est évident qu'une telle attitude ne peut 
être que provisoire. "
Perrimond's honesty and outspokenness in his appraisal o f the PCF's predicament were 
impressive. Equally impressive and indicative o f the more liberal thinking - at the time 
- was the central school's decision to treat the subject so openly, albeit amidst a 
“'trusted”' trainee cadre audience. Unfortunately, we do not know what kind o f a debate 
or reaction ensued on the basis o f Perrimond's article; it was certainly included in the 
study programme to give food for thought.
Eurocommunism in political education: a subtle shift
Eurocommunism was a term used to define the changed attitudes during the 1970s o f 
at least three o f the communist parties o f Western Europe. It covered their theoretical 
stances, strategies and behaviour in relation to the USSR, to communist countries and 
to the international communist movement and, additionally, to Western Europe and the 
parties’ respective countries.30 There were circumstantial reasons for Eurocommunism 
which include the decline o f the Soviet myth; the disintegration o f the international 
communist movement (as evidenced by the Sino-Soviet dispute); the fact that any 
attachment to the USSR was now considered a handicap in the national power stakes; 
and the process o f détente which enabled the communist parties to further their 
autonomy from the Soviet Union.31
The changing policies o f the PCF in the 1970s can best be understood in the context of 
the Party's competition with the PS for left-wing hegemony. Thus, the signing o f the 
Common Programme opened up a new era in the Communist-Socialist relationship and 
this obviously had consequences for the Party's international relations. The PCF's 
fraternal relationship with Moscow started to cool off as the Party sought to disengage 
itself from many aspects o f Soviet influence. However, despite its limitations and the 
fact that the strategy was an obvious tactical necessity in the PCF's competition with the
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rejuvenated PS, the PCF's Eurocommunist phase was also a real and symbolic - albeit 
short-lived - “act o f defiance”expressed by la fille aînée against the father figure o f 
socialism.
From 1975 onward, the PCF criticised the USSR in certain political and ideological 
matters. In October 1975, the Party "deplored" the incarceration o f the Soviet dissident 
Leonid Plyushch in a mental hospital. The Politbureau also criticised the Soviet labour 
camps shown in a television documentary.32 Jean Elleinstein, a leading party historian, 
published L'histoire de l'URSS and L'histoire du phénomène stalinien which revealed 
some unpalatable truths about the Soviet Union but which, at the same time, 
“disengaged the PCF from its historical responsibility”.33 Marchais used the term 
“Stalinism” for the first time in May 1975 - but with the qualification that "le PCF 
n'était pas concerné par cela".34 (Yet, it was not until 1977 that the PCF admitted 
"officially" that its delegation had in fact known about Khruschchev's secret speech in 
1956 - this had been flatly denied for 20 years.35)
As for the international Communist movement, the PCF remained an active member and 
participated in the various conferences organised by communist parties across Europe.36 
Bilateral relations were also cultivated, in particular with the PCI and PCE, although 
here, too, there were differences (the PCI, in particular, was much more critical o f the 
USSR and Eastern bloc countries, more open to dialogue and in favour o f a more 
far-reaching modernisation programme).
As a result o f the extensive criticism directed towards the USSR by the PCF, the 
relations between the two parties deteriorated to such an extent that no Soviet leadership 
representative attended the PCF's 22nd Congress in 1976. Marchais in turn did not go 
the CPSU's 25th Congress in Moscow. However, as we saw in Chapter 1, the period of 
“separation” was never complete and definite, since throughout the 1975-78 strategy the 
PCF maintained effective Unies with the USSR and continued to sing the praises o f  the 
Socialist bloc. Expanding autonomy and distance were not to be confused with actual 
anti-Sovietism. Therefore, the complete reversal o f the 1975-78 policy never came as 
a complete surprise - rather it was consistent with the Party's previous record o f
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volte-face and the fact that the leadership was never really too clear about how far the 
PCF could or should pursue the new goals in changed and constantly changing 
circumstances.
As usual, the tactical shifts in the relations between the PCF and the CPSU were also 
reflected by the political education programmes. Unlike 1956, this time there were no 
abrupt changes; rather the conspicuousness o f Soviet-linked topics was reduced subtly 
as the focus moved from the CPSU and Soviet history to the PCF and French history 
during the ‘independent’ Eurocommunist phase. Between 1972 and 1979 the Soviet 
Union and other socialist countries appeared to become just one subject among many, 
rather than being the alpha and omega o f political training. On the basis o f the study 
programmes and schémas that were available, it is possible to make the following 
observations as regards this subtle evolution which was clearly linked with the PCF’s 
current Left Alliance tactics:
- Between the PCF’s 20th Congress in 1972 and the 22nd Congress in 1976, the USSR 
was dealt with in all study programmes in the section "Notions d'histoire" which 
included themes such as “The Nation and the labour movement (from feudalism to the 
Commune and 1917)”; history o f the PCF (1917-58); history o f the USSR; the 
international communist movement; Latin America, China and the Middle East (or other 
regions). The section concerning the USSR usually also included extensive travail 
personnel, with students researching much of the subject themselves and presenting their 
ideas in discussions.
- After the 22nd Congress in 1976, the emphasis in "Notions d'histoire" shifted to tire 
history o f the PCF; the history o f the USSR became conspicuous by its virtual absence. 
Other themes under "Notions d'histoire" concerned the international communist 
movement, the October Revolution and the III International.37 The subsequent 
four-month school held from September 1977 to January 1978 additionally featured the 
socialist countries in Europe. During 1978, "Notions d'histoire" only presented the 
history o f the Nation and that o f the PCF (1917-72). The themes o f the international 
communist movement, the socialist countries in Europe and "the new international
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situation" had been moved to the end o f the section dealing with scientific socialism.38 
The old tradition o f sending “promising” cadres to perfect their political education in 
Moscow also came to an end in the mid-1970s as the PCF began to distance itself from 
the CPSU.39
- It was not until after the 23rd Congress in 1979 which marked the return o f the PCF 
to the Soviet fold that the study programmes again included a clearly defined and 
detailed section dealing with the Soviet bloc.40. This tied up with the recommencement 
o f the summit meetings with the CPSU in July 1979 with Maxim Gremetz and Boris 
Ponomarev meeting in Moscow.41
Jean-Marie Argelès, who attended a two-week cours de recyclage in 1978, confirms the 
process described above. In 1978, his study programme was still based on the 
guidelines issued by the 22nd Congress in 1976: the history o f the USSR and CPSU was 
still “taught” but, at the same time, the USSR was heavily criticised. According to 
Argelès, “the language used at school was much more critical than that o f  the Party 
which was already preparing its 23rd Congress; the party line was therefore already 
hardening up whereas the school was still being run along the lines o f the 22nd 
Congress”.42
Thus, neither the Party nor the study programmes shut all the doors during the PCF's 
Eurocommunist period. Rather than simply abandoning the Soviet theme (an 
impossibility in any case: it was one thing to deny the existence o f a “model” but quite 
another to deny the Party's raison d'êtrel), its importance was tactically played down, 
for the time being. Wise from past experience, the PCF leadership clearly wanted to 
keep its options open whilst waiting to see which way the uneasy competition for 
left-wing hegemony at home was going.
“Ferm ez la télé, lisez L  ’H um anitél  ’*3
The collapse o f the Left Union and the Left's election defeat in the March 1978 
legislative elections was the catalyst for the internal crisis which had been brewing in
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the Party, in particular amongst the party intellectuals. "Le Parti et les intellectuels" had 
been a study theme in the central schools for a long time but it now acquired a new 
urgency and special significance in view o f the explosive situation. The students 
participating in the four-month central school from September 1978 to January 1979 had 
a dossier44 o f articles to prepare for a discussion about the role o f intellectuals in the 
Party. These included Georges Marchais' "Le Parti et les intellectuels", Jacques 
Chambaz's article published in Cahiers du communisme (no. 2, 1977), François 
Hincker's article (no. 10,1977) and a copy o f Marchais' speech to the party intellectuals 
at the famous Politbureau meeting in Vitry 9-10.12.1978. In the last-mentioned 
document, after discussing the whole spectrum o f party policy45 Marchais finally 
approached the subject o f “intellectuals in the Party”. The criticism expressed by the 
intellectuals as regards the organisational principles o f the Party (democratic centralism) 
received short shrift: "... it is a revolutionary condition, a condition for the realisation 
o f the democratic way and o f socialism in France." Marchais robustly rejected the 
“wholly unjustified” accusation that the Party held its intellectuals in contempt: "Our 
Party, the party o f the working class has at this veiy moment amongst its members tens 
o f thousands o f men and women exercising all manner o f professions. [...] Today our 
Party has itself become ‘un intellectuel collectif which elaborates its own theory and 
policy. Our party intellectuals in their entirety contribute to this task.” It was made clear 
to the students that although the Politbureau fully acknowledged the validity o f  the 
discussion concerning the intellectuals and had undertaken to tackle the problems caused 
by Stalinism as well as to improve the functioning o f democratic centralism, there was 
to be no shift on the essential issues raised by the dissatisfied intellectuals as the Party 
limped towards its 23rd Congress. Marchais’ attitude was a perfect illustration o f what 
was fundamental to the whole history o f the PCF: tactics were changeable whereas 
party practices, structures, basic doctrine and ideology were not. Any further 
development o f Eurocommunist ideas was thus abandoned, and the schools had to 
convey this new volte-face to their students.
The 23rd Congress caught the PCF in the midst o f a vacuum and confusion, "sans 
aucune stratégie de pouvoir"f  True to form, the study programmes mirrored the major 
changes imposed by the 23rd Congress themes. It took the education section the rest o f
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the year 1979 before a revamped syllabus was ready for use. In September 1979, the 
education programmes were introducing the Party's ideas on any future union “from 
below”, in "Une voie nouvelle pour une union nouvelle"?1 a lecture by Henri Martin who 
had now taken on the directorship o f the central school (1977-83). “Advanced 
democracy” (a fixed stage) now gave way to “democratic advance”, achieved through 
a progressive series o f struggles to attain the goal o f socialisme autogestionnaire in order 
to replace State Monopoly Capitalism. Party theory was no longer described as 
“Marxism-Leninism” but as “scientific socialism”, a real science which was constantly 
being enriched and expanded. By March 1980, a new study programme48 for the 
one-month central schools was out. The brochure was now called officially "Socialisme 
scientifique” as decided by the Congress and divided into four sections: philosophy, 
political economy, theory and social reality, and Party history. In the section dealing 
with the PCF in French society, the Party reaffirmed its revolutionary identity as 
opposed to the reformist PS with catch phrases such as "l'essence révolutionnaire se 
développe de manière concrète"; "parti révolutionnaire et théorie révolutionnaire"; 
"formes d'organisation et de fonctionnement permettent au parti révolutionnaire 
d'exprimer son essence" - a clear reference to the maintenance o f democratic centralism 
in the Party. Finally, by May 1980, a more developed version49 o f the study programme 
clearly confirmed the return in force o f  the themes concerning the USSR and other 
socialist countries under their own heading as the bilan globalement positif became a 
formidable bilan de réalisations positives in June 1980.50
The student population of the central schools 1974-80: dém ocratie avancée?
According to Philippe Robrieux, militants chosen to go to the one-month central school 
had in fact already been preselected to become party functionaries; to have been selected 
for the four-month school therefore meant a definite career in the Party51 and a material 
dependence on it. Given the school’s role in elite recruitment it is thus important to 
establish what kind o f people formed the central schools' student population. Up to this 
point, it has not been possible to provide accurate and reliable details as primary archival 
material has only been available to a limited degree. For this period, however, the
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archives o f the Ecole nationale du PCF at Draveil (Essonne) have provided a wealth of 
information.
The sociological composition o f the student population
Henri Martin was the director o f the Central School in 1977-83 after being involved with 
other aspects o f cadre training for many years. Like his predecessors, he also had risen 
to his post through the “system”.52 Bom in 1927 to a Communist father and Catholic 
mother, Martin had left school at the age o f thirteen to start work as a steelworker. 
During the war he joined the PCF “through patriotism” and joined the merchant navy 
as a mechanic after the war. He was arrested for complicity in sabotage on board his 
ship (he was innocent) and for spreading communist propaganda against the Indo-China 
war, and was sentenced to five years in prison in 1950. This made him a party hero, and 
popular campaigns for his liberation were organised; he was finally freed in 1953. 
Martin participated in the four-month central school in 1954 straight from prison and 
became a full-time party functionary, rising to the Central Committee in 1956. Under 
Henri Martin's leadership the Central Education Section kept detailed records o f the one- 
month and four-month central schools (information concerning elementary and federal 
schools was less complete, as it depended on the efficiency and willingness o f the cells 
and federations to return data). In general, 10 one-month and two four-month central 
schools were organised every year (in 1977 and 1978, there were 8 one-month schools 
and in 1979 there were 9 in that year and only one four-month school, probably because 
o f the various elections and the 23rd Congress which all kept the Party organisation 
busy). Records were kept on student numbers, the percentage o f female students, the 
average age o f students, their occupation, the year they had joined the PCF, their level 
o f  responsibility in the Party, their membership in trades unions and other mass 
movements, and their resposibilities and duties as elected representatives on local, 
regional and national level.
Certain problems were encountered in analysing the data revealed in these records. First, 
numbers do not always add up as students may have joined courses later or dropped out, 
and this was not always accurately recorded in the final figures. Second,
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socio-professional categories detailed in our analysis only include the main groups 
(workers, clerical workers /employés, ITC or ingénieurs, techniciens et cadres, and 
teachers/researchers) as only insignificant and often inconsistent figures for other 
occupations are shown; therefore, they do not have much bearing on the overall picture 
which emerges. It is also worth mentioning here that the definition o f ouvrier is 
somewhat deceptive since it is virtually impossible to know when the individual 
concerned last exercised that profession; indeed, most students in the four-month central 
school were already full-time party or trades union officials. As always with the PCF, 
it was the individual's original profession which remained with them throughout their 
life - once an ouvrier, always an ouvrier,53
One-month schools 1974-80
The archives available at the Ecole centrale du PCF at Draveil contained details o f six 
schools for 1974 (total number o f schools held not available); o f all ten schools held in 
1975 and 1976; o f all eight held in 1977; o f seven in 1978 (out o f eight held); o f all nine 
in 1979; and o f six in 1980 (of ten held).
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T A B L E  5.3 O n e-m o n th  cen tra l sch o o ls  1974-1980  (g e n e ra l ly  10 s c h o o l s  a  y e a r ;  no.
o f  s c h o o l s  w i th  d e ta i l s  a v a i la b le  s h o w n  in b ra c k e ts )
Jo in ed  
th e  P C F
1974
(6 )
1975
(1 0 )
1976
(1 0 )
1977
(8)
1978
(7 )
1979
(0 )
1980
(6 )
T o ta l P e rc en tag e
N u m b e r  o f  
s tu d e n ts 368 5 7 0 544 6 2 7 41 1 286 2 4 2 326 3
W o m e n 79 132 135 176 103 82 69 776 2 3 .8 %
A v e ra g e  ag e 28.5 29 29 29 30 29 30
A v . ag e  
29
W o rk e rs 85 178 169 215 121 98 75 941 2 8 .8 %
E m p lo y e s 90 113 110 131 84 61 55 6 4 4 19 .7%
IT C 61 89 1 11 97 52 32 4 0 4 8 2 14 .8%
T e a c h e rs  / 
R e se a rc h e rs 94 123 98 110 109 58 38 6 3 0 19 .3%
1945-
55
3 7 5 5 2 1 - 23 0 .7 %
1956- 
68
1 10 2 0 6 175 109 72 36 39 747 2 2 .9 %
1969- 222 3 5 6 361 503 326 171 203 2 1 4 2 6 5 .6 %
M e m b e rs  o f  
m ass  m o v em e n ts 120 105 123 113 113 50 66 6 9 0 2 1 .1 %
E lected
re p re se n ta tiv e s 12 14 6 49 62 25 21 189 5 .8 %
Source: Calculated from archival data o f the Ecole nationale du Parti communiste 
français (Draveil, Essonne)
The records show that 3263 students were trained in 1974-80 (however, to that figure 
there must be added the “missing” student numbers, i.e. nine schools with an average 
o f perhaps 40 plus students per school, suggesting a total number well over 3500). O f 
the 3263 recorded students, 776 were women (23.8%). The average age o f the students 
was 29 years. Manual and clerical workers were in majority: 941 manual (28.8%) and 
644 clerical workers (19.7%). Teachers/researchers followed closely behind with 630 
students (19.3%) and the ITC category was also well represented with 482 students 
(14.8%); this showed clearly the new type o f militant typical o f the Left Union period. 
The socio-professional breakdown o f the one-month schools thus indicates a good 
mixture and bears witness to the Party's efforts to attract a following from outside its 
traditional clientèle.
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The vast majority o f the one-month central school students had joined the PCF after 
1969 (65.6%). Here the records are somewhat muddled as different party officials have 
used different definitions for dates o f joining, which leads to some overlapping. Mass 
movement membership embraced a wide spectrum o f organisations from the Jeunesse 
communiste to Parents d'élèves and the Secours rouge (21.1% o f all students). Finally, 
about 6% were elected representatives (from local councillors to mayors).
Four-month schools 1974-80
Two four-month central schools were held every year 1974-80 (except in 1979 when 
only one was held in October 1979 - January 1980, probably because o f the preparation 
o f the volte-face 23rd congress). The four-month schools were generally held from 
February to June or from March to July, and again from October to January/February. 
Records were available for all four-month schools held during 1974-80.
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T A B L E  5.4  F ou r-m on th  cen tra l sch o o ls  1974-1980  (g e n e ra l ly  2 s c h o o l s  a  y e a r ;  no .
o f  s c h o o l s  w i th  d e ta i l s  a v a i la b le  s h o w n  in  b ra c k e ts )
Jo in e d  
the  PC F
1974
(2)
1975
(2 )
1976
(2)
1977
(2 )
1978
(2 )
1979
0 )
1980
(2)
T o ta l P e rc e n ta g e
N u m b e r  o f  
s tu d e n ts 64 65 49 47 99 39 68 431
W o m en 6 12 12 1 1 18 4 14 77 17.9%
A v e ra g e  ag e 33 31 .5 31 .5 31 30 .5 32 34
A v. ag e  
32
W o rk e rs 38 32 22 26 39 18 31 206 4 7 .8 %
E m p lo y e s 4 1 1 10 8 20 7 15 75 17 .4%
1TC 10 9 9 8 20 8 4 68 15 .8%
T e a c h e rs  / 
R e se a rc h e rs 7 5 3 3 11 2 9 4 0 9 .3 %
1945-
55
5 4 2 - 2 i 1 15 3 .5 %
1956-
68
49 4 0 34 28 42 h 32 2 3 6 5 4 .8 %
1969- 10 21 13 19 55 27 35 180 4 1 .7 %
M e m b e rs  o f  
m ass
m o v e m e n ts
22 25 11 16 13 5 4 96 2 2 .3 %
E lec ted
re p re se n ta tiv e s 9 6 4 8 24 12 12 75 17 .4%
Source: Calculated from archival data o f the Ecole nationale du Parti communiste 
français (Draveil, Essonne)
In ail, 431 students participated in the four-month schools during the period under 
examination. Amongst the 431, there were 77 women (17.9%), and the students' average 
age at 32 years was slightly higher than in the one-month schools. The schools were 
dominated by working-class students who numbered 206 (47.8%). Clerical workers and 
the / TC category were far behind with 75 ( 17.4%) and 68 ( 15.8%) students respectively. 
Only 40 teachers went to the four-month schools (9.3%) during 1974-80.
The majority of students had joined the PCF in 1956-68 (236, i.e. 54.8%) or in 1969-79 
(180, i.e. 41.7%). Only 15 had been members since before 1956. Those involved in mass 
organisations numbered 122 (28.3% of all students), and there were 86 elected
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Some interesting conclusions emerge from the above analysis. First, the one-month 
schools preparing militants for middle-level leadership accurately reflect the PCF's 
changing membership in the 1970s and correspond to the observations made by Courtois 
and Lazar. Their students were young (29), and almost a quarter o f  them were women 
(although still fewer than the 35.7% in the entire Party in 197954). They were also 
“deproletarised” to a remarkable extent: workers, clerical workers, ITCs and teachers 
were all fairly evenly represented. This was a fairly accurate reflection o f the social 
composition o f the PCF membership in 1979: 30.8% of it was workers (compared with 
43.4% in 1967).55 Their political generation was young, as 65% had joined the PCF after 
1969 (36% o f the middle leadership belonged to that generation in the whole Party56). 
The one-month schools were therefore largely dominated by the new, post-1968, 
pro-left-union generation.
The four-month schools, on the other hand, reveal quite a different picture. More than 
half o f the students had joined the Party before 1968, and many were o f the Thorezian 
era. The schools were heavily dominated by workers (47.8%) with all other categories 
lagging well behind. The students' sociological composition was in fact a mirror image 
o f the top leadership structure in which workers represented 49.6% o f all members o f 
the Central Committee in 1976.57 This was a clear indication o f the Party's deliberate 
intention to ensure the “social purity” o f future cadres and to retain all decision-making 
organs in the hands o f working-class, trained militants through a systematic process o f 
preselection aimed at “reproletarising” the Party.
‘ D es élèves heureux”:51 the bonding process at the central school
The importance o f the internat type o f courses during this period o f change and 
uncertainty cannot be emphasised strongly enough. As individual accounts show, the 
study environment and atmosphere certainly succeeded in maintaining a significant
representatives (20% ) o f  w h om  on e w as a senator and on e a deputy in the N ational
A ssem b ly .
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The closing speech59 at the end o f the four-month school held in February-June 1975 
school provides an interesting insight into the functioning o f the Party's top training 
establishment. As always at the end o f a training period, the organisation o f the school 
was evaluated and la vie collective scrutinised in detail. "La cohésion du collectif' 
received a favourable verdict as students had “got on well with each other and their 
teachers” . This obviously meant that the bonding process so crucial to the unity and 
cohesion o f each promotion had been successful. Certain practical improvements were 
advocated as regards food (which was, surprisingly, "insuffisante et mal adaptée aux 
besoins"]), working conditions (noise from the street and a nearby school, cramped and 
difficult to practise any sport), and equipment (for example, the library was “poorly 
stocked”). The predominantly working-class students (16 workers, five employés, four 
ITC  and one teacher) considered the teaching methods to be generally appropriate; 
personal study tasks had been found demanding but attainable and working in groups 
had proved to be efficient and beneficial. The lessons and lectures had been o f “a very 
high standard and put across clearly” (advance schémas were found particularly useful). 
The regular discussions were considered a useful learning tool (discussions on 
theoretical points were particularly welcome) and wide-ranging debates (on unity, for 
example) were thought to facilitate greatly the application o f theory to current political 
tasks. This particular promotion decided to be called "la promotion Jacques Duclos" to 
honour the life and work o f Jacques Duclos who died during their time at the central 
school. The participants were now returning to their federations “with a conviction that 
we would not return as the same people who had come [to the school]... By enriching 
our theoretical knowledge we are certain that we have achieved a greater mastery o f 
problems which we have to face in our activist lives”. Thus the four-month cadre school 
was deemed to have succeeded in its aim to bring about the final transformation o f the 
students into “complete” Communist persons (see Chapter 2).
Similar feelings were expressed by Marcel Gauterie (whose profession was not stated), 
who completed the one-month central school in 1974 and wrote o f his experiences in
am ount o f  internal unity and d iscip lin e at the core o f  the Party w h en  the L eft U n ion
co llap sed  and an unprecedented intra-party rift began to em erge.
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France Nouvelle.™ Above all he had felt able to clarify his theoretical knowledge o f 
Marxism - “or to be more precise, I realised the limits imposed by my ignorance”. He 
also gained a better understanding of party policy, "this party that has been mine for 
almost 20 years". But the training period also raised some questions: “How does it come 
about that I no longer see this party or m yself as before? ... Was I in ‘the parallel 
university o f  a counter-society’ which I have penetrated more profoundly than ever in 
the past, in the heart o f this collective intellectual mass which the PCF has become in 
the course o f its time and struggles?”
As to Gauterie’s fellow students, they had, despite their diversity, one thing in common: 
“All the students are Communists and want to learn to struggle better in and for their 
Party. This basis, our common property, is what bonds us together... [...] In addition to 
that, these party schools are essentially for workers, excluded from knowledge by social 
division inherent in the capitalist system.” Yet, to spend an uninterrupted month at 
school was “a liberation as much as a constraint”. It meant having the freedom to 
"apprendre à comprendre", all day long, the classics o f Marxism: “Finies les tentatives 
hardies de lire Marx après la journée de travail, harassante, dans la nuit! ” However, 
the students found intellectual work exhausting for the unaccustomed: "Marx, c'est 
compliqué! - Heureusement qu'il n'écrit pas dans l'Humal entendait-on quelquefois. " 
There were 41 students on Gauterie's course (30 workers and 11 intellectuals), and he 
saw the party schools as instrumental in breaking down the age-old barrier between 
manual and intellectual work: “This possibility at last to see manual workers and 
intellectuals communicating with each other on the basis o f a common language and for 
the enriching o f all is, in my opinion, one o f the profound reasons why the students o f 
the central schools are, in the words o f Harris and de Sédouy, ‘des élèves heureux', 
happy to be there and to learn to be active.” As pointed out in Chapter 2, this was indeed 
one o f the functions o f  political education in the PCF: to maintain ideological unity 
between la base intellectuelle and la base ouvrière in order to control them both.
Political training had a profound effect on Marcel Gauterie as on most other students. 
He, too, evokes the psychological impact that “going to school” had on him: “ Being at 
school is a little like going through psychoanalysis; yet, it’s not really a question o f a
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psychoanalysis, but o f  Marxism, and you relate better to yourself and to others. When 
you leave the school, you are no longer quite the same as before and yet, not all that 
different either.” For Gauterie, the school had been only “un long détour théorique pour 
revenir à l ’expérience, à la pratique ”, the concept o f the “unity o f theory and practice” 
which he had now “truly” internalised.
The experience o f Antoine Spire, a party intellectual and journalist, echoes Gauterie’s 
sentiments on the psychological changes that took place amongst the students. In 1969, 
Spire had been “earmarked” to become an attaché de direction o f the PCF’s publishing 
house Editions sociales, and to subsequently take over the management o f the company. 
Before starting in his job, he was told to attend the one-month central school (February 
1969). Since he was being groomed for higher responsibilities, he also had to participate 
in the four-month cadre school (1971). This was a requirement for his promotion: “On 
ne choisit pas de fréquenter ces écoles. On est désigné pour cela. ”61 As described 
above (see especially Chapter 2), the decision was the result o f  a strict process o f 
observation and covert testing - although candidates were extremely motivated, 
‘volunteerism’ was not sufficient.
Spire’s fellow-students were mostly full-time functionaries and o f working-class origin. 
As Spire put it, the cadre school constituted for them “an outstanding contact with many 
fields o f knowledge which, up to this point, had been out o f their reach”. Party education 
was for them a ‘formidable source d ’enrichissement",62 which pointed them in the 
direction o f more personal reading and reflection. The attraction o f the all- 
encompassing philosophy o f Marxism to disempowered workers o f limited education 
(see Chapter 2) is easy to perceive. In Spire’s experience, those who participated in the 
cadre school, were transformed out o f all recognition: “The results were sometimes quite 
surprising, in the best possible sense o f the term.”63
Like Récanati, Poussy (see Chapter 4), Pudal and Gauterie (see above) before him, Spire 
also was profoundly stirred by the exceptional atmosphere o f the school. There was a 
real “communion de pensée” and a deep feeling o f fraternity and solidarity, which was 
“to leave its mark on each person’s emotional itinerary”. The long training period
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encouraged “le brassage sociaT’ o f students from different backgrounds and furthered 
the formation o f a sensus communismi essential to the Party. Whilst admitting the 
“remote possibility” that some people may “just” consider a party training course as 
opportunity for advancement, Spire does not really believe in it; in his opinion, other 
motives are at play: “C ’est un milieu, m point de référence, un lieu de croyances, une 
chaude collectivité où l ’accord implicite sur l ’essentiel est réalisé. ” 64
Despite his praise for the school’s “studious atmosphere, its enriching courses”, 
particularly for those o f working-class origin, he - like Pudal and Argelès above - felt 
that the school had its limitations. In particular, Spire criticised the rigid links with 
current party policy (one o f the primary raisons d ’être o f the political education system!) 
and the way theory was utilised to justify the orientation du jour. (Yet, Spire’s political 
training had taken place under the directorship o f Jean Burlès, who made a special effort 
to include more theoretical thinking and freedom o f expression in the 1970s.) In his 
memoirs Spire later wondered how a certain number o f former central school students 
o f that era “really reacted faced with the sectarian policies o f the Party” in 1979.65
Conclusion
This chapter has focused on the development o f the PCF’s political education system 
in 1965-80. The main themes examined - the process towards the Left Union and the 
shifts in the relations o f the main protagonists; the role o f the working class in the Party 
and the PCF’s specific identity as the party o f the working class; and the effects o f the 
changes on PCF-CPSU relations during the Party’s independent phase and its 
subsequent return to its traditional stance - all found their interpretations in the political 
training programmes. From its state o f Thorezian immobilism the political education 
system, like the Party itself, cautiously and timidly opened up to a certain amount o f 
debate, experimentation and flexibility. But just like the Party itself, the education 
system was unable to keep up with all the changes taking place in the surrounding 
environment. Although the party schools at higher levels still remained effective tools 
for moulding communist cadres, primarily because o f the isolation from external 
influences during the training period, the intensity o f the study programmes and the
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careful selection o f motivated students, they did not entirely succeed in catering for the 
needs o f  the new type o f student, better educated and informed, who began to emerge 
in the 1970s. Equally, despite the training programmes’ being more systematic and 
better organised than ever before, the schools no longer seemed such effective agents in 
promoting political socialisation. The daily challenges posed by the PCF’s physical 
isolation up to the mid-1960s had had a steeling effect on both the party membership in 
general and the party school students in particular, whereas the alliance-building strategy 
and the Party’s consequent opening up to the outside world rendered that need of 
“belonging” which the school environment fostered, often somewhat redundant and less 
important, in particular for students who were not o f working-class origin. Initially, this 
resulted in major shifts in behaviour and outlook, which however prevailed only until 
the disappointment and fear caused by the negative impact o f  the Left Union on the 
PCF’s fortunes allowed the orthodox elements o f the Party to force a return to traditional 
stands and values - and to isolation in French politics.
The schools continued to provide a well organised common meeting ground for 
individuals o f diverse backgrounds, which was shown in the social composition o f the 
central school student body and confirmed the importance o f the schools in propping up 
the “system”. As far as preparing militants up to the middle-level posts in the Party, the 
PCF clearly accepted the heterogeneity o f the student population; however, this fairly 
balanced picture developed a serious flaw at the highest training level in the four-month 
central schools. This was o f course in total harmony with the leadership’s policy o f 
centralité ouvrière, the aim o f which was to block the access o f non-working-class 
militants to the highest level o f leadership. This policy reinforced the Party’s 
“reproletarisation” programme in the late 1970s and the 1980s as well as furthering the 
PC F’s growing “anti-intellectual” attitude. Thus, despite developments outside o f  the 
PCF and efforts made at party modernisation which called for a more differentiated 
leadership, the PCF’s leadership model at the highest echelon remained resolutely stuck 
in the past and ill equipped for the challenges o f the 1980s.
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CHAPTER 6
1981-90: NOTHING LEFT BUT ‘BEING THERE’1
The remorseless decline o f the PCF provides the setting for the final chapter o f  this 
study. The planners o f the education programme faced a challenging and exhausting task 
in keeping abreast with the shifts in the party strategy engendered by major 
developments at home and abroad (the PCF in government and in opposition; the arrival 
o f the perestroika and glasnost programmes; and the collapse o f Communism). A study 
o f their response will form the first section o f this chapter. Second, we will continue our 
analysis o f  the sociological composition o f the Party’s central school students and 
ascertain to what extent the main trends, which emerged in the 1970s (see Chapter 5), 
i.e. the “deproletarisation” o f the one-month schools and the over-representation o f 
workers in the four-month schools, continued during this decade. As the Party declined, 
so too the education system ran down: student numbers dwindled and fewer schools 
were held during this decade. One reason was that the PCF’s student recruitment 
strategy based on the now shrinking party and trade union membership was no longer 
able to produce the customary numbers o f trainees; however, that was only a part o f  the 
picture as there were also other causes which we will examine. Finally, we, too, shall 
attempt to link theory with practice by examining the trajectory and personal experience 
o f a communist militant who was trained in the Party’s central schools in the last years 
o f  the 1980s, more than half a century after the education system was set up, and by 
giving the author’s own eye witness account o f  the “classroom reality” in the Party’s 
central school in the early 1990s.
Political education in a tail-spin
“Le PCF au pouvoir... des socialistes ”2
We noted in Chapter 1 that the PCF returned to government in 1981 for the first time in 
34 years in the most unfavourable conditions possible after the Socialist landslide 
victory. The PCF’s dilemma was how to stage a new retour stratégique to ensure that
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the period o f left government would lead to a transition towards socialism rather than 
turn out to be a mere "social-democratic experience".3 On the face o f it, the Communists 
had achieved what they had set out to do: they had become a party o f government, but 
had to prove that they were up to their new responsibilities while retaining their 
traditional role as the parti de luttes.
On top o f the change in the PCF’s political situation there was the “grande question ” 
o f  the period. This concerned the formation o f a new, coherent communist strategy, 
necessary with its embracing o f the concept o f  socialisme à la française and its 
renunciation o f the dictatorship o f proletariat (in 1976), o f the term ‘Marxism- 
Leninism’, and the notion o f an “official” theory.4 This obviously implied far-reaching 
consequences for the party education system: the whole concept o f communist education 
had been to teach Marxism-Leninism, whereas now the key issue5 was that it was no 
longer enough to present a doctrine; political strategy was to be formed on the basis o f 
changes in the “real” by clarifying these changes via Marxism, which itself had been 
“set in movement”. This became the main plank in the party education o f scientific 
socialism. With the Socialists and Communists in power, the PCF considered that its 
long-term strategy o f “socialism in the French style” had become a realistic goal and 
thus targets in political education were to be defined on that basis. On a concrete level, 
this meant that instructors had to be schooled in the new approach through workforce 
training courses and educational lectures on national and international current affairs, 
along with special nine-day “catch-up” courses to clarify the new thinking.6
However, in the run-up to the 24th Congress in February 1982, the main topic o f 
discussion was the question o f the PCF's electoral setbacks in the 1981 presidential and 
legislative elections. These setbacks were generally attributed to the disintegration o f tine 
Left Union and the Party's subsequent attacks on the PS, and the PCF's immobilism in 
the face o f the great changes which had taken place in French society since the 1960s.7 
In his five-hour congress speech, Georges Marchais' official explanation for the Party's 
poor performance was however "le retard historique de 1956" and its consequences. 
Marchais also set out the party policy to follow (which did not greatly differ from the 
23rd congress line except that with communist ministers now in government, criticism
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o f Mitterrand was naturally muted and the pro-Soviet line considerably modified), 
namely "le socialisme à la française" as mentioned above, i.e. a society based on justice, 
new economic growth, freedom and a cultural renaissance. The methods to be advanced 
in order to achieve this goal were the extension o f democracy and continuation o f the 
class struggle with workers, employés, the ITC, intellectuals, farmers, women and young 
people (i.e. "la majorité écrasante du peuple")', the development o f international 
relations, which would focus on the struggle for peace and solidarity with ruling 
Communist Parties; and finally, a reconceptualisation o f the role o f the Party. The 
Party's attitude to the socialist government was "positive", and the Communist ministers' 
task was to ensure that serious problems such as unemployment and the economic crisis, 
were tackled. There were many new opportunities on offer for the Party: a 
"social-democratic experiment" was not self-evident - it would be "possible to 
implement another policy than that o f managing the crisis in the interests o f  big 
business. [...] the class struggle did not come to an end on 10th May!”8
These main themes o f the 24<h Congress again formed the body o f the political study 
programmes. The issue o f le retard historique was dealt with in the central school study 
programmes: “For two decades, our Party has been giving ‘old answers’ - we did not 
take advantage o f the new conditions created in the international communist movement 
by the 20th Congress o f he CPSU. Not until the 22nd and 23rd Congress did the PCF 
provide ‘radically new responses’.”9
The other important study topic was the Party’s new strategy in the changed situation 
following the May elections: how to combine the role o f a revolutionary party in 
struggle with that o f a party o f government. This required a great deal o f time and effort 
at all levels o f party education as a considerable amount o f adaptation was called for 
from a party which had been in constant opposition since 1947. As a junior partner in 
government, the PCF had to work out how to be “a Communist Party o f the masses”, 
“a Communist Party ever more firmly anchored to the centre o f gravity o f the popular 
movement” and “a Communist Party with an intense political life that would render it 
better able to play its political role.”10
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A new programme for the four-month central school came out in September 1982. It set 
out to clarify the key questions o f the new strategy based on the outlines given at the 24"' 
Congress. First, it was confirmed that “for the first time, socialism was on the agenda 
in France”, not as a distant and abstract concept but as réponse concrète to French 
society’s pressing problems. Second, the party strategy concerning the socialist 
countries, the struggle for peace and disarmament, national liberation movements, the 
international crisis o f capitalism and European integration had to be explained to the 
students. The third main theme was the PCF’s aim to realise a type o f socialism which 
would be democratic and self-managing (autogestionnaire). The final point concerned 
the Party itself, as the party o f revolution and o f government, and how to balance these 
roles. The new programme was supported by 11 lectures on Marxist philosophy to 
provide the theoretical framework for the practical aspects.11
By September 1983, the study programmes were supplemented by an assessment o f the 
PCF’s first two years in government, “Bilan et perspectives gouvernementales: 
Rapports gouvernement-travailleurs-citoyens”, the balance sheet o f  the Left 
government. Since the PCF had been participating in government, “justice had 
advanced, well-being had advanced, democracy had advanced”.12 In addition, the 
socialist countries “continued to advance: in these countries, there was no question o f 
zero or negative growth, ...production had gone up.” To highlight the advances in the 
socialist countries, a detailed study of the USSR (photocopied from “Histoire du temps 
présent 1939-82", by Serge Wolikow, and published by Editions sociales) was included 
with the training programme for further study.
“S eu l contre tou s!”
The strategy o f the "two sides o f the Communist coin" - the leadership on the outside 
keeping a watchful eye on the government policy ("un soutien critique") and the 
Communist ministers on the inside bound by solidarité gouvernementale (agreed in the 
governmental contract with the PS in June 198113) - proved more problematic at the time 
o f the PS's austerity U-turn in the spring o f 1983. By March 1984, the Communist 
ministers' position was becoming untenable in the face o f the government's plan to
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restructure the steel industry (there was a violent strike in the Lorraine steel works which 
the PCF felt duty-bound to support). The crunch came with the European elections in 
June 1984, when the PCF only gained 11.2 per cent o f the vote (compared with 20.5 per 
cent in 1979) against 21 per cent for the PS (and 11 per cent for the Front national).
The departure from the government o f  the four Communist ministers enabled the PCF 
to return to the "hard line" as it was no longer bound by governmental solidarity and 
could become a radical opposition party. 14 The new line was ratified by the 25th 
Congress in February 1985. This time the leadership met with strong internal opposition: 
already in October 1984, when the draft resolution was voted at a Central Committee 
meeting, six members had abstained from voting and five federations also rejected the 
d raft.15 Criticism was voiced publicly regarding the functioning o f the Party (democratic 
centralism); the leadership's "unilateral" analysis o f the decline o f  the PCF and the 
apportioning o f the blame for the failure o f  the Left Union entirely on the PS; and the 
bilan globalement positif o f the socialist countries.
The 25th Congress critically reassessed the last 25 years o f political action and declared 
that the entire Left Union period had been an enormous mistake. The Party also gave its 
own analysis o f  the Communist decline since 1981: "le retard pris" in analysing and 
understanding French society was the main culprit which manifested itself under three 
guises. First, there was the strategic retard o f the Party's inaction from 1956 onwards 
("une interprétation restrictive" o f the CPSU's 20th Congress by Maurice Thorez and 
Waldeck Rochet). Secondly, the political retard in the PCF's analysis o f the Fifth 
Republic was cited. Finally, there was le retard institutionnel as the Party had failed to 
understand the significance o f the new mechanisms o f government introduced in 
1958-62 and the présidentialisation o f the régime. Thus, adhering to the Common 
Programme had in fact "reinforced the perverse effects o f the institutions" by forcing the 
PCF to "fade" behind the PS (in particular during the presidential election o f 1974).16 
Any idea o f rebuilding the alliance with the Socialists was thus officially buried and the 
PCF's participation in the two Mauroy governments was wiped o ff the record.17
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The other principal themes arising from the 25th Congress were the limitation o f the 
powers o f  the President o f  the Republic, job creation, a greater degree o f social justice 
and a more democratic society. To achieve these goals, a new "tool" was set up, the 
NRPM (Nouveau rassemblement populaire majoritaire) o f all those who "ne se 
retrouveraient pas dans la notion de gauche et qui ont néanmois de puissantes raisons 
de prendre leur place dans un mouvement diversifié de lutte pour le progrès"fi 
However, since the rassemblement appeared to be based on little else but “bouffées de 
colère et de désespoir” in order to defend the poor and victims o f hard times19 it created 
a strategy around a “cartel de mécontents " fi  This increased the ambiguities in the PCF's 
ideological image and, inevitably, emphasised its identité ouvrière in the most classic 
way.
The programme planners again had the task o f presenting the repackaged, tired old ideas 
to the students; in fact, the study programmes were beginning to mirror more and more 
singularly the Party’s lack o f a coherent strategy. Even so, the PCF had hardly time to 
implement its training plans for the new party line before another blow fell. The 1986 
legislative elections produced the worst ever Communist result during the Fifth 
Republic, 9.79 per cent o f the votes cast, a result which was just ahead o f the National 
Front and back to the 1924 level (9.5%).
To keep abreast with the fast-moving events the political study programmes were hastily 
supplemented by the leadership’s analyses and explanations o f what had so disastrously 
gone wrong. An interview with Jean-Claude Gayssot in the Party journal Révolution was 
included in the central school reading list.21 Following the example set by Marchais, 
Gayssot reiterated that the Party was now aware o f the damaging effects o f 
presidentialism, bipolarisation and the institutional problems which “seriously distorted 
political debate”. The PCF was also “suffering from a formidable anticommunist 
campaign” whose aim was to discredit the Party’s image.
“O rthodoxe e t enferm é dans ses certitudes p lace  Colonel-Fabien ”
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The severity o f the electoral defeat had left the Party stunned, and the two-year gap 
between the 1986 legislative elections and the 1988 presidential election was not enough 
time for the PCF to plan any coherent strategy. Nor did the worsening internal divisions 
allow the Party to fully exploit the manage forcé between the socialist President and his 
conservative Prime Minister: all the PCF could do was to continue to attack the PS and 
Mitterrand as "objective allies o f the right" while simultaneously continuing its guard 
dog role and proclaiming its own desire for left unity.22 The watchword, "le PCF seul 
contre tous" confirmed the Party's return to its pre-1986 strategy o f "défense des 
défavorisés... tous azimuts" in an effort to recover its tribune role.23 It was also proof o f 
an ever growing ideological vacuum and increasing incoherence.
The 1986 election results had also intensified the PCF's internal strife. The rénovateurs 
published in Le Monde (23-24.4.1986) a petition signed by 3000 people demanding that 
an Extraordinary 26th Congress be held. Many municipal cadres and party officials at 
departmental level joined the intellectuals in their demands. Thus, dissidence was 
becoming increasingly a conflict between the central leadership, "orthodoxe et enfermé 
dans ses certitudes place du Colonel-Fabien", and the periphery.24 Not surprisingly, the 
leadership ran into trouble in trying to silence opposition in the run-up to the 26th 
Congress in December 1987. As before, the complaints o f the contestataires focused on 
the Party's organisational principle o f democratic centralism, and its strategy towards the 
PS since 1977.
As previously, the 26th Congress Resolution also bluntly condemned the 25 years o f 
alliance strategy from 1962 onwards as "negative and damaging" with the exceptions 
o f  the Champigny Manifesto in 1968 and "some months o f  1981 and 1982".25 The 
Party's collective memory wished to retain nothing o f the Communist experience as a 
parti de gouvernement; rather, the PCF was to be considered the only bastion o f 
resistance in French politics, different in all respects - honesty, truth and probity - "un 
instrument nouveau, un parti révolutionnaire",26
The Resolution also dealt with the changes in the Soviet Union where the perestroika 
begun by Mikhail Gorbachev was "une véritable révolution dans la révolution The
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PCF pledged to support the work o f "transformation and improvement" in which the 
Socialist countries were involved. Gorbachev's report presented during the 70th 
anniversary celebrations o f the Russian Revolution was commented upon favourably: 
it had shown clearly the Soviet Union's "indisputable achievements recorded on 
economic, social, political and scientific levels”. In analysing the "causes o f difficulties 
and delays which had accumulated, the errors committed", the CPSU had begun an 
in-depth analysis o f the history o f the USSR which could only lead to a profound and 
coherent movement o f transformation: "Son objectif n'est pas de faire moins de 
socialisme, mais d'en faire plus. "21
The most interesting development in the study programmes was now the theme covering 
the new situation in the USSR with Gorbachev in power. In 1985 - after the temporary 
silence o f the training programmes on the USSR and other socialist countries which 
mirrored the party line during the Eurocommunist period - the party schools were still 
teaching that the “existence o f the many socialist states is a decisive asset” .28 This 
statement was supported by a long list o f  their social achievements; their role as a 
counterweight to imperialism, their economic power and their support for nations 
struggling for independence were also evoked. Yet, there had also been problems, and 
the Party did not “intend to dress up nor blacken the reality”. As to the “development 
crisis” o f  socialism, it was not “comparable to the crisis o f capitalism which is a crisis 
o f  the social system itse lf’.
Gorbachev’s accession to power in 1985 created a political and ideological dilemma for 
the PCF, in particular as it caught the Party at its lowest ebb since the 1930s. The 
unfolding o f the new situation in the USSR was followed attentively by the French 
Communists who hoped to see a new dynamic communist leadership succeed the 
Chernenko-Andropov gerontocracy and prove the supremacy o f Soviet socialism. 
Lectures and discussions regarding perestroika and glasnost began to make their 
appearance at all levels o f the political education system from 1986 onwards. In 
February 1986, Gorbachev accorded an exclusive interview to L ’Humanité (4.2.1986), 
and the entire account o f this was added to the central school study list. The interview 
featured pertinent glasnost-probing questions such as "Mais il y  a encore des queues
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pour l ’approvisionnement, chez vous?” (“Yes,” replied Gorbachev), “Le Parti 
communiste est-il, en URSS, ‘la courroie de transmission ’ de l ’Etat? ” and “La fin de 
la guerre en Afghanistan - et donc le retrait des troupes soviétiques - peuvent-ils être 
raisonnablement envisagés dans un avenir proche? ”29
In 1987, the 26th Congress sang the praises o f Gorbachev and declared its total support 
for perestroika. The four-month central school held in the spring o f 198730 included a 
detailed 12-page “Brève chronologie 1985-87" covering the first two years o f 
Gorbachev’s régime and the most important dates o f his life and career, giving a virtual 
day-by-day account o f the two-year period. A year later, the PCF’s tone was changing 
as Gorbachev’s reforms started to reveal the very backwardness and poverty o f Soviet 
society that the PCF had been trying to conceal. The Party now declared that perestroika 
was not “an obligatory example” for other countries and the Politbureau o f the PCF was 
warning the CPSU against Gorbachev’s “adventurism”.31 The official line o f  the party 
schools was however to provide facts for debates and discussions, and in 1989, the 
central school study programmes included a background reading list consisting o f an 
article by Gérard Streiff “URSS: un changement ample, profond et durable",32 another 
by Maxime Gremetz “Quoi de neuf dans le domaine international? ”33, and an article 
published in L ’Humanité, “La perestroïka à plein régime ”, based on Gorbachev’s own 
report on the situation in the USSR.
Despite the PCF’s see-saw attitude to perestroika the rather factual way o f 
“teaching”about it is worth noting. It is however impossible to know how the theme was 
treated during the discussions and debates that followed, or how the teachers and 
students came to terms with the fact that most o f what had been declared “bilan 
globalement positif” was indeed far from it - and that the truth was coming from the 
horse’s own mouth, i.e. the Secretary-General o f the CPSU. The Marchais leadership 
tried its best to keep the lid on: in the autumn o f 1989, when the Soviet Union was in 
serious danger o f breaking up and the reform programmes seemed to be challenging the 
very principles o f socialism, Marchais still felt compelled to declare that the PCF, 
having already rejected the universal model o f socialism, was in no way obliged to 
emulate innovations from outside: “Ce qui se passe en Union Soviétique ne peut
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constituer un modèle pour les autres partis communistes; c ’est spécifique à l'Union 
Soviétique. ”34 The four short years o f perestroika had in no way prepared the PCF - or 
any other communist party, for that matter - for the demise o f Communism.
“/ /  n ’est p ire  aveugle que celui qui ne veut voir ”
The 6.7 per cent o f the vote collected by André Lajoinie at the first ballot o f  the 1988 
presidential election was the worst result at the polls in the PCF's entire history. Yet, 
despite Marchais's statement in February 1988 that the balance sheet o f  the Mitterrand 
septennat was "negative and catastrophic", the Communist leadership supported 
Mitterrand - albeit au bout des lèvres - at the second ballot in order to block the victory 
o f the right (Chirac and Le Pen).35 The PCF's score (11.1%) in the snap elections o f  5th 
and 12th June surprised the pollsters who were expecting an even worse result than in 
1986, especially as the majoritarian electoral system had been restored. But the PCF's 
renaissance was as deceiving as it was circumstantial: the record abstention rate (34%) 
favoured the Communists; the complaisant and over-confident Socialist campaign 
backfired disastrously; and the PCF's "maires au secours!" strategy - the running o f 
popular Communist mayors as candidates - paid off.36 In any case, the Communist 
remission proved to be short-lived: in the March municipal and June European elections 
in 1989 the Party suffered further setbacks. The PCF's hopes o f  rallying to its banner 
some o f those dissatisfied with the new Socialist policy under Michel Rocard, 
"ouverture vers le centre", were soon dashed; and with its 27 deputies, the PCF - despite 
its threats to the contrary - was more or less obliged to fall in line with Rocard's minority 
government on most issues for fear o f early elections. By this time, the extraordinary 
crisis o f  Communism in the East was casting its shadow on the remains o f Communist 
credibility.
It was against this backdrop that the PCF held its 27th Congress in December 1990. 
With unsurpassed aptness, Georges Marchais felt obliged to ask at the beginning o f his 
Report, "Qu-est-ce que le Parti communiste français? [...] A quoi sert-il?". In the 
Resolution, the failure o f socialism was tackled in a lengthy explanation, which was 
taken up by the party education system to form the basis for the “new” teaching. The
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starting point o f the study programmes was that the socialist countries had enjoyed 
indisputable earlier success, but the rot had set in with the “hijacking” o f socialism by 
Stalin, "une perversion monstrueuse du socialisme, du marxisme, du rôle et de la 
conception même du Parti qui fu t le stalinisme". Stalinism developed first o f all in the 
Soviet Union and then spread its ideological and theoretical ravages to the entire 
Communist movement. Why and how did that come about? Firstly, according to the 
party analysis, the socialist societies, being “sociétés de transition ”, should have moved 
towards the new and fought against the old, but in the socialist countries this process 
was blocked by the leadership which refused to complete the déstalinisation process. 
Secondly, the working class - the original revolutionary class - was deprived o f any 
possibility to participate effectively in the running o f the state and society. Thirdly, a 
vanguard communist party had ceased to exist in these countries; the Communist Parties 
had merged into the state and had transformed themselves into “super-administrations”. 
Finally, the socialist societies did not just collapse by themselves: the anti-socialist 
forces in those countries were helped politically and materially by capitalist countries. 
The conclusion was that the débâcle in the East might have “winged” Marxism and 
socialism, but it had not fatally disabled them - what had taken place, however, was that 
they had been liberated from Stalinist institutionalisation (which, moreover, the PCF had 
been “continually condemning” in its consecutive congresses since 1976: "des pratiques 
et des défauts relevant du passé stalinien", although the Party could not be held 
blameless: “77 ya eu là, incontestablement, de notre part, un défaut d'analyse et 
d ’appréciation. ”) J 7
The explanation o f what had gone wrong, and why, did not make it any easier to 
reconstruct a basis for the new study programmes. The question concerning the 
relevance and raison d ’être o f a party education system based on principles which had 
been so profoundly rejected had to be addressed and the problem o f “what does 
socialism mean now and how is it to be taught” had to be dealt with. At the Central 
School, however, there were no surprises as Lucien Bossu, the director o f the one-month 
central school in 1990, based his thoughts and the teaching programme firmly on the 
analysis o f  the 27th Congress:38 the failure o f  the socialist countries did not mean the 
failure o f socialism - had the Party thought that, it would have changed its name and
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strategy. The “disaster” in Eastern Europe had not removed the need for politics whose 
aim was to replace capitalism, although, admittedly, it had “demonstrated the need for 
new approaches and organisational methods”. Consequently, the PCF would no longer 
offer “une grande théorie ” with ready-made solutions, but had instead formulated a new 
approach, “pousser jusqu ’au bout le nouveau qui se dessine dans la société actuelle et 
que le carcan du capitalisme empêche de grandir: justice, liberté, paix. ” The context 
and form were to be decided by the people themselves. Thus, between capitalism and 
bureaucratic socialism, there was another way: the French idea o f socialism, “socialisme 
autogestionnaire à la française ”. For this, as Bossu put it, there was no pre-established 
“schéma ”, no “petit livre rouge, no “sauveur suprême ” ; rather, the emphasis had to 
be on letting the people set the pace o f the movement towards socialism. The PCF, then, 
would be in the role o f a vanguard party: “passer devant les gens, mais avec les gens 
pour que ça change vraiment". With the PCF leadership continuing to set the 
parameters o f  the political training programmes, the education system once again 
presented a mirror image o f the Party with the programme planners groping their way 
toward the new decade.
Epilogue: “Nous et l ’URSS”
The abortive Moscow coup in August 1991 left the PCF protesting even more 
vigorously and indignantly its independence and separate identity from the CPSU. The 
autumn o f 1991 was devoted to frantic activity at all levels o f the Party to regain a 
semblance o f credibility in time for the March 1992 regional elections. From October, 
a programme o f hundreds o f open débats (covering the whole country) for party 
members, sympathisers, non-communists and ex-communists alike aimed “pour faire 
connaître la politique communiste ” with key words such as liberté, écoute, échange 
d ’idées. A big test o f public opinion was the annual Fête de L ’Humanité which took 
place in Paris just a few weeks after the failed coup. The jubilant and relieved PCF39 
declared a near record attendance (640 000 against 650 000 in 1990 according to Le 
Nouvel Observateur of 19-25th September). The Party further emphasised its traditional 
values and national profile by celebrating, on 20th October, the 50th Anniversary o f 
Châteaubriant with Georges Marchais - defiantly, in the face o f  predictable and
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understandable opposition from both communist and non-communist anciens résistants 
- delivering a speech to honour the memory o f the 27 mainly communist résistants 
executed by the Nazis in 1941. More defensive justification followed in October 1991, 
when Cahiers du communisme published a special edition "Nous et l ’URSS” with a 
keynote article by Maxime Gremetz which confirmed the importance o f the 22nd 
Congress and the correctness o f the analyses and political choices o f the 27th Congress 
(the article subsequently became an update o f  the situation in party schools). The 
complete texts o f two critical and indignant letters (by the CPSU and PCF respectively) 
exchanged between the two parties in 1977 were also published (and studied at the 
central schools) in order to prove that the PCF had not "aveuglément aligné sur le 
PCUS”. So too were long extracts o f  a 1989 discussion between Marchais and 
Gorbachev, in order to convince the nation o f the PCF’s unconditional and loyal 
support, "dès le début”, for perestroika.40
Still solid in their certainties, the training programme planners took to heart the tatters 
o f  the re-confirmed and reinforced party line whilst preparing the rest o f  the year’s 
schools: "... notre idée communiste s ’inspire de notre histoire et des découvertes du 
marxisme. Ces questions, au coeur de l ’enseignement dans les écoles du parti, sont plus 
que jamais nécessaires pour aider tous les militants à débattre. Cela nous amène à 
intensifier encore notre travail d ’éducation. "41 “Defend the status quo” as an epitaph 
would not go amiss.
The lean years of cadre training
In Chapter 5, we established an accurate picture o f the student population o f the one- and 
four-month central schools during the 1974-80 period. Unlike Henri Martin, his 
successors at the central school were not always such meticulous record keepers. Each 
new central school director was “allowed” to make his own mark on his term o f office, 
and this was also reflected in the way student records were kept.42 The lack o f 
consistency creates some difficulty in calculating student numbers and, to a certain 
extent, in interpreting the information available; however, it is possible to establish the
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main trends of the period. The details of the student population are presented in tabular 
form below.
One-month central schools 1981-90
TABLE 6.1 One-month central schools 1981-1990 (generally 10 schools a year; no. 
o f schools with details available shown in brackets)
J o in e d
th e
p e r
1981
(5 )
1982
(9 )
1983 
(6 )
198 4
(7 )
1985
(5 )
1 9 8 6
(9 )
1987
(8 )
1988
(41
1989
(5 )
199 0
(91
T o ta l %
N o . o f  
S tu d e n ts 161 2 6 5 135 2 5 6 8 6 195 199 132 105 157 1691
W o m e n 3 6 73 3 7 63 31 4 6 53 38 22 37 4 3 6 2 5 .8
A v e ra g e
A g e 3 1 .5 3 2 .5 - 33 - 32 3 4 33 35 35
A v . a g e  
33
W o rk e rs 4 7 63 - 52 _ 3 7 4 6 17 10 21 2 9 3 17.3
E m p lo y e s 37 5 6 - 3 6 _ 32 22 14 7 12 2 1 6 12 .8
IT  C 16 36 - 34 _ 21 14 14 17 2 0 172 10.2
T e a c h e r s  /  
R e s e a r c h e rs
2 4 38 - 33 - 18 22 5 16 12 168 9 .9
1 9 4 5 -
1955 1 3 - _ 4 0 .2
1 9 5 6 -
19 6 8 3 0 62 - 4 3 _ 3 0 24 11 12 14 2 2 6 13 .4
1 9 6 9 -
1 9 7 9 101 188 - 195 _ 110 106 5 9 52 75 8 8 6 5 2 .4
1 9 8 0 - 2 6 - 14 - 5 4 4 6 4 3 13 51 2 2 9 13.5
Source: Calculated from archival data of Ecole nationale du Parti communiste français 
(Draveil, Essonne)
Data on 62 one-month schools held in 1981-90 show that the total number o f students 
in these schools was 1691 o f whom 436 were women (25.8% - a 2% increase on the 
1974-80 figures). This provides a marked contrast with the shorter 1974-80 period (see 
Chapter 5), with a total number of 3263 students (776 women). Student numbers 
therefore decreased by half; in tact, there were 50% fewer students in the final decade 
under study even though more schools were held. Two examples further demonstrate 
this huge drop. In 1977, as many as 627 students participated in the eight schools held, 
whereas in 1987 the number had dropped to 199 (also eight schools). In 1980, there were 
414 students in all the ten schools held; ten years later there were only 168 in the ten 
schools held.
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The students’ socio-professional composition also changed: the one-month central 
school student population in 1981-90 showed more variety than that o f  the 1970s. 
Workers represented only 17.3% o f all students (down from 28.8% in 1974-80) and 
employés 12.8%, whereas the ITC category and teachers/researchers accounted for 
10.2% and 9.9% respectively. Compared with the 1974-80 period, all four main 
categories had gone down and together represented just over half (50.2%) o f the total 
number o f  the students. The rest o f the students were an extremely heterogeneous lot, 
made up o f a variety o f professions and trades that did not fit any o f the four main 
categories: amongst them were nurses, academics, economists, farmers, tax collectors, 
housewives, designers, social workers, cleaners, those unemployed and sans profession 
(as well as one sculptor).
Based on the information o f 51 one-month schools, the average age o f the students was 
33 years which was four years higher than in 1974-80. This may reflect the fact that the 
PCF now had difficulty in attracting young people, a pattern already noted in the various 
analyses o f election results. Regarding the political generations, in line with the 1974-80 
period, it was sometimes difficult to find consistency in the way that dates for joining 
the Party had been recorded and as before, this led to some overlapping. However, the 
available evidence suggests that most students (52.4%) had joined the PCF in 1969-1979 
(13.5% had joined after 1979).
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F o u r-m o n th  c en tra l sch o o ls  1981-90
TABLE 6.2 Four-m onth central schools 1981-1990 (generally 2 schools a year; no. 
o f schools with details available shown in brackets)
J o in e d
th e
P C F
198
1
(1 )
198
2
(2 )
198
'",3.
(2 )
198
4
( I )
1 98
5
(1 )
198
6
(2 )
198
7
0 )
198
8
to y
198
9
0 )
199
0
(2 )
T o ta l
%
N o . o f  
s tu d e n ts
24 31 4 2 18 16 5 4 14 - 21 24 2 4 4
W o m e n 2 8 2 2 2 7 4 _ _ 4 31 7 .9
A v e ra g e
a g e 33 3 2 .5 - 3 5 .5 3 7 35 3 6 - 3 9 3 3 .5
A v .
a g e
35
W o rk e rs 14 14 17 10 6 2 0 6 _ 7 7 101 4 1 .4
E m p lo y é s 5 6 9 1 3 6 2 _ 2 1 3 5 14.3
IT C 3 4 4 5 6 4 _ _ 5 2 33 13 .5
T e a c h e r s  /  
R e s e a r c h e r
s
1 5 3 2 - 3 2 - - 2 18 7 .4
1 9 4 5 -
1955 _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ . .
1 9 5 6 - 
196 8 9 4 _ 8 6 8 3 . 4 2 4 4 18.0
1 9 6 9 -
1979 15 27 - 10 10 17 9 _ 15 16 1 19 4 8 .8
1 9 8 0 - - - - - - 2 1 - - 3 6 2 .5
Source: Calculated from archivai data o f Ecole nationale du Parti communiste français 
(Draveil, Essonne)
Details o f 13 four-month schools with a total o f 244 students were available. This 
compares with details of 13 schools in 1974-80 with students numbering 431, and again 
demonstrates a significant drop in student numbers. In 1980, there were 68 students on 
the two four-month courses, but ten years later in 1990, only 24 attended. According to 
figures given by Henri Martin, in the final five-year period 1986-90, only seven four- 
month schools with 131 students were held (the normal figure was two schools a year); 
this meant, on average, only 18.7 students per school.
Although the percentage of workers in the 1981-90 student population in four-month 
schools was down by 5% to 41.4% they were nevertheless still in clear majority 
compared with the employés (14.3%), ITCs (13.5%) and teachers/researchers (7.4%).
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As in the one-month schools, the number o f students outside the four main categories 
had increased and represented almost a quarter o f all four-month school students (from 
19.7% in 1974-80 to 24%). It is however clear that the bulk o f the top leadership was 
still being groomed from “old-style material” in which the working class dominated.
Women accounted for only 12.7% of the four-month school students, a drop o f 5% since 
1974-80. As in the one-month schools, the average age o f the students had risen, from 
32 to 33.5 years. The overwhelming majority o f the students had joined the PCF during 
the 1969-79 period (48.8%) although 44 (18%) were pre-1968 while a mere 2.5% had 
joined after 1979.
To a large extent, the above analyses confirm the trends which emerged from the 1974- 
80 student details. The “deproletarisation” o f the one-month schools continued as the 
four main categories remained fairly evenly distributed. This was also reflected by the 
socio-professional composition o f the middle-level leadership participating in the PCF’s 
27th Congress held in St. Ouen in 1990 when 1019 party delegates were interviewed.43 
According to the survey, almost half (47%) o f the delegates were workers and employés 
(23% and 24% respectively; the percentage o f working-class delegates had gone down 
from 36.9% in the 25th Congress in 1985 and from 46.6% in 1976). Interestingly, the 
congress survey also revealed that, whatever their stated activity, 60% o f the 1990 
Congress delegates felt that they were working class (37% o f managers and intellectuals 
thought so, as did 27% o f graduates). Moreover, a huge majority o f tire delegates (84%) 
thought - in 1990 - that the expression “parti de la classe ouvrière” was still 
appropriate; likewise, “la lutte des classes ” was still a topical issue for 94% o f the party 
delegates. However, as pointed out above, in the one-month schools the novelty for this 
final decade under study was the growth o f the “disparate” group consisting o f students 
from a variety o f professions. This suggests that in theory at any rate, the middle-level 
leadership positions were accessible to individuals coming from outside the traditional 
socio-professional categories.
The other side o f the coin remained virtually unchanged: the four-month schools still 
held firm against any serious threat o f  “deproletarisation”. The students’ socio­
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professional composition continued to reflect that o f the 1974-80 period with workers 
in clear majority which mirrored Marchais’s working-class dominated leadership and 
its continuing policy o f centralité ouvrière. The Party therefore remained well on course 
for ensuring the future leadership’s social purity and to retaining the reins in safe hands.
Few er Indians, fewer Chiefs?
The most dramatic fact to emerge from analysis o f the student population was the huge 
reduction in the number o f students in party schools. Despite the efforts made by the 
Party, the numbers o f participants attending both the one-month and four-month schools 
continued to dwindle throughout the 1980s. This was yet another manifestation o f the 
serious problems o f the PCF in all areas o f party activity: decline in membership, 
decline in militancy and increase in dissidence; all factors which in themselves also 
contributed to the reduction in student numbers and which therefore merit examination. 
According to Courtois and Lazar, the Party’s membership fell from 520 000 in 1978 to 
330 00044 in 1987; Ranger claims that by the end o f 1985, the number o f members could 
not have exceeded 230 00045. The membership also changed composition. Once the Left 
Union started to am  into trouble and eventually broke up, new recruits came mainly 
from “les couches les plus pauvres de la population, sur la base d'un discours aux 
accents misérabilistes” .46 They were no longer representatives o f the "new middle 
classes" but inactifs and people from the lowest paid categories. The problem was that 
the new type o f recruit was unlikely to provide good quality cadre training material for 
the Party's future needs.47
Militant activity is extremely difficult to measure accurately, even more so than 
membership levels, with militancy manifesting itself in varying degrees o f  action and 
commitment.48 However, one can deduce from the PCF's inability, from the 1980s on, 
to mobilise discontented sectors o f the nation around the ideas and policies o f the Party 
that Communist militancy was also on the wane. This was evident from the slowing 
down or simple disappearance o f the PCF's front organisations (peasants, war veterans, 
tenants, etc.) by the beginning o f the 1980s.49 By the 1990s it was becoming clear that 
the PCF was losing its grip on the CGT (still a major force in French trade unionism
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despite its own serious decline from 2.3 million active members in 1978 to about 800 
000 in 198750) as well as the main teachers' union, the FEN (which subsequently split 
in 1993). There was also a noticeable reduction in the militant presence o f the Party - 
once so impressive and all pervasive - evidenced in the virtual demise o f  door-to-door 
selling, posters on the walls and the sellers o f  L'Humanité-Dimanchef
A further indication o f the PCF's problems was the dramatic increase in dissidence since 
1978, first mainly manifested amongst Communist intellectuals, both inside and outside 
the Party. Incidents had been multiplying since 1978.52 In 1979-80, there was the crisis 
o f the Paris federation; in 1980-81 a movement brought together Communists, Socialists 
and Trotskyists with demands for unity; in 1981-82 Fiszbin's Rencontres communistes 
hebdomadaires formed a base for an opposition group; the Party's poor results in the 
1984 European elections caused further upheaval which reached even the Central 
Committee as les rénovateurs communistes were set up in the aftermath, with the aim 
o f renovating the PCF from within. After the May 1988 presidential election, les 
reconstructeurs communistes were bom: their objective was to reconstruct the Party 
from within when the rénovateurs had already left. Finally, les refondateurs made their 
appearance towards the end o f 1989 led by Charles Fiterman and Claude Poperen. The 
increase in dissidence meant that many potential party school students had in fact joined 
the dissident groups and were no longer available for political training.
It would be simple enough to conclude that fewer members and fewer militants equalled 
fewer students. But there was more: student recruitment had traditionally taken place 
mainly amongst the traditional working-class members o f  the Party, and it was this 
category which was in numerical decline in the 1980s. The problem was clearly pointed 
out by Fernand Laporte, the doyen o f the federal committee o f Isère and municipal 
counsellor in Grenoble: “Je mets aussi en cause le système de recruitment des cadres 
du Parti qui s ’opère pour l ‘essentiel dans une couche sociale déterminée: une fraction 
de la classe ouvrière, qui conserve tout son poids dans les directions alors que dans la 
société, ce poids relatif a diminué. ”53 In other interviews carried out among 60 party 
leaders at different levels, all those interviewed also criticised the way communist cadres 
were selected and trained. According to one Central Committee member, the main
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selection criterion was the candidate’s ability “to reproduce the discours o f  the top 
leadership; other qualities were examined afterwards”.54 Neither had the Party - in its 
obstinance to create trustworthy party men and women - heeded the earlier warning signs 
concerning “old-style” teaching dispensed to members o f  a new type.
To a large extent, the party schools had retained their simplisme o f the 1950s and 1960s 
even though they were now often dealing with students with a good secondary or even 
higher education. In the words o f Jean-Pierre Gaudard, "En bref, si des enfants de 1968 
pouvaient adhérer au PCF, se conformer, au moins en partie, à l ’idéologie communiste, 
cela relevait toutefois d ’un anachronisme. Parce qu’ils étaient de leur temps, ces 
adhérents ne pouvaient s ’intégrer aussi profondément que leurs aînés. ”55 It is also 
worth noting here that the 1980s witnessed the end o f identification o f the intellectuals 
with the PCF, the causes o f which Hazareesingh56 traces to the political and ideological 
intra-party conflicts after 1978. This break with the traditional past was officially 
recognised at the 25lh Congress in 1985 when the congress resolution made no mention 
o f the Party’s “alliance” with French intellectuals. The demise o f intellectual support had 
a considerable impact on the political teaching courses as will be seen from the study 
experience o f Gérard Leneveu which will be examined below.
Ironically, this lean period saw the inauguration o f the PCF’s magnificent new ’’training 
institute”, the Ecole nationale at Draveil in 1985, with accommodation for up to 200 
students; a provision which proved to be very optimistic indeed. The party leadership 
which, for a long time, publicly remained in denial about the Party’s decline, felt obliged 
to put forward “official”explanations for the reduction in student numbers after agreeing 
to the construction o f such a vast complex. Francette Lazard, who was la responsable 
o f the political education sector in 1979-84, admitted the low numbers in the 1980s but 
explained that they were due to the “great strategic mutation” that was taking place in 
the PCF after 1979 (i.e. the Party’s adapting itself to participation in the Mauroy 
government after the 1979-81 sectarian phase). According to Lazard, the role o f  the 
political education system was far from clear in the changed circumstances and much 
o f the party leadership was so busy adapting to the new strategy that there was no time
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to focus on developing new courses and fitting in periods o f training for militants who 
were in fact “better employed elsewhere, in practical tasks”.57
We are finally left with the question o f what kind o f people - as opposed to members o f 
given socio-professional categories and age groups - did go to party schools during this 
decade and how their training took place in practice. We shall therefore examine the 
study experience o f a dedicated militant o f the 1980s, namely Gérard Leneveu from 
Calvados, a train driver and a permanent-CGT at the time o f the interview, who, with 
his impeccable working-class pedigree and trades union experience in a large public 
sector enterprise, fulfilled perfectly the requirements for an ideal student o f the Party’s 
four-month central school. Leneveu’s itinerary also constitutes the perfect example o f 
a successful, gradual process o f political socialisation: the complete cycle from imbibing 
communist political culture in his childhood, youth, workplace and party, to a fully 
politically trained communist cadre, rewarded for his efforts by both social advancement 
and personal satisfaction.
“Ju squ ’au dernier s o u f f l e the ideal cadre of the 1980s58
Gérard Leneveu was bom  in Calvados in 1952 in a small rural commune o f  500 
inhabitants which had “always” voted for the PCF and had a communist Mayor. 
Leneveu’s grandfather had joined the Party soon after its foundation in 1922, and his 
father was a railway worker and CGT activist. Leneveu trained as a metal turner and 
started work in a metallurgical factory at the age o f 17 in 1969, at which time he also 
joined the CGT. He had been interested in politics since his early teens and had already 
participated in the Events o f May 1968. Before joining the PCF in 1972, Leneveu had 
toyed with various other ideas and had attended a couple o f  meetings o f  the Ligue 
communiste révolutionnaire. Joining the Communist Party was an “important moment” 
in his life. He started his political career as the secretary o f his cell and also became the 
organisational secretary o f the railway workers’ section (having by now left the factory 
and joined the SNCF). Promotion was rapid for the politically motivated young man: 
first to section secretary, then to the federal committee. At this point he was asked “to 
do the schools”. After the elementary and federal schools and the one-month central
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school in 1984, Marc Bellet, a local party leader and member o f the PCF’s Central 
Committee, suggested the four-month school for which the Party would arrange 
financial help to offset any salary losses. The school took place at the Party’s Ecole 
nationale at Draveil from 17th October 1988 to 3rd February 1989.
Leneveu’s course had 14 students including three women. The average age o f the 
students was 36 years, and they had all completed the one-month central school. All but 
one had responsibilities at section or federal level. Among the students were four 
workers, four ITCs, two teachers and four students from various other professions. The 
director o f the course was Denis Recoquillon, himself a product o f the central schools.59
The study programme included the usual main subjects o f philosophy, political 
economy, history, the Party and practical work. Although theoretical study was still 
considered the cornerstone o f the education programme and certainly gave treatment to 
historical issues, more and more emphasis was placed on current policy problems. These 
were dealt with in a series o f lectures focusing on themes such as “What is the meaning 
o f being a revolutionary today?”, “The Party and Sport”, “Technological issues, social 
change and rassemblement'’, “Capitalist exploitation today”, “The agricultural crisis and 
the PCF”, “The international dimensions o f the crisis o f capitalism”, “Women in today’s 
society”, “Struggles for the new international order”, “Europe”, “The PCF and the 
environment”, “The trades union movement”, “The PCF and the young people”, “The 
communist press”, “Political parties and changes in political recomposition”. Amongst 
lecturers were party leaders such as Jean-Claude Gayssot, Maxime Gremetz, Sylvie 
Mayer-Leroux (the PCF’s environmental expert and a MEP), Ronald Leroy (editor o f 
L 'Humanité) and André Lajoinie (the 1988 presidential candidate). Teaching methods 
at the school were designed to elicit maximum participation from the students, and to 
this end all participants were expected to prepare for lectures in advance by reading vast 
amounts o f  relevant reference material and joining in group discussions and debates 
afterwards.
Apart from the lecture-based theoretical subjects, the students were required to work 
hard at improving their oral and written skills o f communication. Pascal Santoni directed
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an intensive short course in oral communication which most students had difficulty in 
following as demonstrated by Gérard Leneveu’s hasty notes: “Ce n 'estpas un Gadget 
- I ’expression devant une caméra. Il faut communiquer. Les agents accueils [sic! les 
idées en général à partir de leur propre vécu. Il faut exercer une influence sur leur 
comportement. Il faut qu ’ils soient acteurs. Il faut que nous soyons accessibles, nos 
idées. ”60
Students were also taught to design and write political tracts. Pierre Zarka’s (from the 
Secteur Communication du Comité Central) course focused on the practical aspects 
involved in the planning and designing o f an “efficient” tract. For this, the students were 
divided into two groups and each group was given a topic, “Les salaires ” or “L 'Union ” 
on which to prepare their tracts. The following parameters had to be considered: the tract 
had to be tailored to suit its intended audience; it had to form a part o f  a larger 
campaign; it had to catch the people’s interest; it had to be kept simple and factual; 
finally, the tract had to be both “concrete” and political (“the Party, not a trade union”, 
according to Zarka).
Leneveu’s group set to work on “Les salaires ’’ and produced a couple o f samples (see 
APPENDIX 8, p. 240): one was a drawing o f a capitalist wearing a top hat, lighting his 
fat cigar with a 100 Franc note with the text “L ’argent des entreprises ne doit plus être 
gaspillés! ” and “DE L ’ARGENT, IL Y EN A!” Another suggestion was a picture o f  a 
gift-wrapped parcel with a huge cross drawn over it: "Les cadeaux aux patrons - ÇA 
SUFFIT! PAS DE CADEA U! " Finally, the group produced a sketch o f two people one 
o f which was “Yves”: “Je m ‘appelle Yves, je  suis régleur sur machines, j 'a i 15 ans 
d'ancienneté, je  vaene 4800 francs par mois. ’’ The other person was Liliane 
Bethencourt, the managing director o f the cosmetics firm L ‘Oréal: “Je suis Liliane 
Bethencourt, je  suis PDG de l ’Oréal, Yves règle MES machines, qui ME rapportent 
TOUTES LES 3 MINUTES 6000 FRANCS! "6I The students had obviously internalised 
the objectives o f their given tasks.
Another regular feature o f the travaux pratiques sessions remained the revue de presse 
where the students followed the main press for a week or more or chose a specific event
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and compared and analysed the reporting o f the “enemy”. During Leneveu’s four-month 
course, the main topic chosen was the public sector strikes in the autumn o f 1988. The 
students’ attention was drawn to the derogatory comments made by the “enemy” as 
regards the CGT’s “belated action in attempting to jump on the bandwagon” o f the 
coordinations (i.e., the rank and file’s co-ordinating their own strike action 
independently o f their unions, which was a new trend gaining popularity). At the end of 
this exercise there was a discussion for which the students had to produce a synthesis o f 
the task. Gérard Leneveu concluded as follows:
“Que faire? Continuer notre politique de rassemblement tournée vers les 
gens, surtout à un moment où ils luttent. Ne pas être frileux par rapport aux 
coordinations, quand cela doit ce faire il faut être dedans. Renforcer notre 
action dans la CGT, en s ’appuyant sur un critère essentiel. Veiller à diffuser 
L ’Huma sur les lieux où sa lutte, il faut amener le contre-poison aux idées 
dominantes. [...] Il faut que l ‘on soutienne les luttes, mais aussi et surtout 
que l ’on soit acteurs, avec les gens de ces luttes, afin de déjouer tous les 
pièges et manoeuvres qui nous serons tendus dans les jours qui suivent. Il 
faut que nous soyons en harmonie avec le mouvement qui se développe. ” 62
One cannot help but get the impression that the Party’s lack o f a coherent strategy was
reducing the PCF to the very cartel des mécontents it was so hard trying to avoid.
Amongst all the hard work the students were also allowed leisure periods, usually sport. 
As Leneveu put it, “never have I done as much sport as during these four months!” 
There was an ulterior motive for that: some students “tended to get a little agitated, four 
months is a long time, after all”, and sport allowed them to let off steam. The cultural 
programme included visits to the cinema, theatre, concerts, opera, museums and once 
to the Moscow Circus (this new experience was “o f particular importance” to Leneveu 
who had “lacked all cultural stimuli” in his youth).63 In the middle o f the school period, 
there were the Christmas and New Year’s celebrations (and a holiday period), and 
finally in February, a sumptuous repas de cloture (see APPENDICES 9 and 10, p. 241).
Right at the beginning o f the school, the students had to produce a written piece on their 
personal motivation for participating at the four-month school. Again, Gérard Leneveu 
set pen to paper to explain:64 “What has motivated me to participate in this four-month
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school which is, without a shadow of a doubt, one o f the most privileged moments in 
the life o f a militant?” First, it was important to expand “his field o f knowledge” after 
his promotion to new responsibilities in the Party. The truth - as perceived by Leneveu 
- was that “communists are not bom, they are made; and revolutionaries are not bom, 
they are made”. Having participated in the one-month school in September 1984, 
Leneveu had already learnt to make use o f his new skills in the railway workers’ strike 
in the winter o f 1986-87: “In that strike, I had already been able to put into practice the 
theory that I had learnt in the one-month school; I was able to link theory with practice!” 
Leneveu also wanted to learn more about the practical ways o f leading the “straggle”: 
how to design a tract, speak in cell meetings, do door-to-door campaigning and other 
propaganda tasks. Finally, Leneveu wrote, ‘1 hope that the four-month-school will make 
me a better leader and teach me to stand back and learn in order to be more efficient”. 
In this way he hoped to be able to convey his newly acquired knowledge to his 
comrades: “When all is said and done, it is not about keeping all the experience just for 
m e ,... but to utilise the enormous potential o f people who are ready to join us, even just 
to faire un petit bout de chemin ensemble. "
In his case, Leneveu’s expectations were more than fulfilled. Promotion within the party 
apparatus followed swiftly as at each stage o f training Leneveu was given a more 
responsible position.65 Going to the four-month school had equipped him to carry out 
his responsibilities in the trades union and the Party more confidently and efficiently 
than before:
“7 used to have difficulty in expressing myself in speaking, in writing ...
These days, I  write a lot. The Party has enabled me to develop on a personal 
level, too. The Party has given me the desire to discover ... everything! I  
could never envisage a life without the Party or political activities - can’t 
imagine it. Jusqu 'au dernier souffle! ”
In addition to acquiring practical skills, Leneveu had also made life-long friends: 
“When we left, we cried like children... it was very hard, we had got to know each other 
so well. We had lived under the same roof for four months and had forged close links. 
L ’ecole, ce n ’estpas seulement la théorie... " 66 For Leneveu, then, the ideological and 
practical training he had received, as well as the social aspect o f the school in the form
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o f strong friendships, proved the total reward for the commitment and personal 
investment he had made and left absolutely no room for doubt or reservations within 
himself.67
Epilogue: “L e Grand Sém inaire”68
Finally, after much study and analysis o f the experience o f others, it is only appropriate 
that we should attempt to give a description o f the “classroom reality”, i.e. a real flavour 
o f  what actually happens at the Party’s highest learning establishment, the Ecole 
nationale near Paris (see APPENDICES 12 and 13 p. 242-243). The author had the 
rather unique opportunity to visit the PCF’s central school in Draveil (Essonne), where 
it has been situated since 1985. The foundation stone was laid by Georges Marchais in 
1983, and the two large modem buildings on the 16 000 square metre wooded site were 
designed by architects Annie and Louis Soria. The property was donated to the PCF by 
Sylvane Gervais, a life-long party member since the Congress o f Tours, in 1920. The 
construction o f the new building was financed partly by the sale o f  the central school 
buildings in Choisy-le-Roi and Viroflay, partly by donations by party members. The 
impressive complex with its archives, library, a gym, outdoors sports facilities and a 
small park, is intended to remind the students and other members o f the proud traditions 
o f French Communism and the importance o f political education to the Party: 
“L ’ampleur et la qualité de cette réalisation sont à la mesure de l ’importance que nous 
attachons à cette activité d ’éducation des communistes. ”69
At the time o f my first visit in June 1991, the eight predominantly working-class 
students (Rabah, Michel, Jean-Michel, Robert, Yves, Gaétan, Placide and Daniel who 
had all attended the elementary and federal schools prior to coming to Draveil)70 were 
into the third week o f their one-month course. The first week’s theme included a 
discussion about the 27th Party Congress in 1990 and several lectures which reproduced 
some o f the Congress themes: “Scientific and technological revolution”, “Capitalism a 
society o f exploitation”, “The movement o f capital”, “The challenge o f our times” and 
the first lecture on Marxist philosophy. The week ended with a “discussion collective: 
point de la semaine ’’ to sum up the first week’s learning experience. The second week
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included another lecture on philosophy, practical work (preparation o f a tract), and 
lectures on topics such as “The workplace: what is at stake in the class struggle”, “The 
origins o f today’s crisis”, “Political and ideological recomposition”, and “French 
society”. During the third week there was a debate on how to orientate the PCF towards 
young people, a third lecture on philosophy, lectures on other Congress themes such as 
“The PC F’s programme for freedom”, “The PCF’s programme for justice” and 
“Socialisme à la française The students also visited the Central Committee, the offices 
o f  L ’Humanité and went to see a play (“Imprécation dans Vabattoir"). The fourth and 
final week included more lectures, independent study, a visit to the Musée de la 
Résistance and a discussion directed by the old Thorezian hard-liner Gaston Plissonnier 
about what it means to be a communist today. A whole day was devoted to the 
preparation o f the bilan o f the one-month school period and at the end o f the course, 
there was the traditional repas fraternel which offered an opportunity to reminisce about 
the unique training experience.
The daily routine o f activities was strictly time-tabled. Breakfast was served at 8 o ’clock 
with L ’Humanité and other newspapers distributed for early morning familiarisation 
with the latest party line and other news. Lectures started at 9 o ’clock and continued 
until lunchtime. Afternoons were devoted to personal study and sports (pétanque, table 
tennis, football) or more lectures. After the evening meal (usually between 6.30 and 
8.30), there was more reading, writing and studying unless an excursion had been 
arranged. An important part o f the daily routine was the rotation o f jobs such as the 
distribution o f post and newspapers, clearing o f tables and making o f coffee by the 
students. In this way, everybody was made to feel part o f the “team”.
At the time o f my visit71 during the third week o f the course, I was able to attend the 
lectures given by Pascal Acot, a researcher at the CNRS and a writer o f regular columns 
for L ’Humanité, and Daniel Cirera, member o f the Central Committee and the national 
secretary o f the Peace Movement.
Pascal Acot had been lecturing on Marxist philosophy at the central school for the past 
five years and obviously knew the ropes: “Salut les gars!’’, to which the students
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responded, "Salut Pascal! " The party practice o f tutoiement applied to the schools as 
well. Acot’s lecture lasted three hours with a thirty-minute break for coffee and pétanque 
in the park. At the beginning, Acot explained some basic terminology and invited 
questions “si Von ne comprend pas". The lecture turned out to be a polished 
performance by an experienced teacher: it was punctuated with many examples and 
illustrations and, at certain points, was delivered at almost dictation speed to enable the 
students to keep up with their note-taking. By the end of the lecture is was obvious that 
some participants were flagging and just mechanically jotting down what they could. 
The lecture was followed by a discussion which was scheduled to last one hour; but 
Acot had difficulty in eliciting questions or much response from the now exhausted 
students, for whom this lecture series was their first experience o f Marxist philosophy 
at this level. Afterwards, one student admitted that he had lost his fil rouge shortly after 
the pause for pétanque. However, everybody was unanimous in their praise for Acot’s 
superior knowledge: “Pascal, c ’est un sacré philosophe, ”, with “many publications to 
his credit” . However, they were confident that they, too, would master the intellectual 
ramifications o f Marxism which would be their “guide to action” and the “explainer o f 
reality in all circumstances”, as Placide put it.
The afternoon following Acot’s lecture was devoted to reading and independent study 
in the school library. After early dinner, there was an excursion to the offices o ff, ’Huma 
which was to be the bonding experience o f the week. These visits were a regular feature 
o f all central school programmes: they were intended to familiarise the students with the 
production o f “their” newspaper - “comment ça marche en pratique ". The guided tour 
was taken by Pierre Agudo, a journalist and himself a former central school student. It 
was a fascinating experience for all participants, in particular as it ended, by chance, 
with a reception given by the editor, Roland Léroy (see APPENDIX 14 p. 243), to 
visiting Soviet journalists (just two months before the August 1991 putsch). The 
stagiaires thoroughly enjoyed the company o f ‘notre Roland’, the “fraternal and 
informal” atmosphere ( “C ’est comme une grande famille", enthused one), and the 
splendid surroundings ( “Ce n ’est qu 'un outil de travail; nous y  avons participé tous ”, 
was the justification for the unexpected splendour). After the excursion, the warmth o f
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the welcome and the camaraderie o f my fellow travellers made it very difficult indeed 
- even for an outsider - not to feel part o f their grande famille.
“Peace, disarmament, balance o f power in the world and the new world order” was the 
title o f the lecture given by Daniel Cirera. To prepare for the lecture, the students had 
read Cirera’s book "Des missiles pour quoi? L ’alternative pacifiste ”, an article about 
the francophone countries in Africa (L ’Humanité 27.3.1991) and André Lajoinie’s report 
to the Central Committee (18-19.4.1991).
Cirera’s lecture embraced several main points: the Gulf War; the arms race; the process 
o f disarmament; France’s role in the above issues; the developing countries; the UN and 
the need to overhaul it. The main thread running through the lecture was the PCF’s 
stance on these main points, i.e. the Party’s categorical condemnation o f the G ulf War 
and the arms race, and its strong support for the disarmament process; the Party’s 
continued opposition to NATO (especially as the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist); and 
the Communists’ condemnation o f the official French military policy as being offensive 
since its sole purpose was to support Mitterrand’s idea o f the ‘‘rang de la France". 
Regarding the Third World, Cirera underlined the contradictions which existed between 
militarisation and co-opération, as well as between the military and education budgets. 
Finally, moving to the UN, Cirera criticised the UN’s involvement, or “its hijacking by 
the USA”, in the Gulf War which made it an “institution for war-making”.
The lecture was well received and followed by a lively discussion, as this time the 
students felt on firmer ground. There were questions on the role o f  the U N ’s Security 
Council, interventions referring to various points on the reading list, and also frank 
criticism o f the PCF’s “feeble effort” during the G ulf War: this was considered "une 
occasion manquée ” at the time, as the Party should have been in a “privileged position 
to mobilise people, to recruit new members” but none o f this was done “efficiently 
enough”. In his response Cirera referred back to one o f the Party’s main campaign 
themes: there was a clear necessity for everybody to redouble their efforts to achieve 
“union et rassemblement", as it was impossible for the leadership to act on its own. 
Throughout the discussion, Cirera allowed enough room for a structured debate,
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manifestly safe in the knowledge that his interlocutors were trusted militants, carefully 
chosen for their training course, and that it was unlikely that they would challenge the 
official party line in any way whatsoever. It was also obvious that the cadre schools were 
not devoted to a development o f the critical spirit but rather to an assimilation o f the 
current party policy (interpreted through and reinforced by theory); as demonstrated in 
the present and previous chapters, when that policy became untenable, another one was 
substituted and “taught” in turn.
When asked whether any students had ever seriously disagreed with their teachers or the 
party line, Lucien Bossu, the one-month director o f the Ecole nationale in 1991, could 
not recall such an incident. It “might perhaps happen at a lower level”, people “might 
find out then that they are not suited to be trained for responsible positions in the Party”, 
but at the national level, it would be most unlikely. This did not mean that the schools 
were “blind to constructive criticism” but nor did it mean that the students were there 
“to challenge the party line!” 72 The filtering process carried out in the lower schools 
would have therefore, it seems, ensured the loyalty o f the trainees at higher levels. Nor 
had Marcel Rosette (director o f the Central School 1956-63: see Chapter 4) experienced 
any such challenge: the students “were extremely motivated already”.73 Nicolas 
Pasquarelli (central school director 1962-66: see Chapter 4) had come across a couple 
o f students whose “interventions were not appropriate and they were asked to leave”. On 
the whole, however, it was “more likely that there would be problems as regards sexual 
promiscuity,” (four months is a long time, as Pasquarelli put it) “than with straying from 
the party line”.74 Finally, Henri Martin (central school director 1978-83: see Chapter 5) 
had not encountered any problems during his directorship although “once or twice, a 
student had left the Party after attending the cadre school; ga arrive, ... ”75
Given that the students selected for the training schools were by definition already 
partially ‘socialised’ into the Party, had been tested and observed ‘in action’ and had 
been through the early stages o f the structured system of the schools which weeded out 
any potentially unsuitable candidates, the teachers had a dream audience: attentive, 
compliant, keen to learn, motivated - and captive.
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Conclusion
This chapter set out to examine the development o f the PCF’s political education system 
in 1981-90, the final decade covered by this study. Three main areas came under 
scrutiny: the response o f the education programmes to the national and international 
events and the Party’s strategy shifts following its congresses; the evolution o f the 
student population o f the PCF’s central schools in the context o f the Party’s serious 
decline in all areas o f activity; finally, the itinerary and personal experience o f a modem 
communist militant in the communist education system, and a description o f “classroom 
reality” as experienced by the author at first hand.
The development o f the education programmes showed to what extent the programme 
planners were struggling to keep abreast with the zig-zags in party strategy which, for 
most o f the time, was driven by electoral exigency. The PCF’s innovations were always 
derivative as it was still adjusting to the agenda set by the PS, and therefore lacked any 
intellectual inspiration o f its own. In the 1970s, the schools had played an important part 
in introducing and updating party strategy and steering the activists toward and through 
the Left Union, but during this strategically chaotic period they had no comparable 
function to fulfil. The training programme planners’ answer to the incoherent turns o f 
strategy (the attempts to convey the Party’s see-saw tactics as regards the Socialist Party 
and the Soviet Union were clear examples) was to lean heavily on scientific socialism 
and to emphasise, perhaps more than ever before, the linking o f theory with practice in 
order to find a point o f anchorage. The reviews o f the study programmes - reviews 
which mainly gave treatment to current policy problems and were sluggish at best - 
remained strictly a leadership affair, supervised by CP officials and often led by second- 
rate minds. It was therefore obvious that as long as the Party’s Central Committee had 
the final say in the drawing up o f the teaching programmes and in the selection o f the 
students, the schools would remain firmly under the leadership’s control and continue 
to teach what emanated from above to an ever shrinking audience, already out o f  touch 
with the French political and social reality and utterly failing to generate any intellectual 
energy or excitement.
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The analysis o f the evolution o f the student population confirmed the continuation o f the 
trends which emerged in 1974-80: the slow “deproletarisation” o f the one-month schools 
and the continuing over-representation o f workers in the four-month schools. The 
decline o f the Party and the communist-dominated CGT was reflected by the dwindling 
student numbers, although there were other causes: the historic base o f  student 
recruitment, namely the manual working class, was eroding; traditional militancy was 
on the wane; the dissidents, for obvious reasons, were not available for political training; 
and the quality o f teaching had ceased to inspire many potential students as the Party’s 
intellectual and cultural resources were simply not up to the task.
One o f the main tasks o f the party training system had always been to select potential 
cadres and mould them into trustworthy militants who would serve in the Party’s middle 
and top apparatus and its various mass movements. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
purpose o f political education never was to radically change attitudes and behaviour - 
the educators were already preaching to the converted - nor to produce too sophisticated 
an end product. The main intention was to create, from a very heterogeneous raw 
material, continuity and homogeneity. To this end the system was mostly working as 
planned more than half a century ago: compared with the experiences and impressions 
o f  students before him, Gérard Leneveu’s account and the author’s own experience o f 
cadre training show indeed that, in the 1980s, a great many o f the PCF’s leadership 
training procedures remained virtually frozen in previous decades and had become 
regularised “rituals” from which neither the instructors nor the students could extricate 
themselves even if  they had wanted to. With their implanted vision o f a society o f 
exploited manual workers, the students graduating from the Party’s central schools were 
products o f  a by-gone era. The political education system thus came to be used as a 
brake on change and became a further manifestation o f the PCF’s inflexibility, 
immobilism and conservatism.
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CONCLUSION
"... Le PCF, comme dans une forteresse assiégée, croyait-il devoir blinder les coeurs 
et passer le temps en s ’abîmant dans la lecture et l'étude?
This study set out to examine the role played by the political education system o f the 
French Communist Party in the decline o f that Party. Our aim was to ascertain to what 
extent the influence exercised by the central control and direction o f the political 
education o f successive generations o f party cadres reinforced the French Communist 
Party’s general reluctance to change and thus contributed to the Party’s decline. It was 
argued that by skilfully utilising the Party’s organisational principle o f  democratic 
centralism, and by making systematic use o f its political training system, the communist 
leadership ensured the availability o f more or less “obedient clones” who would 
perpetuate the conservative outlook o f their superiors. It might be objected that this 
focus on a purely intra-party element has provided an unnecessarily limited and narrow 
account o f  the marginalisation o f the PCF. Equally, it could be asserted that the 
approach adopted in this investigation has emphasised the significance o f the Party’s 
training system at the expense o f the wider body o f exogenous causes. Before presenting 
the conclusions that have emerged from our investigation, it will therefore be useful to 
review the starting point o f  this study and the subsequent argument.
Another “voyage à l ’intérieur” of the French Communist Party
French Communism was in long-term decline well before the collapse o f Communism 
in Eastern Europe in 1989, the watershed which finally undermined the relevance and 
credibility o f Communist Parties throughout Europe. For many years, scholars o f French 
politics had been conducting studies into the decline o f the PCF and analysing the main 
contributory causes, namely the transformation o f socio-economic structures in France 
since the late 1960s; institutional factors, i.e. presidentialism resulting in particular from 
the 1962 constitutional reform, and bipolarisation involving the creation o f alternative 
governing alliances; the rise o f the French Socialist Party since 1974; and the sharp 
deterioration o f the Soviet image in French opinion, in particular since the 1970s. There 
was unanimous agreement that the party leadership with its orthodox regime and
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intransigent practices was the one common denominator, le fil rouge which ran through 
the process o f decline. The novelty o f the approach adopted here is that, whilst not 
denying the importance o f the other contributory factors, it focuses primarily on the 
party leadership’s own complacency and inability to adapt to changes which were taking 
place in the Party’s social, institutional, political and international environment. It was 
therefore important to begin by analysing these already established causes o f the decline 
o f the PCF, and then to test the hypothesis that the Party need not have been a victim 
o f unseen forces that led inexorably to disaster, nor a victim o f its history, but that at 
each stage, there were active choices to be made.
Our examination of the leadership’s own role in the marginalisation o f the PCF revealed 
the extent o f  the damage inflicted. Under its “workerist” and anti-PS leadership, the 
Party lost touch with the social realities in France. Moreover, the leadership 
miscalculated the équilibre des forces on the French left and ignored for too long the 
institutional threats; these miscalculations also led to serious strategic errors concerning 
the potential o f the rejuvenated Socialist Party. Finally, the unconditional solidarity with 
the Soviet Union as advocated by the PCF leadership caused the deterioration o f the 
image o f the entire communist movement in France.
This suggested that the roots o f the decline had to be sought primarily from within rather 
than without. An analysis focusing on the Party’s mode o f functioning and its internal 
dynamics revealed the extent to which the communist leadership was in fact able to 
make use o f the Party’s organisational principle o f democratic centralism in order to 
retain its disproportionate power. This in turn prompted the question o f why and how 
the Communist leadership was able to implement a principle - which seemed in theory 
to be highly democratic - in such an undemocratic way. The answer was simple: it had 
at its disposal a trained body o f functionaries and militants who would unquestioningly 
apply party policy and thwart any attempt to oppose it. Therefore, while democratic 
centralism formed the infrastructure and framework for the way the Party functioned, 
it was only permitted to do so within the context o f the communist theory and ideology 
which acted as the “cement” or discipline holding the Party together. Since the discipline 
o f  a Communist Party relies heavily on the conviction and commitment o f its members,
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it is evident that their loyalty to the Party would not develop to the necessary degree 
without a systematic strengthening of their grasp o f party theory and ideology. Theory 
and ideology therefore had to be taught. This provided the pons asinorum for our study: 
by dovetailing the functions o f democratic centralism and political education, the 
leadership succeeded in adroitly securing all the power in its own hands and thus 
ensured its own succession by ideologically reliable cadres.
The PCF was o f course not the only party to set up a political education system; nor was 
political education the only means used in the process o f political socialisation. Our 
investigation o f political education as one element in political socialisation revealed that 
the advantages o f an efficient training system had been understood by political 
movements at an early stage. We were also able to demonstrate that it was in fact a 
precondition o f formal political instruction that its recipients should have already been 
exposed to a number o f other agencies o f socialisation. This enabled us to establish the 
crucial importance o f the party political education system as the final piece in the jigsaw 
that made up the fully trained and successfully politically socialised “ideal cadre”.
Promoting trustworthy cadres to suitable positions was o f vital importance, and so one 
o f the principal functions o f the political education system was to select potential 
students for moulding into loyal militants to serve in the party apparatus and various 
party-controlled organisations. In theory, any PCF member was eligible to attend the 
party schools. In practice however, recruitment for the higher levels in particular was 
based on strict selection in which earlier socialisation into the party, manifestation o f 
political reliability and experience as well as social background were criticial factors. The 
education system was primarily designed to unify the behaviour and outlook o f cadres 
and to produce continuity and homogeneity - a status quo with no surprises or radical 
changes. In this area, the PCF’s political education system proved to be an unqualified 
success: the party definition o f the “perfect cadre”, an entity whose desired 
characteristics were compiled in the 1930s, was still recognisable amongst the alumni 
o f the PCF’s central schools more than half a century after the system had been set up.
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The PCF’s system for political training was set up in the 1920s. Since the early 
architects o f the education programmes had little understanding o f the workings o f a 
Communist Party and a very hazy idea o f Marxism, the training o f the party cadres was 
unsystematic and experimental, and mostly supervised by foreign nationals under the 
watchful eye o f the Comintern. Many PCF members received their higher political 
education in the Soviet Union. It was not until the PCF made the critical transition to a 
mass-based political party in the Popular Front era that the French party leadership came 
to fully understand the value and importance o f an efficient political education system 
to satisfy the Party’s urgent need for trained militants. The setting up o f a stable school 
network was also helped by the fact that by then, the Comintern-imposed bolshevisation 
process had been successfully completed in the French Communist Party. This resulted 
in the formation o f the predominantly working-class groupe dirigeant fondamental with 
Maurice Thorez at its helm. Thorez’s leadership group would remain solid until his 
retirement some 30 years later. Significantly, the Thorezian regime also bequeathed to 
its successors the rigidly structured training system which had already made a vital 
contribution to the creation and maintenance o f party unity and cohesion following the 
turbulence o f the earlier decade.
After the Liberation, the PCF began to mature as a complex political organisation. It had 
new responsibilities, both at national and local level, which required ideologically 
correct leadership skills and a far greater degree o f organisational cohesion than hitherto. 
It also needed reliable functionaries to operate the vast internal apparatus that had been 
built up, and trained cadres to direct its mass mobilisation work. By the 1950s, the 
PCF’s network o f schools was operating successfully at all three levels. Our 
investigation revealed the tactical logic behind the structure o f the party school network. 
It was noted how advanced degrees o f  political training went hand-in-hand with 
advanced degrees o f  involvement, commitment and advancement in the party. At the 
base there were the elementary schools, which provided political education for the new 
recruits, equipping them with a certain minimum o f political education and creating a 
sense o f commitment and belonging so that their membership would not remain merely 
nominal. At the next stage, the federal schools were designed for those who had already 
completed the elementary school programme and had certain responsibilities in the Party
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at cell, section or federal level. The apex o f this network o f schools was the one or four- 
month central schools which were intended for those with considerable organisational 
experience, leadership potential and an unshakeable loyalty to the Party. Candidates to 
the central school programmes were put forward by their federations; however, since the 
Secteur d ’éducation o f the PCF’s Central Committee made the final decision after 
consulting the student’s personal record, it meant that the selection process in the elite 
establishments was under the strict control o f the leadership.
Soviet influence remained strong in the PCF’s political education system well into the 
1970s and a important number o f the major figures in the Party were trained in Moscow. 
The selection process was supervised by both the PCF and the CPSU to ensure that only 
“trustworthy” people were sent. It is a testimony to their unshakeable loyalty and the 
efficacy o f the training process that even after seeing the Soviet reality with their own 
eyes, most o f them remained faithful to their ideals.
The study programmes were also drawn up by the Secteur d ’éducation. As the schools 
were not “schools” in the traditional sense o f the word, there were very few subjects per 
se (Marxist philosophy, political economy and history were central themes common to 
all eras); instead, the teaching tended to focus on various traditional or topical “thèmes " 
relevant to a particular period. The “thèmes ” were generally based on the resolutions 
and decisions o f the party congresses and accurately reflected the changes and shifts o f 
party policy as determined by political circumstances and developments in France and 
abroad (usually, in the Soviet Union) at any given time.
The study programmes were always backed up by an extensive and compulsory reading 
programme whose contents faithfully mirrored and reinforced the current party line and 
thinking. The practical side o f the course programmes was dealt with the teaching o f 
routine political tasks, travaux pratiques, whose content and form hardly changed from 
one decade to another. Study sessions were also accompanied by debates, discussions 
and group work the purpose o f which was to accustom the students to team work and 
also to “supervise” their thinking process. These sessions were directed by experienced
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party instructors who did not need to fear any challenges from their carefully selected 
students who shared their basic mindset.
This programme o f theoretical and practical study was lightened by a cultural 
programme which was first introduced in the 1930s by Etienne Fajon and remained 
subsequently a standard feature o f the party schools. “Teaching culture” - a job carried 
out by “reliable” party intellectuals - also followed the trends o f the era concerned, from 
the adulation o f socialist realism to more modem cultural concepts in later years.
By the 1950s, the political education system, then, already presented in many ways a 
mirror image of the Party. Like the PCF, it too appeared successful, enthusiastic and 
dynamic in the immediate postwar era; and just like the PCF, isolated from mainstream 
politics in France, the political education system then threw itself into the feverish 
counter-community life style in order to help preserve communist identity and values 
in the hostile environment. In this activity it proved its worth by maintaining the morale 
and motivation o f party members, militants and cadres and by acting as an invaluable 
mechanism for safeguarding the leadership’s authority, even when that leadership was 
physically absent (as Maurice Thorez was in the early 1950s). But the early triumphs o f 
the communist education system also contained the seeds o f its own downfall; the 
training procedures and methods developed in this era still governed the preparation o f 
French communist cadres in the 1980s and beyond.
Cautious changes in the PCF as advocated first by Waldeck Rochet’s leadership were 
reflected in the political education programmes, as they introduced the concept o f  a 
Common Programme to the trainee cadres and guided them on the path towards the Left 
Union. This was followed by attempts to change the rigid methods o f teaching by 
allowing more open debate and free discussion; again, this mirrored the PCF’s efforts 
towards more openness and flexibility in the early 1970s. Ironically, the PCF’s new 
strategy o f alliance building and opemiess made the education system’s traditional role 
as a reinforcer o f  party identity somewhat redundant in the early days o f  Left Union. 
However, this function was quickly reactivated when the communist leadership returned 
to its isolation and its policy o f centralité ouvrière. We noted that this policy was
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reflected in the social origins o f the central schools’ student population, in particular 
those o f the PCF’s elite four-month central schools, where students from working-class 
background dominated. On the other hand, coupled with the rise o f the middle class, this 
period also saw the emergence o f a new type o f student and party member, better 
educated and better informed than in the past, who now began to express criticism o f the 
“simplistic” study programmes and methods used in party schools. This new 
development was in clear conflict with the “reproletarisation” programme which the 
communist leadership, by systematically favouring the access o f working-class students 
to the higher echelons o f the Party, was preparing to implement at the precise time when 
the working class in France was diminishing significantly.
Throughout the 1980s the PCF found itself in a situation o f accelerated and unrelenting 
decline. As the leadership controlled the preparation o f the study programmes, the 
incoherent and vague strategies which were prompted by the Party’s needs to survive 
were conveyed to the dwindling student audience in party schools. While the training 
system had previously proved a useful means o f introducing, up-dating and maintaining 
the Party’s strategic choices, it now had nothing coherent to convey. The hastily 
prepared study programmes were merely responses to the mots d'ordre o f the party 
congresses and the Marchais leadership and lacked inspiration and intellectual vision. 
With the membership in decline, militancy on the wane, and student numbers less than 
half o f those in the previous decade, the whole relevance o f the education system 
seemed in doubt. The final blow came with the collapse o f  Communism; this was the 
last chance for the Party and the education system which it controlled, to engage in an 
autocritique and respond in a new manner. The Party would not, and the education 
system therefore could not; they thus continued to perpetuate the inflexibility, 
immobilism and conservatism that had been their trademarks for much o f their 
existence.
Bilan - globalem ent
What, then, has been the general contribution or usefulness o f the political training 
system to French Communism?
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From the Party’s own point o f view, the political education system fulfilled many useful 
functions, and its importance in propping up the organisation is beyond dispute. The 
training system clearly contributed to the preservation o f the PCF’s specific identity and 
internal cohesion in times o f trouble. It also pinpointed goals and provided ideological 
justification for personal commitment and loyalty, which in turn reinforced discipline. 
Moreover, the party schools brought together people from different backgrounds with 
initially varying degrees o f  commitment and varying interpretations o f communist 
beliefs. A further transformation then took place to give all communists a common set 
o f goals and values which combined to produce a “homogeneous” and trustworthy body 
o f communist cadres. This in turn helped to develop and maintain the feeling o f 
community, a sensus communismi, which was essential for the Party. The system also 
provided the leadership with an efficient instrument for centralised control and a means 
o f disseminating the party line at any given time.
This obviously called for a special type o f teacher, an instructor and a guide rather than 
a lecturer who might show off his or her own knowledge and thus undermine the 
confidence o f the mainly working-class and uneducated students. However, as the real 
“knowledge” remained the powerful and versatile tool o f the leadership, the Party 
predominantly recruited its instructors on the basis o f  their experience in the party 
organisation and their working-class background (although there never was a shortage 
o f trained schools teachers amongst the membership). Regular training and briefing 
sessions for actual and potential teachers ensured the correct interpretation o f each new 
syllabus which was issued as well the appropriate methods in taking classes.
For the students, there were considerable personal rewards in the form o f improved 
status and responsibility within the Communist movement. The training programmes 
were instrumental in elite recruitment and therefore important vehicles for social 
mobility, in particular in the case o f working-class students. The learning experience per 
se gave the students - most o f whom had only a basic education - a tremendous sense 
o f self-achievement and confidence in their intellectual capacities, which could only 
increase their feeling o f loyalty towards the Party, the provider o f the mental stimulus
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and tool o f their intellectual liberation. The academic aspect o f studying was an obvious 
attraction to disempowered workers o f limited eduction; at the same time, it also 
maintained the morale o f the permanents and militants by offering a brief period o f 
“spiritual” escape from the routine political tasks, in fraternal company and conducive 
surroundings, a time to recharge and sustain commitment - and to quench their 
bottomless soif d ’apprendre. Furthermore, the shrewdly planned and gradually extended 
teaching o f the vital elements o f  theory and practice at various levels provided the 
militants with a certain type o f behaviour pattern and language o f their own, which 
facilitated communication within the Party and thus formed yet another element o f 
internal unity and discipline. The investment o f  time and energy increased as the 
students became more involved and realised that they were in fact approaching the inner 
circles o f  the Party. For those who had been through the “complete education 
experience” there remained a feeling o f belonging, o f  a comradely solidarity, all o f 
which reinforced the esprit de parti o f the “believers” whose acquired convictions could 
then resist considerable shocks.
In sum, then, we now have a picture o f a tightly-knit system controlled by an orthodox 
and powerful leadership, a leadership who wished above all to ensure that it would 
eventually be succeeded by purposely trained cadres who would in turn obediently 
perpetuate the conservative outlook o f their predecessors. Stalin’s dictum, “cadres 
decide everything”, was taken seriously: hence in order to achieve the necessary 
ideologically sound “leadership material”, the Party continued throughout its history to 
allocate a large portion o f its human and material resources to the creation and 
perpetuation o f a political training system which aimed to mould men and women into 
political instruments. As it was the PCF’s Central Committee which had the final say 
on drawing up the study programmes, selecting the students and appointing the teachers 
(or supplying them from its own ranks), the education system remained firmly as the 
leadership’s chasse gardée; what it taught was strictly defined and regulated by the 
orders which emanated from above. This came out with particular clarity in the way 
changes in party line (especially as regards the USSR and the Socialist Party) were 
conveyed to the students. It is important to note that this political training system was 
efficiently safeguarded and held in place by the Party’s organisational principle o f
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democratic centralism. Furthermore, both training system and organisational principle 
were very closely connected since the cohesion and unity o f the communist party 
fundamentally depended on the discipline and conviction o f its membership. Thus, the 
internal political education system propped up democratic centralism by supplying 
“suitable material” to implement it, while democratic centralism in turn provided the 
framework for the dissemination o f the orthodox ideology. The communist political 
education system therefore formed one the o f most important institutions for the 
perpetuation o f the private and all embracing world o f  French Communism.
It has often been pointed out that the fundamental contradiction in the existence o f the 
French Communist Party is the fact that it is (was) a revolutionary movement operating 
in a non-revolutionary environment and circumstances, and therefore its decline was a 
foregone conclusion. However, our argument has been that there was no inherent 
characteristic o f the PCF which forced it to remain a victim o f its history and prevented 
it from responding and adapting to changes in the Party’s social, institutional, political 
and international environment. The fact that the Party did not in fact make this 
adaptation, and that its choices turned out to be the wrong ones, was the consequence 
o f the decisions and actions o f  the leadership at decisive tournants o f the Party’s life. 
The communist leadership, from 1956 onward, consistently thwarted the emergence o f 
healthier options which might have steered the Party into clearer waters, away from its 
stormy Stalinist past. Any significant changes in the PCF’s modus operandi that might 
have permitted it to take advantage o f opportunities on offer rather than allow these 
opportunities to be transformed into disadvantages, were always made too late - if  in fact 
they were made at all. Ironically, the PCF - an entity whose aims and very raison d'être 
were built upon the concept o f  radical revolution - remained an organisation with deep- 
rooted conservatism at its very core and its collective memory fixated by perceptions o f 
its heroic past.
For a long time, then, a carefully selected and trained elite contributed to and shared the 
successes o f the French Communist Party. What worked well for the PCF during its first 
three decades could not however withstand the inexorable evolution o f modem France 
and the changes in its international environment. But a culture in decline traditionally
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has enormous difficulty in understanding the fact o f decline, let alone dealing with it. 
Thus, when developments outside o f the Party, in particular as the late 1970s gave way 
to the early 1980s, called for more differentiated leadership, the system that had begun 
to mould party leaders in the Stalinist era became, in the hands o f conservative and 
intransigent leaders, a major mechanism for stalling change and obstructing 
modernisation.
None o f the arguments above constitutes a claim that the approach taken in this study 
can provide the one decisive explanation for the decline o f the French Communist Party. 
Rather, it is suggested that the role o f the PCF’s political education system, as utilised 
by the party leadership, was just one facet in the complex process o f the Party’s decline. 
As the PCF’s top echelons, in the furtherance o f their own ends, used the education 
system as an additional instrument for controlling le peuple communiste, this system, 
which could well have been deployed as a brake to the Party’s decline, simply ended up 
as a factor which mirrored and exacerbated this decline.
Notes and references 1
1. KRIEGEL, Ce que j  'ai cru compendre, op. cit., p. 564.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1. APPRENDRE, mars 1947
Vu précieux outQ pour ViJuoaticm tÂioriqyui 
et vivant* a» chatfus müLUtnt.
LES CAHIERS
DU COMMUNISME
G U ID ES PRECIEU X  POUR L 'A CTIO N
P a r  le u r s  é d ito r ia u x
fcd»ant m»n*u*îî*m*nt I* point d* la eituatlon 
pollüqus.
P a r  le u rs  é tu d e s
consacré« aux gronda prehlèmM da ï'eetu allié.
P a r  le u rs  c h ro n iq u e s
P a r  leu rs  d o c u m e n ts
TO UT M n r iA N T  o o r r  m i l  u o t e i  e u x  ■ C A JU 1 M  •  
• aum lrei .............. M ireocs
C.C. r**un r C.DJLT. «G U I
A drem ct W* d«m »raies d 'a b o n n rm rn l c l l u  com m andes au
OD.LP., Ii£ boulevard Diderot, Parls-XH1.
B üL L rrm  t r im e s t r ie l  n > m : f a r  l a  s e c t io n  c e n t r a l e  
DXDUCATION DU PARTI COMMUNISTE FRANÇAIS
NUMERO SPECIAL
— consacré aux — 
E X E R C I C E S  P R A T I Q U E S  
de s
E C O L E S  E L E M E N T A I R E S
MASS 1M7 N -7
Appendix 2. APPRENDRE, août 1947
passant cX*z chacun fe n tr *  met, bien quo sa commun* »oit très éten­
du* (car(«Ma camarade» »ont à 7 km. du bourg) »t P t t  U cmmttmà* 
U »mon, député, qui à fait U» cour». *
La preuv* ««t faite one fol* de plu* : U a u tt t  de « en occuper 
aèriwiaeaent poor réussir I
L ia  COU»» D I  PO»NATION MAAirSTILUCNTNTSTI A flOUEOCC 
Tou *  Ut toction en par le e t-  1 v* t
DU SERIEUX ET DE LENTRAIN
Citons la dernière école de Lille-O ntw , I X  le» membre* de* Ira. 
reaux de section ont visité chaque cellule pour le recrutement et U 
préparation politique de l'école, lia ont dlacuti et expliqué les buts 
• t  Futilité d'une telle école.
Sur vingt Inscrits, les quatre cours furent suivis par s c ia  élèves, 
dont sept femme».
Les cnraarades se sont Inquiétés de connaître l& raison des al>* 
fonces et sont allés voir chex eux ceux qui n’avalent pu assister 
à  tous les cour*.
Ces cours ont été vivants. Beaucoup de questions et de discus­
sions entre élèves, provoquées par le professeur.
Un vin d'honneur offert par le Comité de section a terminé gaie- 
ment le programme après qu'une photo de tous les assistants a it lté  
prise.
O o
Retenons enfin l’exemple de ls section de Chelles (Seine-*t-Mar* 
ne) qui a clôturé »es dernières écoles de section d’une manière re­
marquable.
A cet effet, un* soiré* récréative fut organisée un samedi soir 
dans une salle aménagée et décorée avec som. Les élèves et leur* 
familles cL-uent Invités. C'est donc devant plus de soixante per»on*
—— il —..... .. ...... ............ ................... arraJCKD».»
naa, sous la présidence des dirigeant* de la section, du tnalr*. des 
eonaeiUer» municipaux, que ne déroula, dans Fentbousiairme et la plus 
complète fraternité, l'agréable soiré* au cours de laquelle il y  eut vin 
d'honneur, sketch«*, chansons, etc.
Après 1a partis artistique, H y eut un* remisa solennelle, de livres 
à chaque élève : le* un* partiren t avec 1« magnifique ouvrage d’Ulne, 
« Las montagnes et le* hommes v ; d'antre» avec les « iKuvrea ehol 
aie« » d* l-éntûc, etc.
Rn se séparant, ceux qui s ’avalent pas encor* tulvi une école du 
P arti ne manquaient pas da dira : « On Ira à la prochaine ♦ >
L* Comité de section d* Chelles, qui mérite noe félicitations, a 
fait un effort dont de nombreuse» aectiona, nous an aorrvowui convain­
cus, ne manqueront pa* da s'inspirer.
S
« Uiijno>rtnrr n'a encor* ¿onum fi»  vide ii 
p*r«o»»f»i» I »
XA.R1. MARX.
irrur.nt>r*
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Appendix 3. APPRENDRE, décembre 1951. Etude individuelle ( “Fils du peuple")
Fuît*
j io Parti sc 
diri«*? runico I’occupa* 
lion dr la Ruhr (pa-
p«*« 4 W 3 ) .
1925• 1927 : P r e ­
mier* conim i* de Mau* 
rice Thor«  avec la 
réalité soviel ¡que. (Pa- 
6 «  49 & 51.)
1929 : UrlmI dr la 
ciiac économique mon-
dial«, (Page* 75 à 79.)
Im p lic a tio n  d r*  fa ils
La p o I i I i q ii c de 
Poincaré. politique im- 
|>éf ialine dictée par 
le* hommes du capital 
financier (le* 200 (a* 
mille* : Fils du peu­
ple, page» 93-95), e»l 
coin taire aux intérêts 
du la classe ouvrière 
non acnlcinent d'Alle- 
magne, mai» e unsi dr* 
Ftunrv, connue aux vé­
ritable* interri» de la 
nation française. (Pour 
plu* de deuil*, lire : 
André Mari)', « Le 
Parli Coni m u n t i l e  
Français, n i el forgé 
dam la ¡ulte con!re In 
guerre », Cahiers du 
Communisme, n* 12. 
1950, page» 33 à 45.)
Comparu isoli «ni re 
le* deux mondes r
—* le monde capita­
liste pourrissant où 
les tiavailleur» sont 
exploite», menacé» par 
Ica elìaca et le» guer­
re»;
—  le monde socia­
liste en construction 
où les travailleur» tout 
au pouvoir, où l’éco­
nomie «e développe 
sari» heurt» en vue 
d'assurer le bonheur 
de» homme» dan» la 
pai*.
N otion*  th é o r iq u e s
Linternnt ional ¡»me 
prolétarien et le pa­
triotisme lie sont nul­
lement contradictoires, 
mai* ront deux aspect» 
complémentaires de I» 
politique de la classe 
ouvrière qui, à notre 
époque, tend « s’iden­
tifier à la nation.
Fils du peuple, |ip , 
55-56 et pp. 96-97.
Apre» une periodo 
de stabilisation relati­
ve (1921*29), I« mon­
da capitaliste s u b i t  
un» crise économique 
profonde :
Voir e Histoire d u
P.C. (ù) de IU .R S . 
S. », tImp. IX, I  S; 
chap. XI, £ 1;
« Œuvres », livre U, 
tome 1, pp. 61 i  71; 
tome II. pp. I l  k 15; 
tome III, pp. 15 h 37.
StaLlr*S Les ques­
tions du Uni ni s me, 
rapport »u XVII* con* 
grò», cltap. I et II.
------- APPRENDRE
Réflexion» personnelle*
De meme aujourd'hui, le Parti a raison de 
combattre la aale guerre du Viêt-Nam, guerre 
injuste, contraire aux intérêt* fiançai?, guerre 
menée essentiellement dans l'intérêt de» impé­
rialiste» américain», et dont le» peuple* du Viêt- 
Nam et de Franc* font le» frai*. « Paix au 
Viêt-Nam » exprime le patriotisme et l'inter­
national um« des communiste* françaî».
11 noua faut poursuivre avec acharnement !» 
campagne pour 1# libération d’IIcmi Mfcr*in. 
Non* devons faire connaître partout que tus 
lutte a été une lutte patriotique.
Le» nombreux non-comrouniatcs parti» en 
délégation en O.R-S.S. cette année (métallurgis­
tes, médecins, universitaire»...) ont exprimé leur 
admiration pour c« monde nouveau en marche 
\er*  le communisme, el leur confiance dan* 1« 
volonté de poix do» peuple» el de» dirigeants 
soviétiques.
Le* chantiers du communisme, chantier» de 
1» paix, sont une réfutation concrète de* calom­
nies antisoviétiques.
Le développement de VMsoaiation France- 
U.RJSS. aide a dissiper le* préventions à l'égard 
de rU.ILS.S. de milliers de brave» gens, qui 
prennent conscience que la « civilisation » capi­
taliste signifie misère et guerre.
APPRENDRE
Appendix 4. APPRENDRE, mars 1953. Numéro spécial
MESSAGE
AU COMITE CENTRAL 
DU PARTI COMMUNISTE 
DE L’UNION SOVIETIQUE
C hert Comande»,
E n  cm» ¡mure» doidoureustt», où la m o r i bruirsi* 
de STAL IN E  noua frappe lois», al .cruellem en t, }* 
voudrai» voue d ire  combien /* partage la ¡seine im ­
mensa du  peup le  »ovi/tique et de to n  Parti «- ont m u ­
niste. S T  A U N E  était le chef, Pomi, le  frè re  de fou* le» 
travailleur» du  monde.
ll  fu t  et il restera noire guida el n o tre  exem ple. 
Les com m unistes et les travailleur» de France sauront 
t'in sp irer  de scs enteifnem ent», no tam m ent de  »e» 
derniers conseil» à la tribune du 19* Congrès du  Parti 
C om m uniste tle l'Union Soviétique duna leu r  lutte  
po u r lu paix et p o u r  i  indépendance nationale, pour  
la dém ocratie et pour le socialisme.
Je voudrai» aussi exprim er aux camarades du  
C ornili Central mes sentiment» d 'a ffection  fra ternelle  
et le» a ttu rer  de m on attachement indéfectible à h» 
caute de l'im m o rte l STALINE, la grande cause du  
com m unism e.
6 u m n  1 9 5 3 .
M aurice TIIOKEZ.
APPRENDRE
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Appendix 5. Letter written by Paul From onteil, accep ting  to g ive  a lecture on the
subject o f  “F ron t u n iq u e ” at the one-m onth central school in A ugust 1973
PARTI COMMUNISTE FRANÇAIS
FÉDÉRATION DE LA VIENNE
Le J Juillet 1973
Téléphone
- au Cde Directeur
ECOLE CENTRALE D'UN MOIS
V -  7
Cher camarade,
D'accord pour assurer le cours sur le Front Unique le 
MARDI ?1 AOUT à 8h 30.
D'autre part, je t'indique que nous avon3 à l'Ecole 
centrale qui se déroule actuellement un camarade de la Fédération de 
la Vienne qui eût un catholique.
Il me semble intéressant de te donner cette indication. 
C'est un camarade par ailleurs très solide politiquement et qui a 
d'importantes responsabilités au sein de la Fédération des Maisons 
de Jeunes et de Culture. Il s'agit du camarade 30UCHET Bernard.
y
Reçois, cher oamarade, mes sentiments fraternela.
Le S.P. i
Paul FROMONTEIL
Membre du Comité Central
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Appendix 6. Letter to Jean-Claude D elaunay, requesting him  to teach political
econ om y at the one-m onth central school in N ovem ber 1974
-co le  Maufica ïhoroz
t é l
lo 23 septembre 1974
?i Joan-Claurio Dolaunay 
94cOO - VTLLDJUI?
Cher Caraar.'-da,
Le développement important des éco les  
contrai ia de notre p ..r ti n éce ss ite  que noue dl-.rjïiB- 
slon s notre c o l l e c t i f  de professeurs:;' notanmont on éco­
nom ie-politique.
Dans une l e t t r e  que tu avais adressée à 
Henri Charvenot tu nous inform ais qu’i l  ne tf ita it  pue 
p o ssib le  d ’assurer un cours à l ’éco le ccntrulo d’un 
mois avant f in  1973. mais peut-fitre te  s e r a i t - i l  p o ssi­
b le  do le  fa ir e  à présent.
S i tu ¿ ta is  d isp on ib le , nous to s o l l io ite r io n e  pourlie  
premier cours d ’économie o o litiq u e  ( la  marchandise) 
dés le  début do novembre k l ’éco le  ccntrulo d ’un aoio .
3 ien  entendu, nous tenons k ta  d isp o si­
tio n  tous le s  documents ot informations complémentaires 
que te  sera ien t n écessa ire .
Duns 1 ’a tten te  do tu réponse et en t ’en 
remerciant d ’avance, reço is  cher Camarade nos fra tern e l­
le s  sa lu ta tio n s .
Pt la  d irectio n  de 1*écolo  
C olette M aillot
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Appendix 7. Résumé d'activité du militant (to be com p leted  by all applicants to the
central sch oo l in the 1970s)
RÉSUMÉ D'ACTIVITÉ 
DU MILITANT
No« d* Jeune Me .-----------------------
Deli m  lieu de nei***nc* 1 I [
* Avtu-voue euivi dee teolee ou 
«■See dene U Motwemere de le 
ieimee«* C e« « u o leu 7
Aditile
Otore (flnetruciion e« diplome» eventuale i .
Profeeemn d'i 
Nom de feet
lation
da travailleur*
•  Ctat-vou* lyryNtjue ? Depute 
quella data 1 A qual ayixttcat 7
•  Quali«» y aont una r»»ponaa- 
biUtde ?
• A vw voua tuM  d ta  éco>aa 
eyndtcaiae 1
• Appaneoea-voua è d'auHaa or-
• Quelite y  «ora va* raapoaaa-b4.te» ?
• Quelle* ont tie  voa reepenia-
bdlte» den» la Peru «apula voli» _______________________
adhemon 7
................................ ....... ... 1 1 .......... ..— ........... • Situation «a limili* ;
--------------------------------------------------------------------------  t u a « » , D
__________________________________________________________________  nauti* uwa Î  CI
Comb** evat-voe* «anfani«. de
• Avai-WMU «t* «andida! tua  * • * 1
elee Mona 7 (itola*) llglalailvaa □  .. .. .........—  ■............................................... —
c en tonala» Q  ■ ----- ----------------- ------------------------
municipale« □  _ _ _ _ _ ................................ ........... ..................................................
* Mandai» élacbfa t Waquet* f  
Quali«* «ala* f
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A p p en d ix  8. Tracts designed  by the central school students ( 1 7 .10 .1 988  - 3 .2 .1 9 8 9 )
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Appendix 9. "Menu de clôture ” o f the four-month central school 17.10.1988 - 
3.2.1989
M E N U  P E  C L O T U R E  
E C O L E  P E  4 MOI S  
L E  3 F E V R I E R  19*«
S A L A P E  C O M P O S E E  
S A U M O N  F U M E  
P E A U  Ö R L Ö F F ,
C H A M P I G N O N S  -  P O M M E S  P E  T E R R E  S A U T E E S  
S A L A P E  F R I S E E  A U X  L A R P O N S  
P L A T E A U  P E  F R O M A G E S  
O M E L E T T E  N O R V E G I E N N E  
C A F E
C H A M P A G N E
Appendix 10. Invitation to “AperoStroika ” by the students o f the four-month central 
school in December 1989
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A p p en d ix  11. Etienne Fajon during his interview  13.9 .1991,  at 2 p lace du C olonel-
Fabien, Paris
Appendix 12 , Ecole nationale du PCF, Draveil, Essonne, June 19 9 1
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A p p en d ix  13. E co le  nationale du PCF, D raveil, E ssonne, June 1991
Appendix 14. Roland Leroy, editor-in-chief o f L'Humanité, and the author during a 
study excursion of the central school students to the newspaper’s offices 19.6.1991
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A p p en d ix  15. “D es eleves h e u re u x ” o f  the one-m onth central sch oo l 20 .6 .1991
Appendix 16. Lunch break at the Ecole nationale, 20.6.1991
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